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Book Reviews

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Contents

The Changing Nature of World Power — Joseph S. Nye, Jr. — 177

Solving the Riddle of Tax Reform: Party Competition and the Politics of Ideas — David R. Beam, Timothy J. Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson — 193

Can Black Candidates Win Statewide Elections? — Raphael J. Sonenshein — 219

The French Double Executive and the Experience of Cohabitation — Jean V. Poulard — 243

Subgovernments as Determinants of Political Viability — Daniel McCool — 269

The American Exploitation of German Technical Know-How after World War II — John Gimbel — 295

Book Reviews — 311

Reference Books and Source Materials Received — 351

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Book Reviews

Thornton, The Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshaping America's Foreign Policy — WALTER LAFEBER 311

Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy — ROBERT A. DIVINE 312

Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon — RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF 313

Brown, Gandhi, Prisoner of Hope — DENNIS DALTON 314

Akbar, Nehru: The Making of India — GYAN PRAKASH 315

Caplan, Constitutional Brinksmanship: Amending the Constitution by National Convention — DAVID ADAMANY 317

Fraser and **Gerstle,** eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980 — DONALD R. BRAND 318

Harvey, Securing the Right to Employment: Social Welfare Policy and the Unemployed in the United States — FRANK GALLO 320

Lakoff and **York,** A Shield in Space? Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative — STEVEN LEE 322

Sarkesian, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics — MITCHELL POTE 323

Pugh, The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence — WILLIAM T. TOW 324

Booth and **Seligson,** eds., Elections and Democracy in Central America — LESLIE ANDERSON 326

Miller and **Lynn-Jones,** eds., Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy — PHILIP W. DYER 328

Mandlebaum, ed., America's Defense — WILLIAM J. DURCH 329

Laqueur, The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost — ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER 330

Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952 — JOHN M. MAKI 331

Steinberg, The Republic of Korea: Economic Transformation and Social Change — KYUNG AE PARK 333

Ware, Between Profit and State: Intermediate Organizations in Britain and the United States — ARDITH MANEY 334

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hartmann, From Margin to Mainstream: American Women and Politics since 1960 — Susan J. Carroll — 335

Barker and **Walters,** eds., Jesse Jackson's 1984 Presidential Campaign: Challenge and Change in American Politics — Charles V. Hamilton — 337

Pohlmann, Black Politics in Conservative America — Wilbur C. Rich — 338

Francis, The Legislative Committee Game: A Comparative Analysis of Fifty States — Gerald Benjamin — 339

Balkin, Self-Employment for Low-Income People — Eli Ginzberg — 341

Clinton, *Marbury v. Madison* and Judicial Review — Francis Graham Lee — 342

Braveman, Protecting Constitutional Freedoms: A Role for Federal Courts — Sue Davis — 343

Wenocur and **Reisch,** From Charity to Enterprise: The Development of American Social Work in a Market Economy — Barbara Levy Simon — 345

Friend, Seven Years in France: Francois Mitterand and the Unintended Revolution, 1981–1988 — John T. S. Keeler — 347

Lee, State-Building in the Contemporary Third World — Philip Oldenburg — 348

McDonald and **Ruhl,** Party Politics and Elections in Latin America — Paul W. Drake — 350

Maney, Still Hungry After All These Years: Food Assistance Policy from Kennedy to Reagan — Donna Wilson Kirchheimer — 351

Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment — John Gerard Ruggie — 352

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

JOSEPH S. NYE discusses theories about the decline of the United States that recently have become popular. He argues that these theories are based on arbitrary schematizations and that in order to correctly understand possible hegemonic decline, basic distinctions among the terms "power," "balance of power," and "hegemony" must be recognized.

DAVID R. BEAM, TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, AND MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON explain why the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was adopted by Congress in the face of staunch interest-group pressure. Their analysis emphasizes the increasing importance of ideas, experts, policy entrepreneurship, and the media in the American policy process.

RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN compares Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley's 1982 gubernatorial defeat in California to other statewide black candidacies in Massachusetts and Virginia. He suggests conditions for statewide black success and explores what is a necessary prelude to a future black presidential candidacy.

JEAN V. POULARD examines political cohabitation in France between 1986 and 1988. He argues that this experience of two political opponents sharing the French dual executive — president and prime minister — did not produce the predicted constitutional crisis and indeed that cohabitation has demonstrated the resilience of the French Constitution of 1958.

DANIEL McCOOL analyzes the changing conceptualizations of subgovernments — the alliances formed among congressional committees and subcommittees, interest groups, and government agencies. He identifies the factors that affect the ability of a subgovernment to influence relevant policy and then discusses the utility of the subgovernment concept in contemporary politics.

JOHN GIMBEL describes the post-World War II American program to exploit German scientific and technical know-how and reflects on the long-term effects of that program, especially on the Marshall Plan and Germany's postwar economic recovery.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Changing Nature of World Power

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.

Power in international politics is like the weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it. Just as farmers and meteorologists try to forecast storms, so do leaders and analysts try to understand the dynamics of major changes in the distribution of power among nations. Power transitions affect the fortunes of individual nations and are often associated with the cataclysmic storms of world war. But before we can examine theories of hegemonic transition—that is, some of the leading efforts to predict big changes in the international political weather—we first need to recognize some basic distinctions among the terms *power*, *balance of power*, and *hegemony*.

Power

Power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure. Power is the ability to achieve one's purposes or goals. The dictionary tells us that it is the ability to do things and to control others. Robert Dahl, a leading political scientist, defines power as the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do.[1]

[1] Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961). See also James March, "The Power of Power" in David Easton, ed., *Varieties of Political Theory* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1966), 39–70; Herbert Simon, *Models of Man* (New

JOSEPH SAMUEL NYE, JR. is director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government and director of the Center for International Affairs of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, as well as Ford Foundation Professor of International Security and associate dean for International Affairs at Harvard University. He is the author of numerous books and articles on international affairs and foreign policy. This article draws from his recently published book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (Basic Books, 1990).

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But when we measure power in terms of the changed behavior of others, we have to know their preferences. Otherwise, we may be as mistaken about our power as was the fox who thought he was hurting Brer Rabbit when he threw him into the briar patch. Knowing in advance how other people or nations would behave in the absence of our efforts is often difficult.

The behavioral definition of power may be useful to analysts and historians who devote considerable time to reconstructing the past, but to practical politicians and leaders it often seems too ephemeral. Because the ability to control others is often associated with the possession of certain resources, political leaders commonly define power as the possession of resources. These resources include population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability, among others.[2] The virtue of this definition is that it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable than does the behavioral definition. Power in this sense means holding the high cards in the international poker game. A basic rule of poker is that if your opponent is showing cards that can beat anything you hold, fold your hand. If you know you will lose a war, don't start it.

Some wars, however, have been started by the eventual losers, which suggests that political leaders sometimes take risks or make mistakes. Often the opponent's cards are not all showing in the game of international politics. As in poker, playing skills, such as bluff and deception, can make a big difference. Even when there is no deception, mistakes can be made about which power resources are most relevant in particular situations (for example, France and Britain had more tanks than Hitler in 1940, but Hitler had greater maneuverability and a better military strategy). On the other hand, in long wars when there is time to mobilize, depth of territory and the size of an economy become more important, as the Soviet Union and the United States demonstrated in World War II.

Power conversion is a basic problem that arises when we think of power in terms of resources. Some countries are better than others at converting their resources into effective influence, just as some skilled card players win despite being dealt weak hands. Power conversion is the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behavior of others. Thus, one has to know about a country's skill at power conversion as well as its possession of power resources to predict outcomes correctly.

Another problem is determining which resources provide the best basis for power in any particular context. In earlier periods, power resources were easier to judge. According to historian A. J. P. Taylor, traditionally "the test of a Great Power

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York: John Wiley, 1957); and David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics," *World Politics* 31 (January 1979): 161–94.

[2] See Ray S. Cline, *World Power Assessment* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955), chap. 9; and Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), chaps, 3, 4.

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is . . . the test of strength for war."[3] For example, in the agrarian economies of eighteenth-century Europe, population was a critical power resource because it provided a base for taxes and recruitment of infantry. In population, France dominated Western Europe. Thus, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Prussia presented its fellow victors at the Congress of Vienna with a precise plan for its own reconstruction in order to maintain the balance of power. Its plan listed the territories and populations it had lost since 1805, and the territories and populations it would need to regain equivalent numbers.[4] In the prenationalist period, it did not much matter that many of the people in those provinces did not speak German or felt themselves to be German. However, within half a century, nationalist sentiments mattered very much. Germany's seizure of Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1870, for example, made hope of any future alliance with France impossible.

Another change that occurred during the nineteenth century was the growing importance of industry and rail systems that made rapid mobilization possible. In the 1860s, Bismarck's Germany pioneered the use of railways to transport armies for quick victories. Although Russia had always had greater population resources than the rest of Europe, they were difficult to mobilize. The growth of the rail system in Western Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century was one of the reasons the Germans feared rising Russian power in 1914. Further, the spread of rail systems on the Continent helped deprive Britain of the luxury of concentrating on naval power. There was no longer time, should it prove necessary, to insert an army to prevent another great power from dominating the Continent.

The application of industrial technology to warfare has long had a powerful impact. Advanced science and technology have been particularly critical power resources since the beginning of the nuclear age in 1945. But the power derived from nuclear weapons has proven to be so awesome and destructive that its actual application is muscle-bound. Nuclear war is simply too costly. More generally, there are many situations where any use of force may be inappropriate or too costly. In 1853, for example, Admiral Matthew C. Perry could threaten to bombard Japan if it did not open its ports for supplies and trade, but it is hard to imagine that the United States could effectively threaten force to open Japanese markets today.

The Changing Sources of Power

Some observers have argued that the sources of power are, in general, moving away from the emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier eras. In assessing international power today, factors such as technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more important, whereas geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important. Kenneth Waltz argues that a 5-

[3] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 1954), xxix.

[4] Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1955), 248–51.

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percent rate of economic growth in the United States for three years would add more to American strength than does our alliance with Britain.[5] Richard Rosecrance argues that since 1945, the world has been poised between a territorial system composed of states that view power in terms of land mass, and a trading system "based in states which recognize that self-sufficiency is an illusion." In the past, says Rosecrance, "it was cheaper to seize another state's territory by force than to develop the sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial exchange with it."[6]

If so, perhaps we are in a "Japanese period" in world politics. Japan has certainly done far better with its strategy as a trading state after 1945 than it did with its military strategy to create a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity sphere in the 1930s. But Japan's security vis-à-vis its large military neighbors—China and the Soviet Union—depends heavily on U.S. protection. In short, even if we can define power clearly, it still has become more difficult to be clear about the relationship of particular resources to it. Thus, we cannot leap too quickly to the conclusion that all trends favor economic power or countries like Japan.

Like other forms of power, economic power cannot be measured simply in terms of tangible resources. Intangible aspects also matter. For example, outcomes generally depend on bargaining, and bargaining depends on relative costs in particular situations and skill in converting potential power into effects. Relative costs are determined not only by the total amount of measurable economic resources of a country but also by the degree of its interdependence in a relationship. If, for example, the United States and Japan depend on each other but one is less dependent than the other, that asymmetry is a source of power. The United States may be less vulnerable than Japan if the relationship breaks down, and it may use that threat as a source of power.[7] Thus, an assessment of Japanese and American power must look not only at shares of resources but also at the relative vulnerabilities of both countries.

Another consideration is that most large countries today find military force more costly to apply than in previous centuries. This has resulted from the dangers of nuclear escalation, the difficulty of ruling nationalistically awakened populations in otherwise weak states, the danger of rupturing profitable relations on other issues, and the public opposition in Western democracies to prolonged and expensive military conflicts. Even so, the increased cost of military force does not mean that it will be ruled out. To the contrary, in an anarchic system of states where there is no higher government to settle conflicts and where the ultimate recourse is self-help, this could never happen. In some cases, the stakes may justify a costly

[5] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 172.

[6] Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 16, 160.

[7] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), chap. 1. See also R. Harrison Wagner, "Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power and Political Influence," *International Organization* 41 (Summer 1988): 461–84.

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use of force. And, as recent episodes in Grenada and Libya have shown, not all uses of force by great powers involve high costs.[8]

Even if the direct use of force were banned among a group of countries, military force would still play an important political role. For example, the American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds.

In addition, there is the consideration that is sometimes called "the second face of power."[9] Getting other states to change might be called the directive or commanding method of exercising power. Command power can rest on inducements ("carrots") or threats ("sticks"). But there is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as it is to get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power – that is, getting others to want what you want – might be called indirect or co-optive power behavior. It is in contrast to the active command power behavior of getting others to do what you want.[10] Co-optive power can rest on the attraction of one's ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express. Parents of teenagers know that if they have structured their children's beliefs and preferences, their power will be greater and will last longer than if they had relied only on active control. Similarly, political leaders and philosophers have long understood the power that comes from setting the agenda and determining the framework of a debate. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions. This dimension can be thought of as soft power, in contrast to the hard command power usually associated with tangible resources like military and economic strength.[11]

[8] Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 27–29; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization* 41 (Autumn 1987): 725–53.

[9] Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework," *American Political Science Review* 57 (September 1963): 632–42. See also Richard Mansbach and John Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981).

[10] Susan Strange uses the term *structural power*, which she defines as "power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy" in *States and Markets* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 24. My term, *co-optive power*, is similar in its focus on preferences but is somewhat broader, encompassing all elements of international politics. The term *structural power*, in contrast, tends to be associated with the neo-realist theories of Kenneth Waltz.

[11] The distinction between hard and soft power resources is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Both types are aspects of the ability to achieve one's purposes by controlling the behavior of others. Command power – the ability to change what others *do* – can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power – the ability to shape what others *want* – can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and ideology or the ability to manipulate the

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Robert Cox argues that the nineteenth-century *Pax Britannica* and the twentieth-century *Pax Americana* were effective because they created liberal international economic orders, in which certain types of economic relations were privileged over others and liberal international rules and institutions were broadly accepted. Following the insights of the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci, Cox argues that the most critical feature for a dominant country is the ability to obtain a broad measure of consent on general principles—principles that ensure the supremacy of the leading state and dominant social classes—and at the same time to offer some prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful. Cox identifies Britain from 1845 to 1875 and the United States from 1945 to 1967 as such countries.[12] Although we may not agree with his terminology or dates, Cox has touched a major point: soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow. If it can establish international norms that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to change. If it can help support institutions that encourage other states to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it may not need as many costly exercises of coercive or hard power in bargaining situations. In short, the universalism of a country's culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity are critical sources of power.[13] These soft sources of power are becoming more important in world politics today.

Such considerations question the conclusion that the world is about to enter a Japanese era in world politics. The nature of power is changing and some of the changes will favor Japan, but some of them may favor the United States even more. In command power, Japan's economic strength is increasing, but it remains vulnerable in terms of raw materials and relatively weak in terms of military force. And in co-optive power, Japan's culture is highly insular and it has yet to develop a major voice in international institutions. The United States, on the other hand,

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agenda of political choices in a manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. The forms of behavior between command and co-optive power range along this continuum:

Command power	coercion	inducement	agenda-setting	attraction	Co-optive power

Further, soft power resources tend to be associated with co-optive power behavior, whereas hard power resources are usually associated with command behavior. But the relationship is imperfect. For example, countries may be attracted to others with command power by myths of invincibility, and command power may sometimes be used to establish institutions that later become regarded as legitimate. But the general association is strong enough to allow the useful shorthand reference to hard and soft power resources.

[12] Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), chaps. 6, 7.

[13] See Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

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TABLE 1

Leading States and Major Power Resources, 1500s–1900s

Period	*Leading State*	*Major Resources*
Sixteenth century	Spain	Gold bullion, colonial trade, mercenary armies, dynastic ties
Seventeenth century	Netherlands	Trade, capital markets, navy
Eighteenth century	France	Population, rural industry, public administration, army
Nineteenth century	Britain	Industry, political cohesion, finance and credit, navy, liberal norms, island location (easy to defend)
Twentieth century	United States	Economic scale, scientific and technical leadership, universalistic culture, military forces and alliances, liberal international regimes, hub of transnational communication

has a universalistic popular culture and a major role in international institutions. Although such factors may change in the future, they raise an important question about the present situation: What resources are the most important sources of power today? A look at the five-century-old modern state system shows that different power resources played critical roles in different periods. (See Table 1.) The sources of power are never static and they continue to change in today's world.

In an age of information-based economies and transnational interdependence, power is becoming less transferable, less tangible, and less coercive. However, the transformation of power is incomplete. The twenty-first century will certainly see a greater role for informational and institutional power, but military force will remain an important factor. Economic scale, both in markets and in natural resources, will also remain important. As the service sector grows within modern economies, the distinction between services and manufacturing will continue to blur. Information will become more plentiful, and the critical resource will be the organizational capacity for rapid and flexible response. Political cohesion will remain important, as will a universalistic popular culture. On some of these dimensions of power, the United States is well endowed; on others, questions arise. But even larger questions arise for the other major contenders—Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. But first we need to look at the patterns in the distribution of power—balances and hegemonies, how they have changed over history, and what that implies for the position of the United States.

Balance of Power

International relations is far from a precise science. Conditions in various periods always differ in significant details, and human behavior reflects personal choices.

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Moreover, theorists often suffer from writing in the midst of events, rather than viewing them from a distance. Thus, powerful theories—those that are both simple and accurate—are rare. Yet political leaders (and those who seek to explain behavior) must generalize in order to chart a path through the apparent chaos of changing events. One of the longest-standing and most frequently used concepts is balance of power, which eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume called "a constant rule of prudent politics."[14] For centuries, balance of power has been the starting point for realistic discussions of international politics.

To an extent, balance of power is a useful predictor of how states will behave; that is, states will align in a manner that will prevent any one state from developing a preponderance of power. This is based on two assumptions: that states exist in an anarchic system with no higher government and that political leaders will act first to reduce risks to the independence of their states. The policy of balancing power helps to explain why in modern times a large state cannot grow forever into a world empire. States seek to increase their powers through internal growth and external alliances. Balance of power predicts that if one state appears to grow too strong, others will ally against it so as to avoid threats to their own independence. This behavior, then, will preserve the structure of the system of states.

However, not all balance-of-power predictions are so obvious. For example, this theory implies that professions of ideological faith will be poor predictors of behavior. But despite Britain's criticism of the notorious Stalin-Hitler pact of 1939, it was quick to make an alliance with Stalin's Soviet Union in 1941. As Winston Churchill explained at the time, "If I learned that Hitler had invaded Hell, I would manage to say something good about the Devil in the House of Commons."[15] Further, balance of power does not mean that political leaders must maximize the power of their own states in the short run. Bandwagoning—that is, joining the stronger rather than the weaker side—might produce more immediate spoils. As Mussolini discovered in his ill-fated pact with Hitler, the danger in bandwagoning is that independence may be threatened by the stronger ally in the long term. Thus, to say that states will act to balance power is a strong generalization in international relations, but it is far from being a perfect predictor.

Proximity and perceptions of threat also affect the way in which balancing of power is played out.[16] A small state like Finland, for instance, cannot afford to try to balance Soviet power. Instead, it seeks to preserve its independence through neutrality. Balance of power and the proposition that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" help to explain the larger contours of current world politics, but only when proximity and perceptions are considered. The United States was by

[14] David Hume, "Of the Balance of Power" in Charles W. Hendel, ed., *David Hume's Political Essays* (1742; reprint, Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), 142–44.

[15] Quoted in Waltz, *International Politics*, 166.

[16] Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," *International Security* 9 (Spring 1985): 3–43. See also by Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), 23–26, 263–66.

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far the strongest power after 1945. A mechanical application of power balance might seem to predict an alliance against the Untied States. In fact, Europe and Japan allied with the United States because the Soviet Union, while weaker in overall power, posed a proximate threat to its neighbors. Geography and psychology are both important factors in geopolitics.

The term *balance of power* is sometimes used not as a prediction of policy but as a description of how power is distributed. In the latter case, it is more accurate to refer to the distribution of power. In other instances, though, the term is used to refer to an evenly balanced distribution of power, like a pair of hanging scales. The problem with this usage is that the ambiguities of measuring power make it difficult to determine when an equal balance exists. In fact, the major concerns in world politics tend to arise from inequalities of power, and particularly from major changes in the unequal distribution of power.

Hegemony in Modern History

No matter how power is measured, an equal distribution of power among major states is relatively rare. More often the processes of uneven growth, which realists consider a basic law of international politics, mean that some states will be rising and others declining. These transitions in the distribution of power stimulate statesmen to form alliances, to build armies, and to take risks that balance or check rising powers. But the balancing of power does not always prevent the emergence of a dominant state. Theories of hegemony and power transition try to explain why some states that become preponderant later lose that preponderance.

As far back as ancient Greece, observers attempting to explain the causes of major world wars have cited the uncertainties associated with the transition of power. Shifts in the international distribution of power create the conditions likely to lead to the most important wars.[17] However, while power transitions provide useful warning about periods of heightened risk, there is no iron law of hegemonic war. If there were, Britain and the United States would have gone to war at the beginning of this century, when the Americans surpassed the British in economic and naval power in the Western Hemisphere. Instead, when the United States backed Venezuela in its boundary dispute with British Guyana in 1895, British leaders appeased the rising American power instead of going to war with it.[18]

When power is distributed unevenly, political leaders and theorists use terms such as *empire* and *hegemony*. Although there have been many empires in history, those in the modern world have not encompassed all major countries. Even the British Empire at the beginning of this century encompassed only a quarter of the world's population and Britain was just one of a half-dozen major powers

[17] A. F. K. Organski and Jack Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), chap. 1.

[18] Stephen R. Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

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in the global balance of power. The term *hegemony* is applied to a variety of situations in which one state appears to have considerably more power than others. For example, for years China accused the Soviet Union of seeking hegemony in Asia. When Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping met in 1989, they pledged that "neither side will seek hegemony in any form anywhere in the world."[19]

Although the word comes from the ancient Greek and refers to the dominance of one state over others in the system, it is used in diverse and confused ways. Part of the problem is that unequal distribution of power is a matter of degree, and there is no general agreement on how much inequality and what types of power constitute hegemony. All too often, hegemony is used to refer to different behaviors and degrees of control, which obscures rather than clarifies that analysis. For example, Charles Doran cites aggressive military power, while Robert Keohane looks at preponderance in economic resources. Robert Gilpin sometimes uses the terms *imperial* and *hegemonic* interchangeably to refer to a situation in which "a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system."[20] British hegemony in the nineteenth century is commonly cited even though Britain ranked third behind the United States and Russia in GNP and third behind Russia and France in military expenditures at the peak of its relative power around 1870. Britain was first in the more limited domains of manufacturing, trade, finance, and naval power.[21] Yet theorists often contend that "full hegemony requires productive, commercial, and financial as well as political and military power."[22]

Joshua Goldstein usefully defines hegemony as "being able to dictate, or at least dominate, the rules and arrangements by which international relations, political and economic, are conducted. . . . Economic hegemony implies the ability to center the world economy around itself. Political hegemony means being able to dominate the world militarily."[23] However, there are still two important questions to be answered with regard to how the term *hegemony* is used. First, what is the scope of the hegemon's control? In the modern world, a situation in which one country can dictate political and economic arrangements has been extremely rare. Most examples have been regional, such as Soviet power in Eastern Europe, American influence in the Caribbean, and India's control over its small neighbors—Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal.[24] In addition, one can find instances in which one

[19] "New Era Declared as China Visit Ends," *International Herald Tribune*, 19 May 1989.

[20] Charles F. Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 70; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 32; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 29.

[21] Bruce M. Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985): 212.

[22] Robert C. North and Julie Strickland, "Power Transition and Hegemonic Succession" (Paper delivered at the meeting of the International Studies Association, Anaheim, Calif., March–April 1986), 5.

[23] Joshua S. Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988), 281.

[24] James R. Kurth, "Economic Change and State Development" in Jan Triska, ed., *Dominant Powers*

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TABLE 2

Modern Efforts at Military Hegemony

State Attempting Hegemony	*Ensuing Hegemonic War*	*New Order After War*
Hapsburg Spain	Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648	Peace of Westphalia, 1648
Louis XIV's France	Wars of Louis XIV	Treaty of Utrecht, 1713
Napoleon's France	1792–1815	Congress of Vienna, 1815
Germany (and Japan)	1914–1945	United Nations, 1945

Source: Charles F. Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 19–20.

country was able to set the rules and arrangements governing specific issues in world politics, such as the American role in money or trade in the early postwar years. But there has been no global, system-wide hegemon during the past two centuries. Contrary to the myths about *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana*, British and American hegemonies have been regional and issue-specific rather than general.

Second, we must ask what types of power resources are necessary to produce a hegemonic degree of control. Is military power necessary? Or is it enough to have preponderance in economic resources? How do the two types of power relate to each other? Obviously, the answers to such questions can tell us a great deal about the future world, in which Japan may be an economic giant and a military dwarf while the Soviet Union may fall into the opposite situation. A careful look at the interplay of military and economic power raises doubt about the degree of American hegemony in the postwar period.[25]

Theories of Hegemonic Transition and Stability

General hegemony is the concern of theories and analogies about the instability and dangers supposedly caused by hegemonic transitions. Classical concerns about

and Subordinate States: The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986), 88.

[25] The distinction between definitions in terms of resources or behavior and the importance of indicating scope are indicated in the following table. My usage stresses behavior and broad scope.

Approaches to Hegemony

	Power Resources	Power Behavior	Scope
Political/military hegemony	Army/navy (Modelski)	Define the military hierarchy (Doran)	Global or regional
Economic hegemony	Raw materials, capital, markets, production (Keohane)	Set rules for economic bargains (Goldstein)	General or issue-specific

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hegemony among leaders and philosophers focus on military power and "conflicts precipitated by the military effort of one dominant actor to expand well beyond the arbitrary security confines set by tradition, historical accident, or coercive pressures."[26] In this approach, hegemonic preponderance arises out of military expansion, such as the efforts of Louis XIV, Napoleon, or Hitler to dominate world politics. The important point is that, except for brief periods, none of the attempted military hegemonies in modern times has succeeded. (See Table 2.) No modern state has been able to develop sufficient military power to transform the balance of power into a long-lived hegemony in which one state could dominate the world militarily.

More recently, many political scientists have focused on economic power as a source of hegemonic control. Some define hegemonic economic power in terms of resources—that is, preponderance in control over raw materials, sources of capital, markets, and production of goods. Others use the behavioral definition in which a hegemon is a state able to set the rules and arrangements for the global economy. Robert Gilpin, a leading theorist of hegemonic transition, sees Britain and America, having created and enforced the rules of a liberal economic order, as the successive hegemons since the Industrial Revolution.[27] Some political economists argue that world economic stability requires a single stabilizer and that periods of such stability have coincided with periods of hegemony. In this view, *Pax Britannica* and *Pax Americana* were the periods when Britain and the United States were strong enough to create and enforce the rules for a liberal international economic order in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, it is often argued that economic stability "historically has occurred when there has been a sole hegemonic power; Britain from 1815 to World War I and the United States from 1945 to around 1970. . . . With a sole hegemonic power, the rules of the game can be established and enforced. Lesser countries have little choice but to go along. Without a hegemonic power, conflict is the order of the day."[28] Such theories of hegemonic stability and decline are often used to predict that the United States will follow the experience of Great Britain, and that instability will ensue. Goldstein, for example, argues that "we are moving toward the 'weak hegemony' end of the spectrum and . . . this seems to increase the danger of hegemonic war."[29]

I argue, however, that the theory of hegemonic stability and transition will not tell us as much about the future of the United States. Theorists of hegemonic stability generally fail to spell out the causal connections between military and economic power and hegemony. As already noted, nineteenth-century Britain was not militarily dominant nor was it the world's largest economy, and yet Britain is por-

[26] Doran, *Politics of Assimilation*, 15.

[27] Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 32; Gilpin, *War and Change*, 144.

[28] Michael Moffitt, "Shocks, Deadlocks and Scorched Earth: Reaganomics and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony," *World Policy Journal* 4 (Fall 1987): 576.

[29] Goldstein, *Long Cycles*, 357.

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TABLE 3

A Neo-Marxist View of Hegemony

Hegemony	*World War Securing Hegemony*	*Period of Dominance*	*Decline*
Dutch	Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648	1620–1650	1650–1672
British	Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815	1815–1873	1873–1896
American	World Wars I and II, 1914–1945	1945–1967	1967–

Source: Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 41–42.

trayed by Gilpin and others as hegemonic. Did Britain's military weakness at that time allow the United States and Russia, the two larger economies, to remain mostly outside the liberal system of free trade? Or, to take a twentieth-century puzzle, did a liberal international economy depend on postwar American military strength or only its economic power? Are both conditions necessary today, or have modern nations learned to cooperate through international institutions?

One radical school of political economists, the neo-Marxists, has attempted to answer similar questions about the relationship between economic and military hegemony, but their theories are unconvincing. For example, Immanuel Wallerstein defines hegemony as a situation in which power is so unbalanced that

> one power can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at the very least by effective veto power) in the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas. The material base of such power lies in the ability of enterprises domiciled in that power to operate more efficiently in all three major economic arenas—agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance.[30]

According to Wallerstein, hegemony is rare and "refers to that short interval in which there is simultaneously advantage in all three economic domains." At such times, the other major powers become "*de facto* client states." Wallerstein claims there have been only three modern instances of hegemony—in the Netherlands, 1620–1650; in Britain, 1815–1873; and in the United States, 1945–1967. (See Table 3.) He argues that "in each case, the hegemony was secured by a thirty-year-long world war," after which a new order followed—the Peace of Westphalia after 1648; the Concert of Europe after 1815; and the United Nations–Bretton Woods system after 1945.[31] According to this theory, the United States will follow the Dutch and the British path to decline.

The neo-Marxist view of hegemony is unconvincing and a poor predictor of future events because it superficially links military and economic hegemony and has many loose ends. For example, contrary to Wallerstein's theory, the Thirty

[30] Immanuel M. Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations: Essays* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 38, 41.

[31] Ibid.

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TABLE 4

Long Cycles of World Leadership

Cycle	*Global War*	*Preponderance*	*Decline*
1495–1580	1494–1516	Portugal, 1516–1540	1540–1580
1580–1688	1580–1609	Netherlands, 1609–1640	1640–1688
1688–1792	1688–1713	Britain, 1714–1740	1740–1792
1792–1914	1792–1815	Britain, 1815–1850	1850–1914
1914–	1914–1945	United States, 1945–1973	1973–

Source: George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 40, 42, 44, 102, 131, 147.

Years' War *coincided* with Dutch hegemony, and Dutch decline began with the Peace of Westphalia. The Dutch were not militarily strong enough to stand up to the British on the sea and could barely defend themselves against the French on land, "despite their trade-derived wealth."[32] Further, although Wallerstein argues that British hegemony began after the Napoleonic Wars, he is not clear about how the new order in the balance of power—that is, the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe—related to Britain's supposed ability to impose a global free-trade system. For example, Louis XIV's France, which many historians view as the dominant military power in the second half of the seventeenth century, is excluded from Wallerstein's schema altogether. Thus, the neo-Marxist historical analogies seem forced into a Procrustean ideological bed, while other cases are left out of bed altogether.

Others have attempted to organize past periods of hegemony into century-long cycles. In 1919, British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder argued that unequal growth among nations tends to produce a hegemonic world war about every hundred years.[33] More recently, political scientist George Modelski proposed a hundred-year cyclical view of changes in world leadership. (See Table 4.) In this view, a long cycle begins with a major global war. A single state then emerges as the new world power and legitimizes its preponderance with postwar peace treaties. (Preponderance is defined as having at least half the resources available for global order-keeping.) The new leader supplies security and order for the international system. In time, though, the leader loses legitimacy, and deconcentration of power leads to another global war. The new leader that emerges from that war may not be the state that challenged the old leader but one of the more innovative allies in the winning coalition (as, not Germany, but the United States replaced Britain). According to Modelski's theory, the United States began its decline in 1973.[34] If

[32] Goldstein, *Long Cycles*, 317.

[33] Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1919), 1–2.

[34] George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies*

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his assumptions are correct, it may be Japan and not the Soviet Union that will most effectively challenge the United States in the future.

Modelski and his followers suggest that the processes of decline are associated with long waves in the global economy. They associate a period of rising prices and resource scarcities with loss of power, and concentration of power with falling prices, resource abundance, and economic innovation.[35] However, in linking economic and political cycles, these theorists become enmeshed in the controversy surrounding long cycle theory. Many economists are skeptical about the empirical evidence for alleged long economic waves and about dating historical waves by those who use the concept.[36]

Further, we cannot rely on the long-cycle theory to predict accurately the American future. Modelski's treatment of political history is at best puzzling. For example, he ranks sixteenth-century Portugal as a hegemon rather than Spain, even though Spain controlled a richer overseas empire and swallowed up Portugal a century later. Likewise, Britain is ranked as a hegemon from 1714 to 1740, even though eighteenth-century France was the larger power. Modelski's categories are odd in part because he uses naval power as the sine qua non of global power, which results in a truncated view of military and diplomatic history. Although naval power was more important for countries that relied on overseas possessions, the balance in Europe depended on the armies on the continent. Britain could not afford to ignore its armies on land and rely solely on its naval power. To preserve the balance of power, Britain had to be heavily involved in land wars on the European continent at the beginning of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. More specifically, Modelski underrates the Spanish navy in the sixteenth century as well as the French navy, which outnumbered Britain's, in the late seventeenth century.[37] Some major wars, such as the Thirty Years' War and the Anglo-French wars of the eighteenth century, are excluded altogether from Modelski's organization of history.

Vague definitions and arbitrary schematizations alert us to the inadequacies of such grand theories of hegemony and decline. Most theorists of hegemonic transition tend to shape history to their own theories by focusing on particular power resources and ignoring others. Examples include the poorly explained relationship between military and political power and the unclear link between decline and major war. Since there have been wars among the great powers during 60 per-

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in Society and History 20 (April 1978): 214-35; George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987).

[35] William R. Thompson, *On Global War: Historical Structural Approaches to World Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), chaps. 3, 8.

[36] Richard N. Rosecrance, "Long Cycle Theory and International Relations," *International Organization* 41 (Spring 1987): 291-95. An interesting but ultimately unconvincing discussion can be found in Goldstein, *Long Cycles*.

[37] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), 99.

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cent of the years from 1500 to the present, there are plenty of candidates to associate with any given scheme.[38] Even if we consider only the nine general wars that have involved nearly all the great powers and produced high levels of casualties, some of them, such as the Seven Years' War (1755–1763), are not considered hegemonic in any of the schemes. As sociologist Pitirim Sorokin concludes, "no regular periodicity is noticeable."[39] At best, the various schematizations of hegemony and war are only suggestive. They do not provide a reliable basis for predicting the future of American power or for evaluating the risk of world war as we enter the twenty-first century. Loose historical analogies about decline and falsely deterministic political theories are not merely academic: they may lead to inappropriate policies. The real problems of a post-cold-war world will not be new challenges for hegemony, but the new challenges of transnational interdependence.

[38] Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* 40 (October 1987): 82-107. See also Jack S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1983), 97.

[39] Pitirim Aleksandrovich Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics: A Study of Change in Major Systems of Art, Truth, Ethics, Law and Social Relationships* (1957; reprint, Boston: Porter Sargent, 1970), 561.

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Solving the Riddle of Tax Reform: Party Competition and the Politics of Ideas

DAVID R. BEAM
TIMOTHY J. CONLAN
MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON

Observers of the American policy process have long been concerned by its seeming inability to respond to changing conditions and citizen demands in a timely and coherent manner. This concern gained prominence with James MacGregor Burns's warnings about "deadlock and drift" during the early 1960s.[1] More recently, continuing charges of "stalemate," "delay," and "gridlock" have given rise to serious proposals for constitutional modifications.[2]

The enactment of policies that pit the interest of the broad, unorganized public against those of concentrated, highly organized special interests is considered particularly difficult. Tax policy seemingly exemplifies this problem, as the tax writing committees of congress have presided over a massive proliferation of credits, deductions, and exemptions thought to benefit such narrow interests at the expense of

[1] James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

[2] See especially Lloyd N. Cutler, "To Form a Government," *Foreign Affairs* 59 (Fall 1980): 126–43; and James L. Sundquist, *Constitutional Reform and Effective Government* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986). Also relevant and recent is John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989).

DAVID R. BEAM is associate professor of public administration, Illinois Institute of Technology. His most recent book is *Business Strategy and Public Policy: Perspectives from Industry and Academia.* TIMOTHY J. CONLAN is associate professor of government and politics, George Mason University and the author of *New Federalism: Intergovernmental Reform from Nixon to Reagan.* MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON, senior evaluator, United States General Accounting Office, is coauthor of *Managing Regulatory Reform: The Reagan Strategy and Its Impact.*

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both the tax-paying public and the integrity of the tax code itself.[3] This pattern of tax policy making appeared so deeply entrenched that enactment of comprehensive income tax reform was almost universally considered impossible prior to the passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA). After a thorough review of previous reform efforts, political scientist John Witte quite rightly declared that

> There is nothing, absolutely nothing in the history or politics of the income tax that indicates that any of these [contemporary tax reform] schemes has the slightest hope of being enacted in the forms proposed.[4]

Reform proposals were "doomed to failure," economist David G. Davies concurred in 1986.[5] Virtually all participants in the legislative process also believed that success was highly unlikely, both prior to and throughout the bill's consideration.[6]

Nonetheless, the TRA passed both houses of Congress by wide margins and was signed into law by Ronald Reagan on 22 October 1986. Although the tax reform battle is now history, this unanticipated outcome challenges scholars to reconsider conventional theories of politics and policy making.[7] It offers insight not only into tax policy, but into the adoption of other nonincremental policies ranging

[3] See Stanley S. Surrey, *Pathways to Tax Reform* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973); Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, *Tax Expenditures* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); and Joseph A. Pechman, *Federal Tax Policy*, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983).

[4] John F. Witte, *The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 380.

[5] David G. Davies, *United States Taxes and Tax Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 287.

[6] Interview with Rep. Dan Rostenkowski, 12 March 1987. Subsequent quotations that lack specific attribution were obtained from some seventy interviews conducted between 1986 and 1988 as part of a broader research project from which this article is drawn. See Timothy J. Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Beam, *Taxing Choices: The Politics of Tax Reform* (Washington: CQ Press, 1990).

[7] For this reason, and because of its drama and significance, adoption of the TRA has attracted the attention of a number of scholars. Some of these analysts reach interpretations paralleling parts of the one offered here. See James M. Verdier, "The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Some Lessons of Policy Change" (paper delivered at the annual research conference of the Association for Public Policy and Management, 1986); Verdier, "The President, Congress, and Tax Reform: Patterns over Three Decades," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 499 (September 1988): 114–123; Randall Strahan, "Committee Politics and Tax Reform" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1987); Joseph J. Minarik, "How Tax Reform Came About," *Tax Notes*, 28 December 1987, 1359–1373; Dennis Coyle and Aaron Wildavksy, "Requisites of Radical Reform: Income Maintenance versus Tax Preferences," *Journal of Public Analysis and Management* 7 (Fall 1987): 1–16; Swen Steinmo, "Shaping Policy Preferences: Political Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden, and Britain" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1988); Gary Mucciaroni, "The Politics of Comprehensive Tax Reform" (unpublished ms., September 1988). A detailed account by two journalists closely involved in the process is Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray, *Showdown at Gucci Gultch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform* (New York: Random House, 1987). This article is a revision of the preliminary statement of our own findings presented at the 1988 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

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from consumer and environmental protection to deregulation, where outcomes also surprised seasoned observers. Collectively, the acceptance of these policies raises important questions about and helps to illuminate changes in the national policy process itself.

Tax Reform and Traditional Policy Models

Business as Usual: The Pluralist-Incrementalist Perspective

Standard interpretations of business as usual in Washington usually employ what may be termed the pluralist-incrementalist approach. Pluralism interprets policy making principally as a process of adjustment among contending organized interests. Politicians are seen as brokers among active claimants whose influence varies with the extent of their politically relevant resources. Legislatures essentially "referee the group struggle," ratifying interest-group victories and defeats in statutory form, as Earl Latham once wrote.[8]

The theory of incrementalism, to which pluralism is often wedded, emphasizes outcomes as well as processes. It recognizes that most new policies involve only small departures from their predecessors, in part because no individual can rationally evaluate all the means to multitudinous ends. Incrementalism also has a strong political rationale, however, as incremental change is normally the path of least resistance where there is a pluralistic distribution of power. Because the existing allocation of benefits should conform to the allocation of political influence, any attempt to dramatically revise policy would spark heated opposition.

Tax Reform and the Limits of Pluralism. The traditional pattern of U.S. tax politics has been a variant of this pluralist-incrementalist model.[9] Although the federal income tax has grown enormously in fiscal importance and complexity since 1913, it has not changed in basic structure, and proposals to replace or greatly modify it have never advanced far. Further, the creation and expansion of tax preferences, which is the most obvious trend, is typically attributed to the influence of organized groups.[10]

Traditional interest-group politics can hardly explain TRA's enactment, however. Indeed, the anticipated and actual opposition of organized interests was a principal source of the pessimism about its political prospects. According to the familiar logic of the free-rider problem, only narrow interests find it economically profitable to organize and expend sufficient resources to influence most policies. The public interest tends to go unrepresented because, as Davies argued, "taxpayers remain rationally ignorant of tax matters" due to the high costs of participation. For this reason, he stressed that small but powerful organizations hold tax writing

[8] Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Politics," *American Political Science Review* 46 (June 1952): 390.

[9] See Witte, *Politics and Development*.

[10] The classic statement is Stanley S. Surrey, "The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist: How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted," *Harvard Law Review* 70 (May 1957): 1145–1182.

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committees as "virtual prisoners."[11] Other observers, noting that committee members were recipients of unusually large amounts of political action committee (PAC) contributions, agreed that the bill "is likely to go no place, and the reason is that all the groups that benefit from the current system are all big contributors."[12] A cynical Senate aide even predicted that Congress would consider reform legislation only long enough to allow each player "to raise a couple million for the next campaign."

Such predictions proved wrong. Though TRA was heavily lobbied from shortly after its origin in the Treasury to the vote on the Senate floor, in the end, combined efforts by well-organized, well-heeled opponents failed to block or even greatly alter the outline of this landmark legislation. It is true that interest groups—and pluralist politics in general—had some effect on the TRA. Certain provisions affecting large constituencies or well organized groups with strong support on the tax writing committees emerged relatively intact, such as home mortgage deductions and most fringe benefits. Others were granted favorable transition rules. Nonetheless, tax reform gave new meaning to the term "winning." Whereas past legislative victories earned expansions of tax benefits, winning on TRA mostly meant reducing the anticipated damage.

It is also true that a pluralist bargaining strategy was employed by key institutional leaders at different points along the way. Indeed, then-Treasury Secretary James Baker made interest-group accommodation the hallmark of the administration's second draft bill, dubbed "Treasury II," which was released in May 1985. (Treasury I was released to the public in November 1984.) Unlike his predecessor, Don Regan—who believed that when it came to tax reform "the best politics is no politics"[13]—Baker thought instinctively in terms of coalition building and opened the doors of the once-secret Treasury process to groups of every stripe. The initial proposal, Treasury I, "was probably very good tax policy," he acknowledged, "but it had little if any chance of being enacted. With something this big and comprehensive, it's important from the very start to think about the coalitions that you are going to need to put together in order to get it passed."

Congressional leaders, too, blended reform ideas with group demands to produce legislation uniquely structured to pass their respective committees and chambers. After a near brush with failure, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski redefined his coalition during mark-up, conceding on provisions crucial to House Democrats and coopting committee members by allowing them to carve up portions of the pie to their own liking. Similarly, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Robert Packwood's first and unsuccessful attempt to de-

[11] Davies, *United States Taxes and Tax Policy*, 285.

[12] Quoted in *Tax Notes*, 31 December 1985, 1. On contributions to committee members see "Pacing the Deck," *Common Cause News*, 13 June 1985, 1; "Gimme a Break," *Common Cause News*, 11 February 1986; and *Financing the Finance Committee*, Common Cause, Washington, D.C., March 1986.

[13] Donald T. Regan, *For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1988), 213.

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velop a reform bill testified to the power of committee members' alliances with various constituencies and interest groups. After pluralistic politics collapsed in failure, Packwood successfully gambled on a radical reform plan—but only on the individual side of the tax code. His committee still deferred to powerful interests on the corporate side.

In such instances, pluralist bargaining assuredly helped move tax reform along and restricted the scope of legislative change. Without these accommodations, it is doubtful that Baker would have produced a proposal acceptable to the president and his Republican constituencies, that Rostenkowski would have gained essential Democratic support in the House, or that Packwood would have been able to send a bill to the Senate floor.

However, this bargaining was different in scope and character from that observed in ordinary tax bills or predicted by pluralist-incrementalist theories. It did not provide the motive force behind reform legislation, nor did it define the act's contours. Group bargaining and pluralist coalition building simply offered side payments designed to make congressionally unpopular legislation passable. Furthermore, many of these group victories did not survive: thanks to scathing press criticism, the excesses of group bargaining and accommodation often led to their undoing. The requirements of the conference committee process also left little room for accommodating interest groups. What was devised as final legislation was neither as kind to Democratic constituencies as the House bill nor to corporations as the Senate's.

In overall character then, TRA is neither pluralist in tone nor modest in its departures from existing law. Rather, as one leading accounting firm later cautioned its clients, "the legislation begs for superlatives and epithets. . . . The magnitude of change cannot be overstated."[14] Most notably, corporations lost tax benefits totaling over $120 billion over five years, with losers constituting a virtual *Who's Who* among the economic interests that traditionally have shaped tax policy, including real estate, heavy industry, large banks, casualty insurance, defense contractors, and multinational corporations. "This tax bill is really a testament to the limitations of special interest groups," observed Ways and Means Committee member Tom Downey, expressing the view shared by virtually all of those engaged in the process. "They were annihilated. They took a beating the likes of which I could not have imagined before it occurred." In contrast, the clearest "winners" in the tax reform process were the poor, six million of whom were removed from the rolls. Though benefiting from the TRA, this large and poorly represented interest in no way produced it.

How, then, to account for these unexpected outcomes? In part they must be attributed to unique characteristics of the tax reform process. The TRA was adopted during a period of concern about large and seemingly intractable federal deficits. Although President Reagan refused to accept a tax bill that raised net federal

[14] Arthur Anderson & Co., *Tax Reform 1986: Analysis and Planning* (Chicago: Arthur Anderson, 1986), 3–4.

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revenues, other policy makers insisted that reform not aggravate the deficit problem. The resulting need to produce a "revenue neutral" bill transformed the traditionally distributive politics of taxation into a redistributive battle royal.[15] Gaining protection for a targeted preference meant robbing provisions that favored some other group or else raising overall rates. This made coalition building difficult because it virtually guaranteed organized opposition—a fact proponents recognized. As then-Assistant Treasury Secretary Manuel Johnson said, "The whole strategy was to create a zero sum game between special interests and the average taxpayer. That was always the name of the game."

At other key points, organized interests were completely shut out of the development of tax reform legislation or were kept off balance by a high degree of secrecy. This was most clearly true at the beginning and the end, at its initiation in the Treasury Department—when even the White House was left in the dark—and during the closed and highly centralized conference. In between these events, secrecy often prevailed as well. Ways and Means Committee members rejected their earlier experiments with writing tax legislation in the "sunshine" and voted to close each mark-up session to the public. Key meetings of the Senate's core group excluded not only the public but committee members' staffs as well. Although most major interests still had a more or less reliable pipeline to the inside, thanks to supportive members or staff, the scope of the legislation and the speed with which it proceeded limited the value of such connections. For example, the entire Pack II bill was composed in private in just twelve days!

Finally, reformers were assisted by the coterie of groups that viewed tax reform as in their own interests. In addition to assorted public-interest lobbies, supporters included highly taxed corporations and industries—such as wholesalers, retailers, and many electronics firms—that received few tax subsidies and would benefit disproportionately from lower overall corporate tax rates. The Tax Reform Action Coalition (TRAC)—which at one point included over 700 groups representing consumer, business, and social interests—helped inoculate reformers against charges of being antigrowth or antibusiness; and at times it played an important role in rounding up votes. But this coalition can hardly be credited with initiating the legislation or providing more than an assist with passage. In no sense did its members equal the strength or multiplicity of groups opposing tax reform. Had Congress been a mere referee among interests, TRA would not have been enacted.

Old Style Reform: The Presidential-Majoritarian Perspective

The traditional process by which the American system overcomes the structural obstacles and political inertia that block nonincremental policy changes occurs on those rare occasions when it resembles the ideal of responsible party govern-

[15] Tax reform's interaction with the politics of the deficit assisted passage in another way. Although intended to be revenue neutral over the course of five years, TRA's estimated impact varied from year to year. Because the plan produced substantial revenue gains in its first year, followed by several years

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ment.[16] In what can be termed the presidential-majoritarian model, a strong president sweeps into office along with large, unified party majorities in both chambers of Congress. He mobilizes the resources of his office to construct a coherent legislative program, rallying the public and party followers behind it.

Under such circumstances, the nation seems capable of speaking with a single voice, and in a few weeks or months the legislative backlog of an entire political generation may be disposed of. But such periods are usually brief. The presidential party coalition typically succumbs to internal disunity or electoral losses, thereby returning the nation to an era of political stalemate and policy consolidation.

The presidential-majoritarian model and tax reform. Historically, tax policy has been consistent with this pattern, as Susan Hansen has shown. Viewed in the long sweep of history, "major tax innovations show strong links to periods of political realignment and social crisis, in marked contrast to the incremental policies characteristic of 'normal' politics."[17] Furthermore, the presidential-majoritarian model might seem to offer a ready explanation for TRA's legislative acceptance. Movement toward the adoption of tax reform emerged out of campaign politics during the 1984 presidential contest. It gained a prominent position on the national agenda because the issue was adopted by a popular president as the number one item on his domestic policy agenda after an electoral landslide. Moreover, presidential politics fixed several features of the final legislative package. As in Reagan's 1981 tax cuts, lower marginal rates were the president's own *raison d'etre* for tax reform, and he warned that his "veto pen" was poised to attack any tax hike.

Considered more closely, however, this model does not adequately describe TRA's enactment. First, throughout the process, the role played by the president was somewhat less grand than the honorific title "chief legislator" implies. Although substantial executive branch resources were committed to pushing the bill through Congress, neither the Democratic House nor the Republican Senate used the White House's official proposal, Treasury II, as the starting point for its own deliberations. And although Reagan attempted to keep public attention focused on the issue, his personal involvement was episodic and only modestly influential compared with that of past master legislators.

Second and more importantly, Reagan never mobilized a partisan or popular majority in favor of reform. His party did not control the House of Representatives, and conservative control of that chamber was lost after the 1982 election. Moreover, it was congressional Republicans who were least enthralled with tax reform. In 1985 their mass defection in the House nearly killed the legislation. In the Senate, too, Packwood and most of his party colleagues initially viewed tax reform as a direct attack on their preferred style of government and their most

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of shortfalls, its adoption was attractive to policy makers struggling to meet the immediate deficit reduction targets imposed by the newly-enacted Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill.

[16] For a discussion, see James L. Sundquist, "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly* 103 (Winter 1988–89): 624–625.

[17] Susan B. Hansen, *The Politics of Taxation: Revenue Without Representation* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 62.

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supportive constituencies. For addressing social problems, many Republicans preferred tax incentives to government-provided services. Moreover, few in either chamber ever came to accept the administration's early argument that tax reform would shift voters from Democratic to Republican loyalties. Their own conversations back home indicated limited support and, indeed, growing doubts as the specifics of the proposal became understood. Thus, had the president been forced to mobilize a tax reform coalition primarily within his own party, he almost surely would have failed—as did Jimmy Carter in his own drive for tax reform in the 1970s.

What actually drove reform forward was not Republican pressure in the face of Democratic resistance, but rather a process of interparty competition in which leaders of both groups first sought to win credit and later to avoid blame for killing it. Historically and theoretically, partisan divisions within the government are expected to obstruct action. James L. Sundquist observes that

> When one party controls the executive branch and the opposing party [controls] one or both houses of Congress, all of the normal difficulties . . . are multiplied manifold. . . . When the president sends a recommendation to the opposition-controlled Congress, the legislators are virtually compelled to reject or profoundly alter it.[18]

Yet, divided party control not only failed to thwart TRA's enactment, but powerfully advanced its cause by forcing Democrats in the House and then Republicans in the Senate to respond to the reform proposals of their partisan and institutional rivals in ways that would never have occurred had a single party possessed unified control.

This process of party competition began very early in the TRA saga, contributing even to the administration's initial decision to propose legislation. For key advisers in the Reagan White House, concerns about the negative effects of reform on a host of Republican constituencies initially outweighed the positive but more theoretical economic arguments mustered by the proponents in the Treasury. The White House consented to the study that produced the landmark Treasury I proposal "because we were concerned that the other side would be embracing it and using it against us in the 1984 presidential election," as former White House Chief James Baker frankly stated.

When Treasury's study was completed and its recommendations were released after the November election, there was still no assurance that tax reform would be accepted as a major Reagan initiative. Baker and others in the White House were taken aback by the scope and political audacity of Treasury's plan. In the end, however, the continued appeal of potential partisan advantage overcame internal objections, When the Democratic presidential candidate, Walter Mondale, pledged to raise, not reform, taxes, some Republican activists began championing tax reform as an issue vehicle for party realignment. These political operatives hoped to strengthen the GOP's political base by granting a measure of tax relief to lower- and especially middle-income voters and by assuring that corporations

[18] Sundquist, *Constitutional Reform*, 75–76.

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and the wealthy did not escape their fair share of tax burdens. As presidential advisor Mitch Daniels argued:

> Passage of tax reform . . . will erase the cartoon of our party as defender of the rich and privileged. The dramatic relief . . . would reflect very well on . . . all Republican candidates for the next generation.

In turn, the administration's eventual decision to make tax reform the centerpiece of the administration's political and policy agenda posed two important challenges to leaders of the Democratic House. In terms of policy, the president's proposal engendered a protective response to retain what had traditionally been a Democratic issue. Former Speaker Tip O'Neill "called Rostenkowski in and I said, 'Danny, this is *our* issue. You know, [Dick] Gephardt and [Bill] Bradley started this, and whatever you do, don't let [the White House] steal [it] on us.'" This concern was intensified by the need to neutralize the Republicans' electoral gambit. Representative Jim Jones (D-Okla.) observed:

> This whole tax reform measure was . . . driven by politics. . . . The Republicans would like to be the majority party and they are going after a class of voters who vote a lot and they want to give them tax cuts. And Democrats have traditionally been for tax reform, and they obviously want to remain a majority party, so they're defensively protecting tax reform.[19]

Although tax reform began in the administration as a positive proposal to secure political credit and electoral gains, the politics of reform quickly degenerated. By the time the Ways and Means Committee began mark-up in Fall 1985, it was clear that tax base broadening lacked widespread political appeal. Opinion polls showed that the public's concern about losing specific and tangible tax preferences increasingly outweighed the speculative promises of gaining from lower rates. This realization dampened enthusiasm for reform in Congress but failed to halt its partisan momentum, as neither party nor chamber wanted the proverbial "dead cat on their doorstep." Despite weak support for specific legislation as revealed by opinion polls, legislators in both parties feared that a skillful political opponent might turn the issue against them at some later date. Representative Tom Downey observed:

> This was blame avoidance in part when we went into it. . . . If [the Republican] party turns its back on tax reform and [it] loses . . . Democrats [will have] the opportunity to beat them about the head and shoulders saying, "Your own President wanted it, it was fair, and you were too interested in worrying about big corporations . . . to help the American people." So it is largely a process of dodging political bullets. [The] party that dodges them best can turn around and use some of those bullets against their adversaries.[20]

[19] Quoted in "Taxes Behind Closed Doors," *Frontline* #411, (Boston: WGBH TV Transcripts, 1986), 3.

[20] Quoted in "Taxes Behind Closed Doors," 22; on the importance of such future-oriented strategic calculations in congressional behavior, see Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). The growing importance of blame

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Such concerns helped sustain tax reform through both chambers, even though the cause never did in fact become popular.[21]

The New Politics of Reform

The foregoing models are plain and familiar. Both have been carefully formulated and frequently applied in policy research. Yet it is apparent that neither of the two models that describe the formation of past tax policy adequately explains the enactment of TRA. Each accounts for some elements of the legislation but fails to capture the entire dynamic.

Instead, the success of tax reform and many specific features of the legislation are largely the result of a quite different set of political conditions, actors, and forms of behavior. Some of these have been described above, including party competition, revenue neutrality, and the enforcement of secrecy at key points in the process. However, other significant factors include policy ideas and expert professionals, political entrepreneurs, and the news media.

If these factors were important only in the passage of tax reform, TRA would be an interesting but isolated historical curiosity. However, some analysts have offered a similar analysis to explain the enactment of other significant legislation that is difficult to account for on the basis of interest-group politics or presidential party leadership. Like tax reform, many consumer and environmental regulations, as well as economic deregulation for air transportation and other fields, pitted the interests of broad, unorganized publics against narrow, highly organized opponents. Given the seemingly unequal sides, "it may seem astonishing that . . . legislation of this sort is ever passed," James Q. Wilson has written. Yet "it is, and with growing frequency in recent years."[22] Viewed in this context, the TRA is simply the most recent, complex, and far-reaching example of what might be termed "the new politics of reform."[23]

The Politics of Ideas

This new model of reform politics begins by emphasizing the significance of ideas. It treats respectfully the often-quoted remark of the economist John Keynes:

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avoidance in congressional behavior is discussed in R. Kent Weaver, *Automatic Government: The Politics of Indexation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988).

[21] One poll conducted the month of TRA's passage found only 19 percent of interviewees favorable, with a nearly equal 16 percent opposed. Another the next April showed only marginal improvements in the sense of "tax fairness." See Barry Sussman, *What Americans Really Think and Why Our Politicians Pay No Attention* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 153–4.

[22] James Q. Wilson, ed., *The Politics of Regulation* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 370.

[23] What is here described as the "new" reform politics was actually quite influential during the Progressive era. On the role of experts and muckraking journalists in securing the passage of early food and drug legislation, see Mark V. Nadel, *The Politics of Consumer Protection* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 383–4.

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> The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. . . . I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.[24]

Perhaps because American politics has lacked the ideological passions of Europe, it has often been regarded as pragmatic and interest-based. In recent years, however, a few political scientists have come to emphasize the role of beliefs and ideas as an independent and influential force. Wilson concluded his insightful volume with the observation:

> A complete theory of regulatory politics—indeed, a complete theory of politics generally—requires that attention be paid to beliefs as well as interests. Only by the most extraordinary theoretical contortions can one explain [recent statutes] by reference to the economic stakes involved.[25]

Similarly, Deborah Stone argues:

> . . . ideas are the very stuff of politics. People fight about ideas, fight for them, and fight against them. . . . Moreover, people fight *with* ideas as well as about them.[26]

And John Kingdon writes that political scientists "miss a great deal" if they ignore the processes by which ideas are developed and come to be accepted, instead seeking to explain public policy solely in terms of power, influence, and pressures.[27]

Changes in politics, society, and the economy help explain the recent interest in developing this ideational model. Party loyalties have diminished, and increasing reliance has been placed on mass communications and issue politics. Americans are more highly educated now, and the percentage of professionals in the workforce has increased more than 50 percent since 1960.

This professionalization of the work force is important, because experts of various kinds are natural generators and propagators of ideas. In part, they leave their mark through scholarship, teaching, and writing—activities that often make an impression only slowly. However, when experts and professionals are employed in and around government itself, they can influence policy more quickly and directly. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan traces much of the War on Poverty to what he termed "the professionalization of reform."[28] Similarly, Samuel H. Beer has noted:

> . . . in the fields of health, housing, urban renewal, transportation, welfare, education, poverty, and energy, it has been . . . people in government service, or closely associated with it acting on the basis of their specialized knowledge, who first perceived the problem,

[24] John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1964, originally published in 1936), 383–84.

[25] Wilson, *The Politics of Regulation*, 372.

[26] Deborah A. Stone, *Policy Paradox and Political Reason* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott-Foresman, 1988), 25.

[27] John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 131–32.

[28] Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Professionalization of Reform" *The Public Interest* 1 (Fall 1965): 6–16.

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conceived the program, initially urged it on the president and Congress, went on to help lobby it through to enactment, and then saw to its administration.[29]

Ideas, Experts, and Tax Reform. The concept of comprehensive tax reform was "invented" decades before the TRA began moving ahead on Capitol Hill.[30] Although the legislation itself can be rightly described as "apparently coming from nowhere to become the law of the land,"[31] the statute contained little that was truly original. Instead, its most-touted features consisted of long-recognized solutions to often-considered problems.

The movement for tax reform rested above all else on the shared conviction of knowledgeable experts in and outside of government that the federal income tax system had grown indefensible from the standpoint of professionally salient values. By the mid-1980s most experts agreed on the basic features of an ideal income tax system: it should be horizontally equitable; it should be investment neutral; and it should be administratively efficient. All three goals could be attained by broadening the tax base and lowering rates, as Joseph A. Pechman had demonstrated in the 1950s and had been more recently emphasized by the Bradley-Gephardt, Kemp-Kasten, and various flat tax proposals.[32]

There were, of course, differences among economists as to the taxable base to broaden: whether it be income (thus yielding a flat or modified flat-rate income tax) or consumption (thus favoring a tax on consumed income). But this difference was counterbalanced by a relatively new agreement, which married base-broadening principles with the supply-side objective of lower marginal rates, not with the traditional liberal goal of more progressive taxation.

This professional consensus was especially important because after the president requested that Treasury produce a reform proposal in his 1984 State of the Union address, there was virtually no further input from or contact with the White House, other members of the administration, Congress, or outside groups until Treasury I was released. As former Assistant Treasury Secretary John E. Chapoton observed, "[The White House] wanted to be able to say, 'Me No Alamo, I don't know what Treasury is doing,' so as not to get it mixed up in the presidential race." This insulation was reinforced by Secretary Regan's highly idealized approach to the reform process. "Political considerations were irrelevant," he instructed his staff, urging them "to disregard every factor except fairness, simplicity, and efficiency."[33]

[29] Samuel H. Beer, "Federalism, Nationalism, and Democracy in America," *American Political Science Review* 72 (March 1978): 17.

[30] The origins of the concept may be traced to the work of Henry C. Simons and Robert M. Haig. See Simons, *Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938); and Robert M. Haig, ed., *The Federal Income Tax* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1921).

[31] Minarik, "How Tax Reform Came About," 1359.

[32] See Joseph A. Pechman, "Erosion of the Individual Income Tax," *National Tax Journal* 10 (March 1957). Summaries of key reform proposals appeared in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., *A Citizen's Guide to the New Tax Reforms: Fair Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985).

[33] Donald T. Regan, *For the Record: From Wall Street to Washington* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1988), 206

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Consequently, the initial Treasury I plan was an astonishingly pure expression of expert views. Although never formally proposed as legislation, it—rather than current law—set the standard against which subsequent proposals were measured.

Despite all the subsequent changes, the basic contours of the TRA—base broadening, reduced rates, revenue and distributional neutrality—were all fixed at this early stage. (Many of the same features had also appeared in the 1982 Bradley-Gephardt bill, which helped ensure bipartisan support for the Treasury proposal.) For example, it was Treasury experts who completed the stricture of revenue neutrality. While the president was unwilling to raise taxes, many economists thought it unwise to reduce revenues. Expert consensus accounts too for the removal of the poor from the tax rolls, a costly feature of Treasury I adopted without instructions from the president and also without controversy.

It was even choices made by Treasury experts that instituted the sharp business tax hike. Responding to Regan's request for a lower, simpler personal rate structure than the one first proposed by departmental estimators, Treasury lawyers recommended a rise in the corporate tax rate from 28 to 33 percent to finance it. Though unplanned at the start, the resulting revenue permitted individual tax cuts that were subsequently embraced by the president and then sold by the White House as tax reform's principal attraction.

As one would expect, professional ideas were less overtly dominant through the remainder of the legislative process. In Treasury II the experts' handiwork was reexamined through the lens of pure politics. Similarly in the legislative arena, professional purity consistently lost out to the immediate needs of coalition building whenever the two came into direct conflict—whether it be fringe benefits and state and local taxes in the House or corporate provisions in the Senate.

Nevertheless, to look solely at such politically-motivated departures from the professionals' design is to greatly understate their influence. First, most provisions did not engender overt conflicts between political demands and professional norms. Second, the vast scope and comprehensive structure of reform overwhelmed members, leaving an enormous number of issues to be decided by the Joint Tax Committee (JTC) staff. As a top House tax aide said:

> This bill presented a very bold challenge. Any one of these issue areas—the R & D credit, bonds, accounting, pensions—would be an enormous change. Lift out any two and you've got a big tax bill. Weave them all together and the only way that people could feel comfortable dealing with it was to look at it globally.[34]

Finally, by controlling the all-critical revenue estimates, JTC staff exercised life-and-death power over countless alternatives considered by decision makers. Revenue estimators were the invisible hands in the legislative marketplace, directing choices and often controlling outcomes. As one disillusioned member of the Ways and Means committee remarked: "If I really wanted to influence the way the ac-

[34] Interview with Rob Leonard, 28 January 1987.

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tual law was written, I would have applied for a job on the Joint Tax or Ways and Means staff."[35]

Values and Symbols in Tax Reform. In a field as complex as tax policy, it may not be surprising that the assessments of experts were quite important. But that is only half the story. In the new politics of reform, ideas also shape policy in a second, quite distinctive way.

Some have suggested that the power of ideas has an essential normative foundation. For example, Steven Kelman contends that "the wish to choose good public policy, evaluating options against a standard of . . . right and wrong" is "important in understanding the results of policy making in the United States."[36] Such a view suggests that tax reform was enacted because a majority of the participants wished to do what was right, and they relied upon experts to define "right" for them.

For some of the participants in the process, this public-spirited objective was paramount. Apart from the tax experts themselves, whose definition of good policy coincided nicely with their professional interests, certain legislators believed that tax reform should be enacted because it was correct and courageously chose to subjugate their own electoral interests to its pursuit. But for most, the power of the reform idea was more complex. Indeed, if a commitment to "doing right" were all that was required, tax reform should have been enacted many times before. In point of fact, opinions varied sharply about what constituted good policy. Those legislators who lacked the economists' faith in efficiency and neutrality could honestly grant a higher value to tax policies that benefited charitable giving, federalism, or economic competitiveness. Others believed that competing priorities such as deficit reduction were more important.

The power of the ideas that propelled tax reform politically actually lay more in the realm of symbolism than in intellectual rigor or moral commitment.[37] As Rostenkowski observed early in the process:

> Those who are gathering to derail tax reform should recall [Reagan's] knack for dividing complex issues into two simple parts — good and bad, fair and unfair, givers and takers — and asking, "which side are you on?" . . . It's a devastating question that could unleash a potent backlash.[38]

Symbolic concerns also shaped the substance of reform proposals, as some features were designed to suit the purposes of propagandists more than policy analysts. Regan settled on a three bracket rate structure of 15-25-35 percent for Treasury I, because the original 16-28-37 suggested by staff "sounded like a football signal" and would fail to grab the public's imagination. Yet this slight change in enumera-

[35] Interview with Representative Robert Matsui, 12 August 1986.

[36] Steven Kelman, "Why Public Ideas Matter" in Robert B. Reich, ed., *The Power of Public Ideas* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), 31. See also Arthur Maass, *Congress and the Common Good* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

[37] See Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb, *The Political Uses of Symbols* (New York: Longman, 1983).

[38] Quoted in Strahan, "Committee Politics and Tax Reform," 25–26.

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tion had enormous fiscal consequences, forcing a sharp increase in business taxes and creating net tax cuts for many individuals. The symbolic power of a low, two-rate structure became even more important in the Senate. It was "magic" recalled Packwood, and an idea that "intoxicated us" reported Senator John Danforth (R-Mo.). So strong was this magic that when a higher third rate had to be created to maintain revenue neutrality, it was done in a hidden fashion, with quite perverse distributional results.

Tax reform is not unique in these respects. As Mark Moore observes:

> Many ideas that become powerful lack the intellectual properties that policy analysts hold dear. Most such ideas are not very complex or differentiated. There is no clear separation of ends from means, of diagnosis from interventions, of assumptions from demonstrated facts, or of blame from causal effect. . . . Moreover, it is not clear reasoning of carefully developed and interpreted facts that make ideas convincing. Rather, ideas seem to become anchored in people's minds through illustrative anecdotes, simple diagrams and pictures, or connections with broad commonsense ideologies that define human nature and social responsibilities.[39]

However, the case history of tax reform offers striking illustrations of these propositions. For example, poll data suggest that the public was dissatisfied with income taxation but that its understanding of the tax's operation and relative burdens was a caricature of reality. The public's imagination had been captured by lurid stories about wealthy corporations and individuals who paid no income tax, leading them to wrongly conclude that a majority of the rich paid no income tax at all.[40] Further, although the public and experts agreed on the need for action, there were sharp contrasts in their understandings of such key concepts as fairness and simplicity. The public at large would have preferred a stiff minimum tax that would prevent the avoidance of tax liabilities, rather than the elimination of popular deductions and exemptions for such things as state and local taxes, fringe benefits, and IRAs. Experts, on the other hand, aimed to attain real horizontal equity, which threatened many popular deductions and exemptions and which, taken to the extreme, implied such things as the taxation of the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing—a result that surely would have astonished the general public.

Although the symbolic, emotional aspects of tax reform had more impact on the citizenry than experts, one cannot help but be impressed by the extent to which key figures also were won over to the cause by highly personalized representations of tax injustices. Reagan often recalled that when his movie income placed him in the top marginal bracket of 94 percent during World War II, he and other actors simply stopped making films. For Bill Bradley, simmering resentment at being considered a "depreciable asset" as a professional basketball player fueled his early interest in reform. And one committee member recalled:

[39] Mark Moore,"What Sort of Ideas Become Public Ideas?" in Reich, *The Power of Public Ideas*, 79.

[40] See "Corporate Taxes in the Reagan Years," Citizens for Tax Justice, October 1984. See the discussion in Joseph J. Minarik, *Making Tax Choices* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1985), 7.

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> Danny [Rostenkowski] spoke very emotionally about his sick daughter and how she paid more taxes than the airline she worked for. He's rough and tough, but I thought there were tears in his eyes.

Policy Entrepreneurs

On many specialized policy issues, particularly those in which the executive branch assumes leadership, professionals alone may formulate policy. But when it comes to nonincremental policy changes, where the formation and manipulation of symbols is important, a second set of actors—who specialize in placing ideas in the political arena—often help shape the agenda. The term "policy entrepreneur" has become the accepted designation for such champions of policy ideas.[41]

Entrepreneurs are not necessarily the originators of policy proposals. More commonly they act as intermediaries between professional experts, who formulate and perfect policy solutions, and the broader political arena. Entrepreneurs simplify and distill these complex ideas and link them to values accepted by and familiar to the broader public. This is frequently a vital role. Wilson has traced the enactment of much recent regulatory legislation that favors dispersed interests over narrow interests directly to such policy entrepreneurs. Enacting such laws, he writes,

> requires the efforts of a skilled entrepreneur who can mobilize latent public sentiment (by revealing a scandal or capitalizing on a crisis), put the opponents of the plan publicly on the defensive (by accusing them of deforming babies or killing motorists), and associate the legislation with widely shared values (clean air, pure water, health, and safety).

In such cases the entrepreneur serves as the "vicarious representative of groups not directly part of the legislative process."[42]

Policy entrepreneurs can be members of Congress, independent advocates, civil servants, legislative staffers, academicians, lobbyists, or writers. Typically, they do not occupy positions of great formal power or visibility. Instead they gain influence largely because of their expertise, persistence, and skill, plus an ability to develop a symbiotic relationship with political figures who are hungry for action proposals.[43] Policy entrepreneurs also rely heavily on what Wilson describes as "third parties," of which the media may be most important, to build support. Unable to steer events by exercising authority, entrepreneurs manipulate ideas and symbols to alter the behavior of others. Often, they seek to "expand the scope of conflict" from narrow, anonymous centers of decision to much larger and more visible political arenas.[44]

Policy Entrepreneurs and Tax Reform. In tax reform, experts worked hand

[41] See Kingdon, *Agendas,* for extensive discussions of policy entrepreneurship.

[42] Wilson, *Politics of Regulation,* 371.

[43] Nelson W. Polsby, *Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 171–172.

[44] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).

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in hand with politically junior middlemen who packaged professional concepts for mass merchandising and then marketed them to those who counted most. These entrepreneurs played a vitally important role in helping place tax reform on the political agenda. Indeed, during the early 1980s the cause itself was almost indistinguishable from the names of its most noted congressional proponents. It was through the Kemp-Kasten and particularly Bradley-Gephardt plans that the concept of tax reform gained widespread recognition.

For such men, the cause was attractive because they could at once pursue their policy ideals and enhance their reputations. As Senator Bradley's tax counsel said, "We had nothing to lose and everything to gain." In contrast, tax reform almost certainly would not have been initiated by institutional leaders, who by virtue of their position and responsibilities had much to weigh against quixotic causes. They acted only when circumstances dictated.

The role of these entrepreneurs was quite distinct from that of the tax professionals. None of these energetic merchandisers developed as much expertise as the latter possessed. Indeed, Charles E. McLure, who served as deputy assistant secretary for tax analysis in 1984–85, later commented that "having spent all of my adult life studying tax reform, I did not need to be taught the subject by Bill Bradley and Jack Kemp." But in the arena of political ideas, they contributed something even more important: a politician's ability to seize a useful idea and tie it to a potentially compelling problem. They took complex concepts like horizontal equity and investment neutrality and converted them into powerful populist themes like fairness and economic growth, helping to move tax-writing from C-Span to prime time. Aided by groups such as Citizens for Tax Justice, they helped establish the notion that support for tax reform (in whatever incarnation) was a way to make one's stand for the general public welfare, while any opposition (even the most principled) was to be considered the product of excessive dependence on special interests.

Still, although the entrepreneurs played a vital role, it was also a limited one. Having kicked the ball off, they orchestrated little of what followed. Some, like Jack Kemp and Dick Gephardt, graduated toward other pursuits, notably presidential politics. The most successful among them in tax reform, Bill Bradley, was also the most persistent. As one Rostenkowski aide recalled: "He showed he was not only willing to *be* for tax reform, he was willing to *work* for it." Still, although Bradley devoted much of his time to the cause, he was often limited to making suggestions and taking directions. Indeed, Bradley would not have played such a cornerstone role in the Senate's floor debate had not Russell Long made up his own mind to step aside.

The Politics of the Media

The entrepreneur's least costly and most effective resource is publicity. For example, consumer activist Ralph Nader first attracted attention to the issue of auto safety through a magazine article charging that some vehicles were "unsafe at any

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speed." Such stories, insider "leaks," and other information disseminated by the press provided much of the foundation for the development of consumer protection programs. Furthermore, as analyst Mark V. Nadel has noted, information provided through the press was "always favorable."[45] In part, this may be because media writers reflect the values held by their readers, who are likely to favor safer cars, cleaner meat, and purer water. Reporters also regard consumer advocates as much more reliable sources of information than business groups or even government agencies.[46] But it has also been argued that the tendency of journalists to favor the little guy has other attractions. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda Lichter suggest that the media are increasingly

> eager to unmask the hypocrisy and puffery of the [political] combatants. . . . By deflating the claims of all sides that their own selfish interests represent the public interest, journalists . . . establish themselves as the final repository of the public interest, . . . [producing] a gratifying self-image. . . .[47]

The Media and Tax Reform. Without strong media support, the TRA would not have been adopted. At every step along the way, the legislation was prodded by intensive, mostly favorable, often page-one coverage. A content analysis of indexes under the headings "tax policy" and "tax reform" indicates that the *Washington Post* placed tax reform on its front page 12 times in 1984, 54 times in 1985, and 46 times in 1986. Similarly, the *New York Times* ran 15 such front page stories in 1984, 53 in 1985, and 46 in 1986. In contrast, not a single front-page story on tax reform (as distinguished from tax reductions or increases) appeared in either publication between 1978 and 1982.

Only some of the credit for this media attention can go to the entrepreneurs, however. Tax reformers had tried long and hard to enlist the press to their cause with only modest success. The subject had been viewed as too arcane to merit prominent or extended treatment.

This had changed by the mid-1980s, with a variety of external factors contributing to its newsworthiness. Tax policy gained salience after the California-led property tax revolt of the late 1970s. The supply-side theory and the dramatic rate cuts of 1981 also brought tax issues to center stage, focusing attention on taxes and their relationship to economic growth. "We never had the press interested in what we were doing in the '70s," JTC director David Brockway recalls.

> It was only the cattlemen, or oil and gas, or low income housing—all those groups that inevitably the members would react to. It changed in the early '80s when the president began tapping general resentment about taxes and saying, "Look, the message is very simple: taxes are too high." Then the members had to respond to the general public. Taxes had become large scale politics like SALT or something. It was a different ballgame.

[45] Nadel, *Politics of Consumer Protection*, 192.

[46] S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter, *The Media Elite: America's New Power Brokers* (Bethesda, Md.: Adler & Adler, 1986), 57.

[47] Ibid., 130.

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In particular, the release of Treasury's proposals gave the media a new and sharper angle, a story in black and white, pitting special interests and the tax policy status quo against the public interest and tax reform. This theme, which Bradley and others had been sounding for years, was amplified first by the purity of Treasury I and later by the president's endorsement crusade. Indeed, the administration's own initial misgivings were countered in part by publicity favoring the Treasury plan, as aide Eugene Steurle recalls. The proposal, he emphasizes, "received uncharacteristically strong attention from the press. . . . It was the positive press reaction to the study in December that got people [in the White House] thinking, 'Hey, maybe we *should* make this a political issue.'"

Treasury I's uncompromising application of economic principles gave the study credibility with the media, while Reagan's subsequent emphasis on fairness, simplicity, and economic growth gave journalists the prominent themes they needed for front-page news. Thereafter, ambitious reporters who might normally expect to find their articles relegated to newspaper business sections continued the story, translating it from technical economic and legal language into words which held their editors and Washington itself spellbound.

This media attention turned tax reform into a tar baby for politicos inside the Washington beltway. The TRA battle became an epic struggle between good and evil, the best political story in town. And like all good stories it was highly personalized. As a Rostenkowski aide noted, "The press did its share, running pictorials of many of those who voted against us." Later, Bob Packwood became the most visible victim of media crusading when he was singled out as the Senate bad boy on tax reform.

Such lessons were not lost on wavering legislators. Thanks to press scrutiny, an infamous Ways and Means committee vote that gave banks generous new benefits was reversed, resurrecting reform after many gave it up for dead. Similarly, the man unceremoniously dubbed "Senator Hackwood" by a merciless press became born-again in a matter of days after he embraced sweeping reform. Thereafter his committee reported a radical reform bill in less than two weeks as members considered the price for standing in front of a rolling train – or worse being tagged as one who had derailed it. Populist rhetoric, bright lights, and the casting of tax reform as something members could only be for or against converted many who would not have been supporters under other circumstances.

Leadership: The Missing Ingredient

Tax reform was "the bill no one wanted," Dan Rostenkowski said at one point. And it may be fairly said that in the beginning no one of importance wanted it. With the exception of President Reagan himself, most institutional leaders came belatedly and with reluctance to the cause.

Yet, if *no one* wanted it, tax reform would not have been adopted. In fact, professional experts wanted it. Diligent but poorly positioned entrepreneurs promoted it, aided by good government groups and sensation-hunting journalists.

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But to attribute the legislative success of tax reform to the role of ideas, experts, policy entrepreneurs, and the press ignores a critical variable. When you ask participants in the reform process what single factor was most responsible for the TRA, the vast majority point to those with leadership responsibilities. "Ronald Reagan, pure and simple," said one House Democrat. "If it hadn't been for Rostenkowski, there would have been no tax bill," maintained a high administration official. "We got it because the President of the United States, the Speaker of the House, the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, and ultimately the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee decided that they wanted the bill," declared a top congressional staffer.

Such answers might be taken as the product of Washington myopia, but the truth here seems otherwise. By every indicator, the efforts of leaders were absolutely critical to the enactment of tax reform. It was they who put reform so firmly on the agenda that it could not be ignored; they escalated the partisan and institutional stakes at every turn. Having decided for personal and political reasons to take action, they became converted to the cause, devoting themselves completely to its success and compelling followers to proceed down a path most resisted.

Tax reform, then, did not just happen. This massive legislation was *willed* into effect by men in powerful positions—kingpins, not young turks—who concluded that moving tax reform forward at least *one more step* coincided with the best interests of their party, their institution, their career, or their country.

Beginning, of course, with the president. Shortly before Ronald Reagan put the issue squarely on the policy agenda, Tip O'Neill told Bradley and Gephardt their cause was "years ahead of its time." Reagan's stamp of approval alone made it worthy of serious consideration. Although never fully understanding the legislation he eventually signed and rarely fulfilling his expected leadership responsibilities once Rostenkowski picked up the legislation, his men continued working, mostly around the edges but on occasion at the very center of congressional activity.

After the president put the issue on the government's action list, it would not have advanced without the backing of other skilled leaders, most notably Rostenkowski and Packwood. To achieve success, they creatively used all the resources at their disposal. Traditional leadership tools of staff, timing, and distributive benefits were aggressively employed; but they brilliantly adapted the new techniques of entrepreneurial politics to serve their ends.

In the House, it was Dan Rostenkowski who "picked up the challenge and did it," surprising many in the process.[48] Rostenkowski wasn't known as a reformer and had no prior inclination to act. But faced with the concerns of partisan protection and personal reputation, as well as policy content, he forced his committee to act. He negotiated with House members and sought to ameliorate their concerns. He closed the mark-up to outside groups. He went public in response to the president and urged voters to "write Rosty" in a dramatic TV appearance. He manipulated symbols, seeking to make the House bill "fairer to the middle class."

[48] Interview with Representative Ray McGrath, 30 June 1987.

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When his committee balked, he utilized media criticism to bring members back into line. After the giveaway of new benefits to large banks nearly killed reform, he told his staff to "let it stew a while, and let the press go to work."[49] When necessary, he altered his coalitions to build a majority. And finally, by producing a Democratic bill, he compelled the Republican Senate to respond in what had become a high stakes game of partisan one-upmanship.

Packwood, in turn, picked up the challenge when only three of his committee members wanted to proceed. Failing first in an effort to use time-tested methods of coalition building, he aggressively changed strategies; he joined forces with Bradley to win media acclaim with a startlingly pure reform bill on the individual side and pacified his committee members with old fashioned constituency politics on the corporate side. Like Rostenkowski, he appealed to committee pride and team spirit, as well as electoral self-protection, and used the symbols of reform and the vise of revenue neutrality to push a bill through the Senate floor with virtually no amendments. Finally, in conference committee, Packwood and Rostenkowski alone assumed full responsibility. Meeting around the clock and in secret, while relying on teams of staff experts, these two men completed what their full committee could not: they pieced together a unified reform bill from the distinctive handiwork of both chambers.

Leadership and the New Reform. This strong leadership role has implications that extend beyond tax reform to reform politics in general. The risks involved in legislation that pits dispersed benefits against concentrated costs means that entrepreneurs are critically important in placing such issues on the policy agenda. And on issues of limited scope or on individual provisions of omnibus bills, their efforts can be sufficient to win enactment. But on larger, more controversial legislation, formal leaders have often been central to the adoption of reforms, even though their role has not always been adequately stressed. For example, activist Warren Magnuson headed the Senate Commerce Committee when he sponsored landmark consumer protection legislation in the 1960s.[50] Edmund Muskie was chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, as well as a presidential contender, when he exerted leadership over the sweeping environmental regulations of the late 1960s and early 1970s.[51] Attributing such reforms solely or principally to the work of isolated entrepreneurs and supportive social movements is to ignore a factor of leadership that was central to the politics of policy adoption.

Leader behavior on tax reform quite exactly parallels that on airline, trucking, and telecommunications deregulation. While deregulation too was built on an idea-

[49] Interview with Representative Dan Rostenkowski, 12 March 1987.

[50] For a detailed account of the entrepreneurial reform activities of Magnuson and his committee staff, see David Price, *Who Makes the Laws: Creativity and Power in Senate Committees* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1972).

[51] For an account of Muskie's role, as well as a description of a case of partisan and institutional policy escalation that parallels tax reform, see Charles O. Jones, *Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).

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tional consensus among experts and across parties, it was moved toward implementation and enactment by legislators in key committee posts, as well as by President Gerald Ford and the heads of the regulatory commissions. The seemingly remarkable willingness of such leaders to embrace a variety of innovative reform causes seems to reflect the pressures of publicity and responsibility that are uniquely focused on them. Compared to other legislators, Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk suggest that

> Leaders on an issue will be more prone to act on their conceptions of the public interest. . . . They will be more prone to use the issue to gain the respect of colleagues and other elites, because their behavior is more closely watched. . . . Compared with other congressmen, leaders will have diminished regard for the wishes of organized interest groups and sometimes even for the economic interests of their states or districts.[52]

Moreover, in deregulation as in tax reform, leadership competition had a major effect on the scope and pace of legislation: "When numerous leaders in different parts of the government became involved and began competing with one another, policy change occurred very fast."[53]

Conclusion

Tax reform owes its existence to and illuminates the dynamics of a new model of reform politics that has appeared with growing frequency in recent years. Although it has become more common, the outcomes of the process are no less surprising in each successful case. "It can't happen here" has been the usual forecast. In truth, the legislative obstacles to legislation for civil rights, aid to education, antipoverty assistance, health insurance, consumer and environmental protection, occupational safety and health, sex discrimination, and the deregulation of airlines, trucking, broadcasting, telecommunications, as well as welfare reform, seemed considerable. But in these and many other cases, seemingly insurmountable political barriers dropped away.

Some of these achievements can be explained at least in part by the old reform politics: presidential leadership, an aroused public, and strong partisan backing. But others fit more closely what is described here as the new politics of reform, which emphasizes the role of ideas, experts, entrepreneurs, the media, and key leaders. What certainly seems established by tax reform and other parallel cases is that advocates of far-reaching policy shifts now have two roads down which they may travel.

Why is the acceptance of such legislation still so surprising? In part, these outcomes remain unexpected because the pattern of legislative victories appears only across varied policy fields. Within any single realm, historic patterns of behavior and the weight of the status quo typically remain stacked against far-reaching

[52] Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, *The Politics of Deregulation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), 103.

[53] Ibid., 241.

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change. But when the aggregate of important nonincremental changes is weighed, lingering images of "deadlock and drift" seem dated and incomplete.[54]

Such outcomes also are surprising because they flow from a pattern of politics that is inherently less predictable. Traditional interest-based politics is stable because the underlying patterns of interests change only slowly as society, government, and the economy evolve. Ideas, on the other hand, come not only in the form of lasting ideologies but frantic fads. Public moods and intellectual commitments can come and go quickly. Entrepreneurs similarly may switch issues or fade from view.

To some extent, then, the unpredictability of the new politics reflects the increasing individualization of politics, the erosion of more stable political alliances, and the fragmentation of governing institutions. Highly atomized structures, as our political institutions are now thought to be, are often erratic. With fewer mediating structures, they can move quickly from stagnation to rapid change and back again.[55]

Further, it is only through complex and fortuitous combinations of actors, strategies, and circumstances that dramatic changes can occur. The TRA underscores the observation of former Representative John Brademas that "any bill passed by Congress is a tapestry woven from strands of intellectual effort, political opportunity, institutional rivalry, and personal ambition"[56]—a nice summary of the legislation. And its passage also "required the most incredible confluence of circumstances—almost like an alignment of the planets," as Joseph Minarik notes.[57]

Finally, tax reform experience illuminates Brademas's cautionary observation that "the safest response to those who ask how policy is made . . . is 'It all depends.'"[58] For the political analysts, its case history is a warning against reliance on any one model of the policy process. The TRA process has something to tempt every theoretical taste; the politics of pluralist bargaining, of presidential leadership, and of entrepreneurial mobilization each contributed at different stages or to different aspects of the resolution of this complex issue.

Indeed, the goal of clarity is better advanced if these models are reconceptualized as distinctive *systems of power*, rather than deterministic patterns of action. There is in contemporary American government one system of power revolving around organized and constituent interests, another around presidential elections and parties, and a third around ideas. To some extent, each constitutes a separate

[54] Noting the success of the deregulatory and tax reform efforts, James Q. Wilson also has argued that "it is increasingly implausible to use 'deadlock' as a word to describe economic policy making in America." See "Does the Separation of Powers Still Work?" *The Public Interest* 86 (Winter 1987): 47.

[55] See Anthony King, "The American Polity in the Late 1970s: Building Coalitions in the Sand" in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 393.

[56] John Brademas, *The Politics of Education: Conflict and Consensus on Capitol Hill* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 22.

[57] Minarik, "How Tax Reform Came About," 1372.

[58] Brademas, *Politics of Education*, 52–53.

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game with its own rules, resources, umpires, and plays. Yet, the nature of the dominant game can change in midplay with new players added or dropped. One test of effectiveness in the political arena is the ability of certain players to alter the prevailing game to their advantage.

Unpredictability is inherent in such a dynamic contest. Yet this more flexible image corresponds well with the character of contemporary power relations. We now have, as journalist Hedrick Smith has written:

> a more fluid system of power than ever before in our history. Quite literally, power floats. It does not reside in the White House, nor does it merely alternate from pole to pole, from president to opposition, from Republicans to Democrats. It floats. It shifts. It wriggles elusively, . . . passing from one competing power to another, . . . gravitating to whoever is daring enough to figure out the quickest way to make a political score.[59]

Because "normal" tax politics operates as a game among interests, involving few but the most attentive, tax reform seemed a certain failure. Here, the advantage lay with those who were best organized and against isolated policy entrepreneurs, just as pluralists suggest. To this problem, most advocates and analysts saw only one clear solution: a change in the game to presidential and party politics. Success seemed to require a mobilized electorate, strong presidential leadership, and unified party control of the institutions of government. Past efforts of this kind have failed, however, leading to more pessimistic forecasts.

Nonetheless, tax reform was embraced by President Reagan, giving it a strong push ahead. In the end, however, it was adopted because the dominant character of the game shifted and changed once again. Experts, entrepreneurs, and the media all played important roles; but when a combination of factors led key legislative leaders from both parties to put their reputations and resources on the line, the highly publicized cause advanced from the unmovable to the seemingly unstoppable.

As the nature of the game changed throughout the tax reform process, so did its goal. Initially, it may be said that good public policy was the prime objective of reform—the motivation of experts and entrepreneurs. But partisan credit-claiming came to the fore as the Republican administration seized leadership on the issue. When it later became apparent that tax reform lacked the popularity anticipated, blame-avoidance became the chief aim. This led the "impossible dream" of generations of reform proponents to its astonishing conclusion.

Despite such twists and turns, the main lesson of tax reform is clear: far-reaching policy change remains a real possibility in American politics. Without changes in constitutional structure and despite the proliferation of organized interests, the system has developed sources of creativity and energy that make it capable of mounting seemingly insurmountable political obstacles and bridging apparently unbridgeable gaps of institution and party. These rest with the new model of ideational-entrepreneurial politics, coupled with the commitment and legislative

[59] Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game: How Washington Works* (New York: Random House, 1988), 14–15.

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skills of established leaders. The power embraced within the new politics of reform may be gaining ground, while the older power systems centered on organized interests and the presidential party are both diminishing in importance. To more fully understand the character of these forces and to be certain that the costs as well as benefits of the political style they typify are recognized, is an important challenge.

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Can Black Candidates Win Statewide Elections?

RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN

While black office-holding has steadily increased at the local level, statewide successes have been few and far between. Edward Brooke, the two-term (1967–1979) Republican from Massachusetts, has been the only black senator in this century. Until Douglas Wilder's 1989 election in Virginia, no black had ever been elected governor. (In 1873, the black lieutenant-governor of Louisiana, P.B.S. Pinchbeck, was elevated to the post of acting governor for forty-three days.) Below these top offices, the dismal record continues. In 1979 there were six statewide black elected officials; by 1985 there were only three. One of these officials, Illinois State Comptroller Roland Burris, called the group "an endangered species."[1] Women and Hispanics have won more top-level statewide offices than blacks. There are currently three women governors and two senators; four Hispanic governors have been elected since 1974. In this century, there have been two Hispanic senators.[2]

A statewide base is a critical factor in attaining national leadership. Excluding generals and vice-presidents, most presidential nominees have previously served as senators or governors. The 1984 and 1988 Jesse Jackson campaigns raised interest in a black presidential candidacy. This article suggests that understanding

[1] Roland Burris, "Winning Statewide Office," *Focus* 13 (October 1985): 3.

[2] Maurilio Vigil, "Jerry Apodaca and the 1974 Gubernatorial Election in New Mexico: An Analysis," *Aztlan* 9 (Spring-Fall 1978): 133–149; Maurilio Vigil, "The Election of Toney Anaya as Governor of New Mexico: Its Implications for Hispanics," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 12 (Summer 1984): 81–98; Maurilio Vigil and Roy Lujan, "Parallels in the Careers of Two Hispanic U.S. Senators," *Journal of Ethnic Studies* 13 (Winter 1986): 1–21.

RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, associate professor of political science at California State University, Fullerton, has written extensively on the dynamics of interracial politics.

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the intermediate level of statewide black candidacy can shed additional light on the prospects for a winning black presidential campaign.

Are black statewide victories virtually unattainable? Attempting to answer this question highlights how little research has been devoted to the problem. Perhaps the lack of success has discouraged exploration, or perhaps it is also the lack of terms of reference for undertaking the inquiry. Certainly the excitement of the Jackson presidential campaigns has overshadowed attempts to build a long-range foundation for statewide and national campaigns. There is no real literature on the statewide black candidacy. The only efforts even indirectly to explore the issue have involved analysis of the near-victory by Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley in the 1982 California governor's election. And these studies have not moved on to a more general discussion of statewide black candidacies. This article examines the Bradley campaign in light of other statewide black candidacies.

Several studies have contended that Bradley's race was not the central factor in his defeat.[3] Jack Citrin et al. studied pre-election polls of racial attitudes and voting preference. Whites with conservative racial views tended to oppose all Democratic candidates, especially at the top of the ticket. These voters were no more likely to vote against Bradley than against Democratic U.S. Senate candidate Edmund G. Brown, Jr. The relationship between racial attitudes and voting was no stronger in the gubernatorial race than in the senatorial contest. These studies found far higher levels of racial voting in the 1983 Chicago and Philadelphia mayoral elections than in the 1982 California governor's race. Citrin et al. concluded that "it is misleading, then, to say . . . that Californians are not yet ready to tolerate a Black governor."[4]

Others have argued that the main cause of Bradley's defeat was indeed white racist voting. Charles Henry compared votes for Bradley, winning Democratic lieutenant-governor candidate Leo McCarthy, and previous Democratic gubernatorial candidates.[5] In Henry's view, the defection of white Democrats because of race cost Bradley the election. Henry suggested that if a popular moderate candidate like Bradley lost, the prospects for statewide black victories are dim: "Bradley, as a mainstream candidate in a relatively liberal state, represented the best hope. . . ."[6]

The research on the Bradley campaign seems to be polarized between those who deny that racism played a major role and those who see race as a controlling factor

[3] Stephen C. Baker and Paul Kleppner, "Race War Chicago Style: The Election of a Black Mayor, 1983" in Terry Clark, ed., *Research in Urban Policy* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1986), vol. 2, 215–238; Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, and David O. Sears, "White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race Matter?" paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, 1987.

[4] Citrin et al., "White Reactions to Black Candidates," 33.

[5] Charles P. Henry, "Racial Factors in the 1982 California Gubernatorial Campaign: Why Bradley Lost," in Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., and Paul L. Puryear, eds., *The New Black Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York, Longman, 1987), 76–94.

[6] Henry, "Racial Factors," 90. An argument along the same lines was made by Robert Staples, "Tom Bradley's Defeat: The Impact of Racial Symbols on Political Campaigns," *Black Scholar* 13 (Fall 1982): 37–46.

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TABLE 1

Outcomes

1966	Brooke	(R)	61%	Peabody	(D)	39%
1982	Bradley	(D)	48%	Deukmejian	(R)	49%
1985	Wilder	(D)	52%	Chichester	(R)	48%

beyond influence. The focus has been on voting and survey analysis of the electorate, searching for the degree of racial influence on the results. There has been little discussion of the political dynamics of the election campaign itself, with the exception of a recent study by Thomas Pettigrew and Denise Alston.[7] They examined both the campaigns and election returns of Bradley's 1982 and 1986 races for governor. Their conclusions about the 1982 Bradley campaign—that race was a major factor but that the campaign was potentially winnable—are generally consistent with the analysis presented here. However, like the other studies, the authors do not place the Bradley campaigns within the context of the statewide black candidacy. The Citrin et al. and Stephen Baker and Paul Kleppner studies compared the Bradley case to two big-city elections, not to statewide campaigns.

Fortunately, such a comparative approach is possible. The victories of Edward Brooke in Massachusetts in 1966 and L. Douglas Wilder as lieutenant governor of Virginia in 1985 have been explored both from the standpoint of voting analysis and political dynamics.[8] An analysis of the Bradley campaign can therefore be compared to the Massachusetts and Virginia cases. This study was completed before the Wilder win in 1989, but is suggestive about that historic campaign as well.

The three cases had significantly different outcomes. Brooke won an overwhelming victory, while Wilder was only narrowly elected. Bradley lost to George Deukmejian in one of the closest gubernatorial elections in California history. The difference between Wilder's victory and Bradley's defeat is small. However, underdog Wilder's showing exceeded expectations and was considered a major upset, while Bradley's defeat came as a great surprise to most observers. Why then did Wilder do so much better than expected while Bradley failed to do as well? Why did Brooke do so much better than Bradley? Why were all three campaigns so successful (considering Bradley's near-victory) in light of the low number of statewide black office-holders? What can other statewide black candidates learn from these experiences?

The present study will explore the political dynamics of the statewide black candidacy in light of the continuing impact of race. These dynamics represent the

[7] Thomas F. Pettigrew and Denise A. Alston, *Tom Bradley's Campaigns for Governor: The Dilemma of Race and Political Strategies* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1988).

[8] John F. Becker and Eugene E. Heaton, Jr., "The Election of Senator Edward W. Brooke," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 31 (Fall 1967): 346–358; Charles E. Jones, "Wild About Wilder: The Election of Doug Wilder for Lt. Governor of Virginia," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, 1987.

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context within which the voting results must be interpreted. The study is based on newspaper and magazine articles, campaign finance reports, public opinion polls, participant observation as a volunteer in the Bradley state campaign headquarters, and several interviews conducted before the election. It is obviously exploratory and even speculative in the hope of raising questions that may encourage further research on an important phenomenon.

The Dynamics of the Statewide Black Candidacy

My first premise is that the dynamics of a statewide black candidacy are qualitatively different from those of the mayoral elections that structure much of the literature on black candidacies. My second premise is that the race of the candidate significantly influences the dynamics of the campaign; race is deeply embedded in the battle itself, not just in the direct evidence of the voting returns. The factors that influence black prospects in statewide elections differ considerably from those in the urban setting. The mass of research on urban racial politics provides a beginning, but the dynamics of statewide racial politics require separate investigation.

Racial politics at the state level differs from the city setting in both demographics and the structure of party competition. While blacks comprise a high percentage of the population in many large cities, they represent a much smaller share in the states. Blacks do not exceed 20 percent of the population in any state outside the South. Within the South, the highest levels of black population are found in the states most resistant to black advances—Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina. No state exceeds Mississippi's 35 percent black population.

Without a large base of black voters, black statewide candidates must appeal to a mostly white electorate. The racial attitudes of the white majority can be expected to play a major role in any statewide black campaign, along with the style and issues offered by black candidates.

But it is not just a matter of population percentages; there are also structural differences. Black statewide candidates find themselves in a different relationship to political parties than that faced by black mayoral candidates. While big city politics often centers on the intraparty conflict between party regulars and party reformers, state politics more often involves interparty competition.

In many cities, blacks have attained independent political power by navigating between traditional party organizations and antiparty reformers. Because black mayoral candidates have generally encountered party opposition, blacks have often formed alliances with white liberal reformers against the party organizations. These struggles have occurred *within* the Democratic Party's urban base.

Interparty competition is clearly higher in statewide races than in most big-city elections. The South has usually been cited as the region with the lowest level of two-party competition. However, the ability of southern Republican candidates to win elections for governor and senator has eroded even that bastion of one-

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party government.[9] According to one measure, nearly half the states experience substantial two-party competition in gubernatorial races, while others have significant, if lesser degrees of competition.[10]

The statewide setting offers new opportunities but also significant limitations for black candidates. While partisan elections seem to create the conditions for reduced racial polarization in voting, this advantage for candidates is offset by the lack of black numbers. The Democratic Party's statewide candidates already draw heavy support from minority and white liberal voters; the marginal increase due to a black candidacy is small. Black candidates cannot afford to run highly publicized minority mobilization campaigns for fear of creating a white backlash. Virtually any white racist voting is likely to come straight off the top of the black candidate's vote. Thus, even when racist voting is small compared to a city election, its marginal impact may be much greater.

A black Democrat whose only white support is from antiparty reformers has little chance of winning a statewide election in a state with a significant level of two-party competition. The black candidate needs the votes of Democrats who might in their own city vote against a black mayoral candidate. Party unity is therefore crucial to black statewide success. Conversely, a black Republican will only succeed if the reluctance of blacks and white liberals to cross party lines is overcome.

I will explore three dynamic elements: racial attitudes of the state electorate, the political situation, and the campaign stance adopted by the black candidate. Through examination of these factors, I will suggest the best environment and strategy for a black statewide victory.

Racial attitudes can be assessed by opinion surveys as well as analysis of the state's social history. Of the three factors, racial attitudes represent the longest-term forces least subject to the control of the black candidate. Political situation includes such current political factors as the popularity and organizational strength of the parties, the quality of the opposing candidate, and the background of the black candidate. The possibilities for control are somewhat higher; the black candidate can choose what office to seek and when, depending on the political situation. Campaign strategy includes the ideological positioning and campaign tactics of the black candidate. What is the message and how is it projected? Of the three factors, this is the most controllable by the black candidate.

Racial Attitudes

California, Massachusetts, and Virginia are widely divergent in black population and voting patterns (see Table 2). Virginia has the largest black population of the

[9] Charles J. Barrilleaux, "A Dynamic Model of Partisan Competition in the American States," *American Journal of Political Science* 30 (November 1986): 822–840.

[10] C. Anthony Broh and Mark S. Levine, "Patterns of Party Competition," *American Politics Quarterly* 6 (July 1978): 357–384.

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TABLE 2

	Black Percentage of Population-1980	*Reagan Percentage 1984 Election*
California	7	58
Massachusetts	3	51
Virginia	17	62

three, as well as the most conservative voting record in national elections. It provided bedrock support for massive resistance to integration. Massachusetts is the most liberal and Democratic state in national elections. California, a state that has voted for only one Democratic presidential candidate since 1948, nonetheless has a reputation for racial liberalism.

For this exploratory study, the racial attitudes of each state will be considered as typical of their regions. In surveys of racial attitudes conducted by the Gallup and Harris organizations, clear regional differences have emerged. Generally, the descending order of racial liberalism has been West, East, Midwest, and South. The deep South has been the most conservative. For instance, the 1978 Gallup Poll asked voters if they would vote for a well-qualified black presidential nominee of their own party.[11] While 87 percent in the West and 78 percent in the East said they would vote for the black candidate, only 67 percent in the South and 53 percent in the deep South agreed. A 1971 Harris Poll showed that nearly identical shares of voters (about 30 percent) in the East, Midwest and West agreed that blacks are discriminated against a great deal; in the South the proportion was only 17 percent.[12]

A recent study of party voting in the South argued that the survival of the biracial coalition that supports Democratic candidates virtually depends on keeping blacks from winning statewide nominations on the Democratic ticket. In this view, white hostility to black candidates is so great that such a nomination would ensure Democratic defeat.[13] Wilder's gubernatorial victory thereby seems all the more remarkable.

Thus, the southern social setting would seem to represent the toughest challenge for black statewide candidates, in spite of the larger black population in the individual southern states. Since 1974 the voters of California have elected as many statewide black candidates (a lieutenant-governor and a superintendent of public instruction) as the entire South has since Reconstruction. Victory in a southern state like Virginia requires a favorable political situation and flexible candidate strategies. In an eastern state like Massachusetts or a western state like California, the prospects ought to be considerably better.

[11] Gallup Poll, *Public Opinion 1978* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1979), 214.

[12] Harris Survey, *The Harris Survey Yearbook of Public Opinion 1971* (New York: Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., 1975), 321.

[13] Merle Black and Earl Black, "Democratic Gubernatorial Runoff Primaries in the Modern South," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1987.

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Political Situation

Bradley

The 1982 California governor's race began with the decision of two-term Democratic governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. to seek a seat in the United States Senate. Brown, who had been hugely popular during his first term, ended his governorship in the depths of unpopularity. His public appeal suffered from two presidential campaigns, slowness in dealing with the Medfly infestation, and chaos in the state budget. A 1981 survey revealed that 55 percent of the state's voters had an unfavorable view of Brown.[14] Less than a year later, Democratic voters surveyed on the day of the June 1982 primary gave him a shocking 50 percent disapproval rating.[15]

By contrast, Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley brought considerable political strength to his bid to succeed Brown. In his nine years as mayor, Bradley had built a reputation as a unifier of an ethnically diverse city.[16] His steady movement away from his liberal roots to a more moderate stance increased his acceptability to the city's voters.[17] Through his economic development program, Bradley obtained the support of the downtown business community, attracting campaign money for his reelection campaigns. Bradley's favorable public image was reflected in statewide polls; he was the most popular politician in California among the voters of either party.[18] Despite wide recognition, Bradley's name evoked few negative responses.

Backed by an experienced and highly loyal candidate organization of blacks and white liberals,[19] Bradley enjoyed a stature that discouraged other campaigns from getting off the ground. In addition to Bradley's popularity and access to campaign money, no leading Democrat wanted to alienate black voters. As a result, Bradley coasted to an easy victory in the primary with 62 percent of the vote.

Bradley's political situation in the general election was less promising. Californians were not only choosing a governor, but also a senator, members of the assembly and state senate, and six statewide constitutional officers. State voters had several controversial ballot propositions to consider, including Proposition 12—an advisory nuclear freeze initiative—and Proposition 15—a measure to regulate handguns. Bradley supported both. While the ticket brought Bradley into alliance with a well-regarded slate of Democratic candidates for lesser state offices, he was also saddled with the highly visible Jerry Brown and a gun control initiative bitterly opposed by the National Rifle Association (NRA).

[14] *Los Angeles Times*, 26 July 1981.

[15] *Los Angeles Times*, 9 August 1982.

[16] Raphael J. Sonenshein, "Biracial Coalition Politics in Los Angeles," *PS* 19 (Summer 1986): 582–590; Sonenshein, "The Dynamics of Biracial Coalitions: Crossover Politics in Los Angeles," *Western Political Quarterly* 42 (June 1989): 333–353.

[17] Maurice Weiner, former deputy mayor of Los Angeles, interview with the author, 6 November 1981.

[18] *Los Angeles Times*, 26 July 1981 and 5 August 1981.

[19] Raphael J. Sonenshein, "Bradley's People: Functions of the Candidate Organization," (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1984).

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Despite his easy primary victory, Bradley was not in a good position to unite his party. His relationship with state party leaders was distant. In Los Angeles, party organizations have traditionally been very weak.[20] Bradley's mayoral coalition united minorities with white liberal reform Democrats who had built their movement out of opposition to the statewide Democratic regulars headed by Assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh in the 1960s.[21] At the state level, regular Democrats were much more powerful than in Los Angeles. The Unruh forces, bearing the scars of the intraparty wars, were unenthusiastic about Bradley.

While Bradley was dominant among minority politicians in Los Angeles, he was alienated from key black and Latino state politicians. Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, the state's highest ranking black elected official, kept his distance from Bradley, as did the legislative allies of Bradley's long-time black rival, Congressman Mervyn Dymally. Latino factionalism emerged as Bradley's urban Latino allies contended with their rural Latino rivals.[22]

These crosscutting factional winds meant that Bradley would be unable to easily unite the already fractious California Democrats. The party was also suffering from an eroding voter base. After the 1980 elections, approximately 300,000 Democrats were dropped from the rolls for non-voting. The party had to undertake a huge registration drive throughout 1982 simply to recoup its strength.[23]

Bradley's mayoral post both helped and hurt him. On the one hand, the image of his record as mayor was one of his greatest strengths, cited most often by voters in pre-election polls as a reason to back him.[24] But big city mayors, whether black or white, have rarely won statewide office.[25] Long-time association with the problems of a big city can counterbalance the high name recognition, even if positive, available to a mayor. A veteran mayor has made many compromises and is held responsible for the city's unsolved problems. The Los Angeles murder rate, for instance, inconveniently set a new record in 1981, causing Bradley severe political damage. As an advocate of his city's interests, the mayor suffers the ire of the rest of the state. This is particularly difficult for a big-city black mayor, because of the association between race and urban conflict. (It did not prevent San Diego Mayor Pete Wilson from defeating Jerry Brown for the U.S. Senate in 1982.)

Finally, Bradley faced a strong opponent in the general election. California Attorney General George Deukmejian, a former state senator from Long Beach, was

[20] Charles R. Adrian, "A Typology for Nonpartisan Elections," *Western Political Quarterly* 12 (June 1959): 449–458.

[21] Sonenshein, "Biracial Coalition Politics in Los Angeles."

[22] *Los Angeles Herald-Examiner*, 14 November 1982.

[23] Tony Quinn, "The Independent Mood of the California Voter," *California Journal* 13 (September 1982): 347–348.

[24] Field Poll, 13 April 1982.

[25] Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), 35. Theodore J. Lowi, "Why Mayors Go Nowhere," *Washington Monthly* 3 (January 1972): 55–61. For a contrary view, see Russell D. Murphy, "Whither the Mayors? A Note on Mayoral Careers," *Journal of Politics* 42 (February 1980): 277–290.

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unlike Bradley's Los Angeles opponents. In three of Bradley's four mayoral races, he had faced Sam Yorty, a maverick Democrat who frequently left the bounds of respectability. By contrast, the dull and cautious Deukmejian duplicated much of Bradley's personal appeal—sober, conscientious, moderate, and clean-living. Bradley had never faced a solid, well-behaved candidate backed by a strong party organization. Unlike his Republican primary opponent, Mike Curb, Deukmejian had few negative evaluations among the voters; his only problem was being unknown.[26]

As a state senator and attorney general, Deukmejian had identified himself with law and order. Having defeated black Democrat Yvonne Brathwaite Burke for attorney general in 1978, he knew how to make subtle racial appeals in a statewide race. The viability of Deukmejian's campaign was enhanced by the likelihood that he would oppose a black candidate. As early as January 1981, one reporter noted:

> Some insiders believe that the recent emergence of GOP Atty. Gen. George Deukmejian as a prospective candidate for governor reflects an assessment by Deukmejian and his chief strategist, Bill Roberts, that Bradley is likely to be the Democratic candidate and that he will be vulnerable to the same kinds of law-and-order arguments they used so successfully in their 1978 campaign against Democrat Yvonne Brathwaite Burke for attorney general. . . . One of the state's leading and most experienced politicians remarked this week, "I don't think Bradley is in the ball game against Deukmejian—a good, tough law-and-order candidate."[27]

Thus, Bradley's political situation was mixed. His high popularity, political style and reputation, solid and loyal political base, and ability to raise money were considerable assets. These strengths helped him preempt Democratic primary opposition and made him a very strong candidate for governor. On the other hand, his race, big-city mayoral post, lack of statewide experience, Democratic factionalism, serious Republican opposition, and association with Jerry Brown and gun control were strong negatives. Finally, he was running for the top executive office, a challenge likely to threaten some whites.[28]

Rather than being the ideal candidate in a perfect situation, as some described him in retrospect after his defeat, Bradley was highly competitive, but not in command. Most observers at the time ignored the negatives. But Pettigrew and Alston wrote in July: "Though Bradley holds a thin edge at this point, it looks as though he may need to use all the political skills he has acquired in his two decades of elected office to become America's first black governor."[29]

Jerry Brown hurt Bradley in several ways. It was bad enough that he left an unpopular Democratic administration to be judged by the voters; he also appeared

[26] Field Poll, 13 April 1982.

[27] *Los Angeles Times*, 16 January 1981.

[28] Thomas E. Cavanagh, "Race and Political Strategy," Conference Report of a symposium conducted by the Joint Center for Political Studies (JCPS), *Focus* 11 (June 1983): 1–9.

[29] Thomas F. Pettigrew and Denise Alston, "Bradley Wins Gubernatorial Nomination," *Focus*, JCPS, 10 (July 1982): 4–5.

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on the ballot as a candidate for U.S. senator to remind the voters of his shortcomings. The association with Brown meant that Bradley had to persistently define his own independence, thus shaking the momentum of his own campaign. Bradley was even cut off from effective statewide operatives associated with Brown.

Bradley carried Brown throughout the state. Statewide he ran 292,701 votes ahead of Brown. Meanwhile, Deukmejian was being carried by Brown's opponent, Pete Wilson, who outpolled Deukmejian by 141,551 votes. Bradley outperformed Brown in fifty-four of the fifty-eight counties; Bradley won 41,225 more votes than Brown in conservative Orange County. Wilson ran ahead of Deukmejian in forty-one counties and led him by 22,925 votes in Orange County.

In addition to Jerry Brown, Bradley had another ticket partner, Proposition 15. Gun control raised the temperature of the campaign among those voters least likely to support a black candidate. Thus it may have crystallized latent racial feelings. Unlike the purely advisory nuclear freeze initiative, the handgun proposition generated tremendous, highly organized opposition. Proposition 15 opponents, led by the National Rifle Association, fielded 30,000 volunteer workers—more than the two gubernatorial campaigns combined—and spent $5.8 million.[30] The proposition was defeated by a margin of 63–35 percent, losing in all but two of the state's fifty-eight counties. In nineteen counties, the vote was more than 80 percent against the initiative. Turnout was 10 percent higher in rural areas where anti-Proposition 15 sentiment ran high than in the urban areas likely to favor Bradley.[31]

The NRA had as many as 200,000 members in California, and 37 percent of the state's households owned firearms in 1980.[32] An election-day survey indicated that, exclusive of absentee voters, 48 percent of those who voted owned firearms.[33] The NRA lobbied in favor of Deukmejian, who had joined them in opposition to Proposition 15.[34] In early August, Attorney-General Deukmejian issued an advisory opinion sought by the NRA asserting that cities lacked the legal power to limit handguns.[35] Deukmejian also mailed literature directly to conservative households, highlighting his opposition to Proposition 15.[36]

The "normal" racist vote may have been augmented by the outpouring against gun control. People may have came out to vote against Proposition 15 and stayed around to vote against the black candidate.[37] An analysis of exit polls found that

[30] Eric Brazil, "A Mixed Bag of Messages From Those Ballot Propositions," *California Journal* 13 (December 1982): 442–444.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Field Poll, 14 August 1980.

[33] Ibid., 1 February 1983.

[34] Brazil, "A Mixed Bag."

[35] *Los Angeles Times*, 4 August 1982.

[36] Tony Quinn, "How Governor Deukmejian Won in the Mailbox, Not the Ballot Box," *California Journal* 14 (April 1983): 148–150.

[37] Thomas F. Pettigrew and Denise Alston, "What Happened to the Bradley Campaign?" *Focus*, JCPS, 10 (November-December 1982): 5–8.

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about 500,000 Democrats had cast their votes against Bradley rather than for Deukmejian. These anti-Bradley Democrats were typically white males; half owned handguns and 79 percent voted against Proposition 15. Half of them said that Proposition 15 was the most important issue on the ballot, compared to 14 percent of the total voters.[38]

The balance of party organization clearly favored Deukmejian. By comparison to the Republican operation, the labor-based Democratic get-out-the-vote program was unimpressive.[39] Deukmejian was the beneficiary of a brilliant Republican absentee ballot campaign. State Republican leaders sent out absentee ballot applications to all 2.4 million registered Republicans. These mailings had two important elements: a request for funds to cover the mailing's cost and a laser imprint of the voter's name and address. All the voter had to do was sign the application and mail it to party headquarters. There it would be sorted and sent to county registrars. The mailing included a four-page letter from Deukmejian and was followed up by telephone.[40]

There was a significant increase in absentee voting in 1982 to 6.5 percent of all ballots; in 1978 the figure had been 4.5 percent.[41] Deukmejian won 59.6 percent of the absentee ballots. "Had Deukmejian run no better among absentee voters than [Republican gubernatorial candidate] Evelle Younger did against Jerry Brown four years before, he would have lost."[42] The Republicans even recouped much of the project's cost through voluntary contributions from the recipients of the ballot applications.

Brooke and Wilder

Both Brooke and Wilder faced far more auspicious political circumstances. Like Bradley, Brooke possessed enormous popularity in both parties; unlike Bradley, Brooke had statewide experience. As the incumbent state attorney general, he was well known for his investigation of Massachusetts elected officials, which had led to corruption indictments against Democratic and Republican politicians. He was also running for legislative, not executive office in a progressive state.

Despite the large Democratic registration edge in Massachusetts, the Republicans had been doing very well statewide. In the face of the massive national Democratic landslide of 1964, Brooke was reelected attorney general by 350,000 votes, and Republican John Volpe was elected governor. In 1966, an excellent Republican year nationwide, Brooke's senatorial victory was part of a Republican sweep in Massachusetts led by the reelection of Governor Volpe with 63 percent of the vote.[43]

[38] *Los Angeles Times*, 7 November 1982.
[39] Ibid., 25 November 1982.
[40] Quinn, "How Governor Deukmejian Won."
[41] Field Poll, 1 February 1983.
[42] Quinn, "How Governor Deukmejian Won."
[43] Becker and Heaton, "Election of Senator Edward W. Brooke."

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While Wilder lacked the enormous personal popularity of either Bradley or Brooke, he had substantial state experience due to his work as a state senator. Well acquainted with the state's Democratic politicians, he was less alienated than Bradley from the state party leadership. Wilder benefitted from the great popularity of outgoing Democratic Governor Charles Robb. Unlike Jerry Brown, Robb had been an extremely popular one-term governor who left office only because of a state law against successive terms. At the time of the election, Robb's public approval exceeded 70 percent.[44] While Robb himself was not running, his popularity assisted the entire Democratic ticket. With 52 percent of the vote, Wilder ran behind his party's gubernatorial (55 percent) and attorney general (61 percent) candidates. Unlike Bradley and Brooke, however, Wilder had personal liabilities, including charges of operating as a slumlord.[45]

Both Wilder and Brooke faced weak opponents in the general election. Brooke ran against former Governor Endicott Peabody, who had been defeated only two years earlier in the Democratic gubernatorial primary. Brooke's polling revealed that many of the state's voters had negative opinions of Peabody, while few held such views of Brooke.[46] Peabody opposed capital punishment, placing Brooke in the enviable position for a black candidate of being more identified with law and order than his white opponent. Furthermore, as a liberal black Republican, Brooke's race was an asset that allowed him to take black and liberal votes from the Democrats. Brooke won 86 percent of black votes, compared to a respectable 39 percent for Volpe.[47]

Wilder's opponent in the general election was John Chichester, a Republican state senator with limited support within his own party. He won the party's nomination as a compromise between bitterly divided party factions.[48] Thus, while the unity factor favored the Republicans in California and Massachusetts, it supported the Democrats in Virginia. Chichester did not have the list of personal negatives associated with Peabody, but he was considered an inept campaigner. Despite considerable encouragement from fellow Republicans, Chichester was unable to effectively use Wilder's personal problems as a campaign issue.[49]

Thus, both Brooke and Wilder had the good fortune to run on strong party tickets in a good year for their state parties. Neither had to defend a big-city mayoralty, and both had extensive state experience. Brooke and Wilder faced weaker opponents than Bradley faced. Both were seeking posts less likely than the governorship to threaten whites. In sum, while Wilder may have faced the least auspicious social setting, Bradley may have confronted the least comfortable political situation.

[44] *New York Times*, 6 November 1985.
[45] Jones, "Wild About Wilder."
[46] Becker and Heaton, "Election of Senator Edward W. Brooke."
[47] *New York Times*, 10 November 1966.
[48] Jones, "Wild About Wilder."
[49] Ibid.

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Campaign Strategies

Bradley

Bradley's basic campaign strategy was an extension of his 1981 Los Angeles mayoral reelection campaign.[50] While the mayoral reelection model built on several of Bradley's greatest strengths, it may have also exacerbated some of the hidden weaknesses of the Bradley candidacy. His approach differed from the way he first won the mayoralty in 1973, when he aggressively charged Mayor Sam Yorty with inattention to city problems and called for the prevention of oil drilling in the Pacific Palisades. His reelection campaigns in 1977 and 1981 reflected his increasingly centrist methods of governance.

As mayor, Bradley's plans to redevelop downtown Los Angeles brought him closer to business than he had been in 1973. Over the years, his reliance on liberals for campaign funds decreased, and a larger percentage of his money came from business.[51] Bradley's corporate ties made him less inclined to stress environmental issues. Bradley still maintained his support among blacks and white liberals due to their incorporation into the city regime and the symbolism of the black mayor's career. At times, this support was given with only moderate enthusiasm. His mayoral reelections were quiet affairs against weak candidates in which Bradley's ability to preempt Democratic opposition and dominate campaign fundraising assured victory. His evolving style was much less issue oriented, focusing instead on his management skills and ability to conciliate.

For a number of reasons, the strategic approaches that derived from his reelection style came to dominate Bradley's statewide campaign. A strategy that created a crushing sense of inevitable victory through a combination of campaign money, name identification, and heavy advertising had the virtue of being tested and available. The staff and consultants who comprised Bradley's candidate organization were comfortable with it and had seen it create an unassailable incumbency for the mayor. The plan worked in the gubernatorial primary, as strong Democrats ran from the battle and Bradley's "machine" prevailed.

Bradley's emphasis on behind-the-scenes negotiation created a positive image without sharp definition. He tended to leave issues vague and even contradictory, as befitted a big-city mayor. Reporters found it hard to assess where Bradley stood.[52] For instance, as mayor he had lured the Oakland Raiders football team to Los Angeles. Led by its black mayor Lionel Wilson, Oakland had been unforgiving. During an early campaign stop in Oakland, a conciliatory Bradley suggested that the Raiders could return to Oakland if Los Angeles received an expansion team. Los Angeles labor leaders and sportswriters were enraged. Bradley also became

[50] *Los Angeles Times*, 1 March 1981.

[51] Maureen Kindel, former campaign fundraiser for the mayor, interview with the author, 11 February 1982.

[52] *Los Angeles Times*, 19 April 1982.

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embroiled in Latino politics as he sought to maneuver between agricultural interests and the United Farm Workers union (UFW).[53]

Bradley made several staff changes in order to enhance his issue positions, but the overall approach was too deeply embedded to be truly altered. While Deukmejian offered a consistent conservative refrain that linked crime, liberal judges, Jerry Brown, gun owners' rights, low taxes, and support for the death penalty, no single issue emerged to characterize Bradley's campaign. Relying on big business financial support that failed to materialize, Bradley could not easily stir popular backing on the environment or farm labor.[54] His campaign slogan – "He doesn't make a lot of noise; he just gets things done" – invited the electorate to assess what Bradley had already done in Los Angeles, rather than what he would do in Sacramento. Deukmejian was only too happy to focus on Los Angeles, blaming Bradley for the city's crime and transportation problems.

The need to avoid association with Jerry Brown deeply influenced Bradley's strategy. Bradley found it necessary to cut his links to campaign advisers with statewide experience who were known as Brown associates. Deukmejian's persistent linking of Bradley to Brown kept the mayor on the defensive. An observer suggested: "'I'm not Jerry Brown' has become such a familiar Bradley phrase that some jokesters have suggested the mayor put it on his campaign buttons."[55]

Consistent with his inevitable victory approach, Bradley used television advertising early to encourage fundraising. Reliance on expensive television advertising was part of the overall Bradley strategy from the start.[56] But it also derived from another limit on mayoral campaigning; he could not easily leave the city. Bradley's plans to run for governor had been an issue in his 1981 mayoral campaign. Had he packed up and gone campaigning, he could have been characterized as another Jerry Brown, abandoning one job to seek a higher one.

After the June 1982 primary, Bradley urgently sought and received $500,000 in loans from campaign supporters in order to put on a television advertising blitz to get ahead of Deukmejian.[57] These efforts jacked up his poll ratings, building both optimism and overconfidence among Bradley's supporters. In Los Angeles such a strategy would have demoralized the opposition and preempted major campaign money. Bradley's campaign peaked early and became vulnerable to a late surge of campaigning by Deukmejian. In the last phase of the campaign, Deukmejian ran a series of blistering anti-Bradley commercials, while Bradley's ads continued to use soft-focus, non-attack approaches.[58]

One controversial aspect of Bradley's campaign was his apparent decision not to mobilize Los Angeles black and liberal voters. Los Angeles blacks expressed

[53] Ibid., 4 October 1981.
[54] Ibid., 3 October 1982.
[55] Ibid., 9 August 1982.
[56] William Heckman, manager of the Bradley gubernatorial campaign, interview with the author, 21 December 1981.
[57] *Los Angeles Times*, 6 August 1982.
[58] Ibid., 11 September 1982.

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resentment, reflected in a column in a local black newspaper, the *Sentinel*: "Is Tom Bradley Taking the Black Community for Granted?"[59] It became part of the local conventional wisdom that had Bradley worked his base better, he would have won. A *Los Angeles Times* post-election survey indicating a low turnout in the black and Jewish neighborhoods of Los Angeles was widely quoted to support this view.[60] Pettigrew and Alston considered Bradley's decision to avoid mobilizing his minority and liberal base to be central to his defeat.[61]

Although it irritated his long-time supporters, this part of Bradley's strategy made some political sense, at least in theory. If the problem faced statewide by all mayors is a limiting association with their own cities, black mayors face the additional dilemma of association with racial issues. The challenge of the black mayor running statewide is shown by how unforgiving his city allies are of the need to ignore them. The city's groups, especially blacks and white liberals, were accustomed to attention from their coalition-building mayor. Wilder's black allies, by contrast, were much more understanding of his dilemma and mobilized black voters without his participation.[62] Even so, Wilder also suffered from a low black turnout.

But in actuality, Bradley did not raise the sort of issues that would have given life to his centrism—such as his strong and clear support of the death penalty or his commitment to keeping taxes low in Los Angeles. To the extent that he campaigned as a conservative, it was as a pro-business conservative. In a race for an open seat, business will likely stick with the Republican, and conservative white Democrats would hardly be drawn in by pro-business appeals. Business would have more likely responded had Bradley been a Democratic incumbent running for reelection.

At the same time, Bradley did not pursue the sort of broad progressive issues—environment, the symbolism of minority success—that might have appealed to a large body of voters. These issues could have been combined with a quiet, grassroots mobilization effort in minority communities.

The turning point of the campaign may have come on 7 October. Deukmejian's campaign manager, Bill Roberts, said in a published interview that if Bradley's lead could be closed to less than five points, the Republican would win on the basis of race. Roberts asserted that white voters would not admit racial bias to a pollster.[63] Although Deukmejian fired Roberts after a public furor arose, there was a sudden drop in Bradley's popular support between the Field Polls of 1 October and 15 October.

The context for this key event may have been the release of a new Field Poll on 7 October. Partly as a result of the Bradley television advertising blitz, the poll

[59] *Sentinel*, 30 September 1982.
[60] *Los Angeles Times*, 25 November 1982.
[61] Pettigrew and Alston, *Tom Bradley's Campaigns*.
[62] Jones, "Wild About Wilder."
[63] *Los Angeles Times*, 8 October 1982.

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showed a fourteen-point Bradley lead. In addition to giving a spur to racist voting, Roberts's remarks undoubtedly sought to reassure Deukmejian's financial backers that he could still win. Deukmejian was planning a series of fundraisers for coming weeks. The interview courted danger in that it gave Bradley a chance to challenge what had been a subtle campaign of anticrime rhetoric with potentially racist overtones.

Other than an immediate comment about the inappropriateness of Roberts's remarks, Bradley made little attempt to counterattack. Bradley's reaction resembled his stance in his losing 1969 mayoral campaign against Sam Yorty. When Yorty characterized Bradley as a tool of black militants and as soft on crime, Bradley relied on the voters to see through the charges. He guessed wrong.[64] By 1973, the voters knew Bradley much better, he publicized his experience as a police officer, and Yorty's racial charges fell flat.

California voters had less direct experience with Bradley; they had only a generalized positive image. They would not conclude on their own that race was irrelevant. Deukmejian's appeals to racial feelings were much more subtle than Yorty's; only after the campaign did Bradley's staff speak openly about what they saw as racist commercials and phrases such as Deukmejian's promise to be the governor of "all Californians."[65] Throughout the Bradley campaign the general attitude was that Bradley was well ahead. The prescription was caution – avoid dangerous issues and most of all steer clear of race. Thus, when faced with the Roberts interview which could after all have offered an opportunity to turn the race issue to advantage, the Bradley campaign reacted passively.

Race obviously hurt Bradley. In the balance between mobilizing pro-black and demobilizing anti-black forces, Bradley fell short. He received a large share of black, Jewish, and Latino votes, but there was no particular surge of minority or liberal turnout. A large number of people voted for Leo McCarthy, the Democratic candidate for lieutenant-governor, but not for Bradley. McCarthy, a liberal who opposed the death penalty, outpolled the moderate Bradley, who favored the death penalty, by a margin of over 200,000 votes. Other than race, there is no obvious explanation for this phenomenon. The undecided vote was persistently higher for the gubernatorial election than for either the senate or lieutenant-governor races; high levels of undecided white voters are prevalent in biracial contests.[66] Bradley's early lead was undoubtedly inflated by the high number of undecided white voters who shifted to Deukmejian in the closing days of the campaign.

Race helped voters perceive Bradley as more liberal than he actually was. Citrin et al. noted that Bradley's style had caused voters to see him as just another liberal Democrat; they presented this as evidence that Bradley had transcended the race issue.[67] An early poll showed that 40 percent of the voters saw Bradley as liberal.[68]

[64] Richard L. Maullin, "Los Angeles Liberalism," *Transaction* 8 (May 1971): 40–51.
[65] *San Francisco Examiner/Chronicle*, 7 November 1982.
[66] Pettigrew and Alston, *Tom Bradley's Campaigns*.
[67] Citrin et al., "White Reactions to Black Candidates."
[68] *Los Angeles Times*, 26 July 1981.

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But an analysis of Bradley's positions and style would mark him as a moderate or even conservative Democrat, certainly more conservative than Jerry Brown or Leo McCarthy. He was pro-death penalty (unlike McCarthy) and pro-business (unlike Brown). His image of moderation among well-informed liberals left him in the middle, unable to ignite their liberal enthusiasm. How much better would a white, moderate former police officer who favored the death penalty have done than Bradley among moderate white Democrats? How much better might an openly liberal white candidate have done among liberals? Various estimates placed the impact of racial voting from 3 to 10 percent, obviously enough to determine the result.[69] Race was embedded in the campaign, in the decisions on candidacies, in the issues and strategies used by the candidates and in the results.

Bradley's campaign was solid, with important elements worth emulating. It was marked by positive image making, sophisticated television advertising, a broad coalition, and remarkable fundraising bringing in over $8 million. Its weaknesses were a lack of flexibility and an inability to break with the pattern of Los Angeles reelection campaigning. In such a close race, Bradley's strategy left him open to Deukmejian's attacks without a counterattack of his own. He built up an artificial lead, only to watch it shrink.

In his 1986 rematch with Deukmejian, a more experienced Bradley did real damage to the Republican on the issue of toxic waste, and he directly and dramatically addressed the race issue. However, the odds of defeating a popular incumbent in a good economic year were too hard to overcome and Bradley was crushingly defeated. Facing a virtually hopeless political situation, Bradley ran a campaign that itself merits study by other statewide black candidates. This analysis confirms the conclusion reached by Pettigrew and Alston: if Bradley had run in 1982 as he did in 1986, he would have probably won.[70]

Brooke and Wilder

While there was some overlap among the strategies of the three black candidates, there were significant differences. In the area of style, Bradley, Brooke, and Wilder pursued similar strategies. They presented the image of the nonthreatening, moderate middle-class black politician. Only Wilder, whose previous style had been somewhat more flamboyant, needed to make changes in order to present this image.[71] None of the three mobilized the black community through overt racial appeals.

Wilder compensated for his lower name recognition through a statewide walking tour. Visiting towns in all parts of the state, Wilder introduced himself to local dignitaries and townspeople, making a favorable impression wherever he went.[72] Without a city to administer, Wilder could easily bring this off.

[69] Henry, "Racial Factors."
[70] Pettigrew and Alston, *Tom Bradley's Campaigns*, 91.
[71] Jones, "Wild About Wilder."
[72] Ibid.

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Strikingly, both Brooke and Wilder succeeded in focusing their campaigns on law and order. Brooke's investigations, the anticrime backlash of 1966, and Peabody's opposition to the death penalty gave the black candidate a solid stance on the crime issue. Wilder used crime as his main issue in a very aggressive manner, stressing his anticrime legislative record. His voting support was highest among those voters expressing fear of crime.[73] Thus, without sacrificing progressive credentials, each candidate took the conservative road on the crime issue.

Like Bradley, Wilder avoided the issue of race. Fortunately, the race issue was not explicitly or even subtly raised by his opponent. The Virginia media closely monitored the campaign to prevent any racist appeals. Wilder was careful to avoid direct attacks on his white opponent, cautiously following the southern norms of racial behavior. He sought and received the endorsement of conservative white leaders. Finally, Wilder may have been such an underdog that his campaign failed to generate a hostile white turnout.

Brooke faced the issue of racism head-on in a dramatic and forthright manner reminiscent of John F. Kennedy's response to the issue of his Catholicism in the 1960 presidential campaign. Brooke suffered a large dip in support near the end of the campaign, which his pollsters attributed to racist feelings among undecided white voters. Brooke immediately sponsored a radio call-in program in which he addressed the issue of race. He rejected extremists of the right and the left, explicitly repudiating the doctrine of black power. The drop in his polling support ended within days, even among the most prejudiced whites, and he went on to a smashing victory.[74]

Thus, political strategy was probably used most creatively by the underdog Wilder to adapt to the conservative southern culture. Brooke's ability to respond to the racism issue also stands out; his strategy may have prevented a landslide from turning into a dangerously close race. Both Wilder and Brooke took control of the potentially volatile crime issue; Bradley's opponent made it hard for Bradley to make the crime issue his own. Bradley's strategy was notable for its depth and consistency, but neither for its flexibility nor its ideological strength. Under better political circumstances, he might have won anyway. Finally, all three black candidates were highly competitive because of their ability to pursue the "politics of style."

Can Black Candidates Win Statewide Elections?

Black candidates can win statewide elections, but success will be neither frequent nor easy. There is no wave of victories on the horizon, and there will be many disappointments along the way. The prospects of winning will depend heavily on the context of the election and the strategies used by black candidates in light of that context. The outcome is not fixed, but is subject to luck and design.

Race does not exclude black candidates from contending statewide and even

[73] Ibid.

[74] Becker and Heaton, "Election of Senator Edward W. Brooke."

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winning. However, race is a central factor throughout the campaign. Women are likely to find the statewide and, by implication, national level substantially easier to enter than blacks. Some research indicates that women candidates have been less limited by bloc voting against their group so much as by the unavailability of seats and candidates.[75] It is unknown what constraints will limit Latinos, since their statewide victories have been generally confined to the Southwest, where their population share is large.

Racial attitudes in a particular state provide a general background for black candidates. Wilder's victory shows that even the most conservative environment can be overcome if the political circumstances are fortunate and the strategies are flexible. However, the optimism engendered by Wilder's success should not obscure the severely constraining context of the South.

The Bradley case indicates that an undesirable political situation in a moderate/liberal state can lead to defeat; only an exceptional strategy in such circumstances can create a victory. But the prospects for black victories in such states may be better than Bradley's defeat indicated. The Brooke case shows that when a black Republican in a progressive state can reach blacks and white liberals, he or she can win a landslide.

Blacks can definitely win statewide nominations. The black electorate, while insufficient to dominate individual states, is often a crucial factor in determining which party wins general elections. This means that even though party leaders may fear that a black candidate will cost the party votes, they cannot afford to oppose him or her publicly. Potential opponents of the black candidate may choose to avoid the primary or nominating convention. Both Bradley and Wilder had easy nomination victories, partly due to this factor. All three black candidates were initially discouraged by party leaders, yet they encountered little effective opposition to their nominations. Since the nomination is obviously the first step to election, the initial opening is apparently available. The Republicans, in fact, have an incentive to nominate blacks for statewide offices even in hopeless races, in order to create conflict among Democrats.

However, the general election is always likely to be hard. Strong Republican opponents will actively seek to run against a black Democrat, perceiving the negative impact of race on the Democrat's chances. Black Republicans will face the deep Democratic loyalty of black and liberal voters, and progressive black Republicans who can be serious candidates must overcome the conservatism of Republican primary voters.

Best Conditions for Statewide Black Candidacies

Liberal Racial Attitudes. States with sufficient black population to command deference, but with liberal racial attitudes are ideal. The first factor eases the route

[75] R. Darcy, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark, *Women, Elections and Representation* (New York: Longman, 1987).

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to nomination; the second makes election possible. Sophisticated big states outside the South remain the most inviting targets. Levels of black population are likely to be less important than in black mayoral candidacies. Only a state where blacks are in a majority—and that means Washington, D.C. if it obtains statehood—could sustain a truly black-identified victory. That may help explain Jesse Jackson's interest in statehood for the capital city. The state-by-state focus also indicates that what works in California may not work in Virginia. Ideological positioning of the black candidate must take into account the electorate's views in the particular state—clearly a factor in conservative Virginia.

Positive Political Situation. At the statewide level the health of the party is critical to a black candidate's success. Black mayors can build urban coalitions without or even against the party; black statewide candidates cannot. As Jones noted, "One valuable lesson to be learned from the Wilder victory is the importance of working within the party structure, because without party backing, black statewide aspirations are doomed to political failure."[76] Membership on a popular party slate and a party organization at least as effective as that of the opposition are crucial to a black candidate.

The Brooke case indicates the underrated potential of the Republican option. While Democratic leaders may be reluctant to support statewide black candidacies, Republican leaders in big states may see the potential for symbolic appeals to black voters through supporting black candidacies. While such campaigns may seem quixotic at first, a Brooke-style Republican could find race an asset when combined with Republican identification. Black voters have indeed shown a willingness to cross party lines to reward Republican appeals. In recent years, black support helped Republican governors win in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Viable black Republican candidacies may place pressure on Democratic leaders to be more responsive to black interests.

Ironically, just as black Democrats need to move somewhat rightward, black Republicans would have to strongly identify themselves as liberal in order to attract blacks and liberals. For the foreseeable future, such Republican candidacies are likely to be confined to those Northeastern states where Republican forces are liberal enough to nominate a black candidate who would be taken seriously outside the party.

Who are the most viable black statewide candidates? Just as an earlier generation of traditional black politicians found it hard to wage mayoral campaigns, black mayors may have important liabilities in statewide campaigns. Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young's campaign for governor of Georgia should provide an illuminating test. Politicians with state experience may be in a better position to unite the state party and to develop state issues. For the top statewide posts, earlier experience in lesser statewide offices is truly helpful. While holding down the post of lieutenant governor, Wilder had strong assets in seeking the governorship.

The prospects for victory depend on the quality of the opponent. Given the

[76] Jones, "Wild About Wilder."

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inherent liabilities facing black Democrats, stylistic or substantive weaknesses in an opponent are necessary to provide a wedge for campaign charges or to reduce the credibility of the opponent's charges. A strong opponent without substantial liabilities, like Deukmejian, may be able to run a sophisticated campaign that hardly mentions race while subtly drawing on racial feelings. The Deukmejian approach is likely to be studied by Republicans as a model for defeating black Democratic candidates. Any personal weakness is likely to be exploited. Brooke's defeat in 1978 was due in part to a messy divorce. In the same year, California's black lieutenant governor, Mervyn Dymally, was defeated for reelection despite the victory of most of the statewide Democratic ticket; unproved charges of political irregularities hindered his campaign.

Flexible Campaign Strategy. By now, the political style most acceptable to white voters is well known. It is an approach in which the black candidate is highly qualified and middle-class, with a quiet and conciliating style. Bradley is a leading practitioner of the crossover black political style.[77] California's relative success in black statewide candidacies may have been advanced by the presence of a large number of black politicians with this style.

But a "deracial" approach need not mean divorce from the black and liberal agenda.[78] As Jones has asked: "should black candidates seeking political office abandon a progressive agenda which addresses the chronic problems plaguing the black community in order to enhance their electability?"[79] Conservatism on crime, for instance, can coexist with progressive stances on the environment, education, and civil rights. As Wilder has shown, a crossover style can also coexist with an aggressive and assertive campaign.

Black statewide candidates cannot afford to be vulnerable on crime, an issue deeply intertwined with racial feelings. In 1978, black Democrat Yvonne Brathwaite Burke was defeated by Deukmejian for attorney general of California largely on the issue of crime. Even if liberals are alienated by an anticrime strategy, the crime issue left unchecked can devastate a black campaign. The liberal constituency for a statewide black candidate needs to realize that by being black the candidate is already strongly liberal in the minds of many voters.

Black candidates who face a sudden erosion of support or an unusually high number of undecided white voters may be torn between the Brooke and Bradley reactions. A high road approach like Bradley's may work best against a blatant racial appeal when the black candidate is familiar to the voters, but it may be too weak against sophisticated attacks that are not overtly racist. The viewpoint of the media may be very important; in the Wilder case, the media appointed itself as a watchdog looking for racist appeals.[80] In California, Bradley's constant repe-

[77] Michael Goldstein, "The Political Careers of Fred Roberts and Tom Bradley: Political Style and Black Politics in Los Angeles," *Western Journal of Black Studies* 5 (Summer 1981): 139–146.

[78] Charles V. Hamilton, "De-Racialization: Examination of a Political Strategy," *First World* 1 (March/April 1977): 3–5.

[79] Jones, "Wild About Wilder."

[80] Ibid.

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tition of the theme that race didn't matter may have helped lull the media into ignoring evidence of subtle racial factors. Pettigrew and Alston's advice that the racial issue should be directly confronted seems to be wise.[81]

The dilemma for the black candidate of how to use race as an asset while reducing its liability has yet to be solved. For instance, how low a profile must be kept among liberals and minorities in order to prevent conservative reaction and white backlash? Bradley's careful cultivation of the business community at the expense of an environmental constituency left him with the enthusiastic support of neither. Both Bradley and Wilder avoided black community campaigning, and both experienced a lower-than-average black turnout. Are there ways to solicit minority support without alienating whites?

IMPLICATIONS

The black statewide candidate faces an uphill struggle. While the analysis in this article does not accept the notion that the barriers are insurmountable, it also rejects the notion that black candidates can easily transcend the race question. Blacks remain one group that will not easily gain support from the majority of whites for their candidacies.

The statewide black candidacy carries the evolution of black politics in a logical direction toward higher offices through crossover appeals. Through occasional successes, black politicians can gain entry to higher levels of decision making. In a political system dominated more by media images and political symbols than traditional bargaining, the presence of minority politicians in the visible inner circle of power may be an important factor.

Statewide politics may ultimately allow blacks to navigate within the structure of party competition, creating a potential base of support within both parties. In light of the tendency of Democratic leaders to take the black vote for granted, such flexibility may force both parties to compete more directly for black voting support. As in urban politics, a new and more forceful relationship to party politics may yield important political benefits.

Finally, the analysis of the statewide black candidacy provides an important opportunity to reconsider the dynamics of a black presidential candidacy. This study suggests that it will be a long time before Americans elect a black president. Statewide success, the first step toward the White House, is still underdeveloped. But we can speculate about what sort of black candidate will someday win that election.

The experience of the Jesse Jackson campaign does not provide the most likely model for an eventual black president. Jackson has built an enthusiastic base through highly progressive appeals, but he faces highly negative evaluations from white voters and is handicapped by lack of office-holding experience. A winning black presidential candidate, by contrast, will probably emerge in an atmosphere

[81] Pettigrew and Alston, *Tom Bradley's Campaigns*, 88–90.

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of reduced racial prejudice, running against a weakened opponent as a member of a strong and popular party, with extensive office-holding experience and centrist strategies building on highly positive personal evaluations by heavy majorities of the public.

Postscript

In November 1989, L. Douglas Wilder of Virginia became the first elected black governor in the nation's history. This article was largely completed well before election day. What does Wilder's victory mean for the analysis presented here?

As in his 1985 campaign for lieutenant-governor, Wilder demonstrated the importance of a creative, assertive strategy. His effective use of the pro-choice position on abortion, placing his Republican opponent on the defensive, was foreshadowed in 1985 by his emphasis on crime. As in 1985 as well, Wilder touched bases with the southern political culture, cultivating the support of conservative whites.

Wilder's razor-thin margin of victory reemphasizes the vulnerability of the black statewide candidate even when he or she has an outstanding strategy. In both 1985 and 1989, Wilder trailed the other two members of the statewide Democratic ticket; and in 1989, one of those partners was a political unknown. Wilder's close win confirms the view that even when race is not an overt campaign issue, it is deeply embedded in the election.

The obvious question is whether Wilder's election means that the South is a more promising site for statewide black candidacies than my analysis suggests. Even if Virginia has become a less conservative state with the influx of northern liberals in recent years, it is still in the South. Is Wilder an historic exception to the rule or the harbinger of a new southern system? The Andrew Young campaign for governor of Georgia promises to provide a partial answer. It still remains true that Wilder is the only black elected to a statewide office in the South since Reconstruction. His success calls for more attempts in the South, while experience suggests that non-southern states may yet remain the most receptive settings.

In the broadest sense, Wilder's victory ought to help achieve the central goal of this article—to get people thinking about the phenomenon of the statewide black candidacy. For the first time in recent years, it will be possible to focus on a crucial step along a realistic path toward a successful black presidential candidacy.*

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The French Double Executive and the Experience of Cohabitation

JEAN V. POULARD

After the legislative election of March 1986, the French political system went through an unprecedented experiment that most Frenchmen called cohabitation. This new addition to the rich French political vocabulary refers to the major consequence of the 1986 election: the division and the sharing of governmental powers between a Socialist president of the Republic, François Mitterrand, and a prime minister of the Right, Jacques Chirac, supported by a majority in the National Assembly.

While such a situation had been expected to happen sometime in the course of the evolution of the French Fifth Republic, most analysts and some French politicians had argued that it could not possibly work—such an experiment would bring about grave political controversies and would ultimately end in a constitutional crisis. Yet, cohabitation between President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac avoided the severe problems that so many had predicted and lasted until the French presidential election of 1988.

This article investigates the meaning of cohabitation, the reasons for its relative success, and its ultimate consequences in the present French political system. It presents four main points: the constitutional provisions responsible for cohabitation, the various theories and scenarios about cohabitation, the operation of cohabitation, and the present and future consequences of the experiment. The article concludes by discussing whether France is headed toward a system change.

JEAN V. POULARD is assistant professor of political science at Indiana University Northwest and is the author of "The French Communist Party and the Popular Union" in *The Many Faces of Communism* edited by Morton Kaplan.

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I

The political system of the Fifth Republic is a hybrid incorporating some features of a presidential system and some features of a parliamentary system. Its main characteristic is a double-headed executive made up of a president of the Republic who is not a mere figurehead, has real powers, and is directly elected for a term of seven years and of a prime minister, chosen by the president but responsible to the National Assembly, which itself has a maximum term of five years.

In 1964, Georges Pompidou, the second prime minister of the Fifth Republic, described the system in these words:

> France has now chosen a system midway between the American presidential regime and the British parliamentary regime, where the Chief of State, who formulates general policy, has the basis of his authority in universal suffrage but can only exercise his functions with a government that he may have chosen and named, but which in order to survive, must maintain the confidence of the Assembly.[1]

This odd structure was conceived to remedy the defects of the constitution of the Fourth Republic, which had a weak executive who was never able to remain in place for more than a few months and was seemingly paralyzed from taking effective measures for the resolution of France's numerous and difficult problems.[2] The regime of the Fourth Republic had also produced an interesting political term, *immobilisme*, which referred to the consequences of a too powerful National Assembly divided by a multitude of political parties with none even close to holding a majority of seats, constantly intervening in the domain of the executive and regularly withdrawing its support from the policies of the government of the day.[3]

In comparison with the Fourth Republic, the constitution of the Fifth did indeed establish stability and more efficacy at the government level. This new constitution provided the executive with greater powers and reduced the role and powers of the legislature, limiting the number and length of its sessions and making membership in the government incompatible with membership in Parliament.

The powers of the executive are now shared between the prime minister and the chief of state who, unlike his predecessors in the previous French Republics, is now a very important player in French politics and in the day-to-day governmental process. The president's important position is based on the facts that he is elected by universal suffrage in an election requiring an absolute majority and that he is given decisive reserved powers by the 1958 constitution. Among these,

[1] Ironically, this description was given by Pompidou in response to an oral question in Parliament by Mitterrand on 24 April 1964. Quoted by Suzanne Berger in Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam, eds., *Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe*, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1973), 381.

[2] There were twenty-three different governments in France from 1946 to 1958. Yet the accomplishments of the Fourth Republic were not negligible. Among others, the economic recovery of postwar France, the solution of the Indochina war, and the creation of the Common Market go to the credit of that Republic.

[3] The term government is used in this article with its European meaning: the executive and more precisely the prime minister and his cabinet.

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the president appoints the prime minister and, on the latter's recommendation, the members of the Cabinet. He also terminates the functions of the premier when the latter presents to him the resignation of his government, according to the letter of Article 8 of the constitution—or, as the article has been interpreted in the first twenty years of the Republic, when the president desires it.[4] Furthermore, the president presides over the meetings of the Council of Ministers. These powers are particularly relevant to any discussion of cohabitation.

Moreover, the president may dissolve the National Assembly, although he cannot do it twice in the same year or during a time of emergency. This power, which had been regarded by the French for many years as antirepublican or antidemocratic and which had been in disuse since President Edme Patrice de MacMahon resorted to it in 1877—an act that was branded "MacMahon's Coup"—has now been used four times since 1958 and seems to be well accepted as a legitimate and necessary part of the political system. The founder and first president of the Fifth Republic, Charles de Gaulle, had insisted on this power and had made clear his intention to use it if the National Assembly too frequently became a hindrance to the efficient working of the government. To him, the logic of the political system he had created required cooperation between the executive and the legislature or, more precisely, support for the president on the part of Parliament. As his statements and his dissolution of the Assembly in 1962 indicate, he felt that conflict between Parliament and the chief of state cannot be allowed to endure; unless the president is ready to resign, the verdict of the people must be heard. "'Hence there is always a democratic way out,' explained de Gaulle when he wanted to contrast his system with the recurring constitutional deadlocks in the United States."[5] He would have never envisaged cohabitation with a hostile Parliamentary majority.

Another "democratic way out" for the president is the power to call for a referendum. However, the use of this type of consultation of the electorate is "limited to three types of measures—those concerning the organization of the public authorities, approving an agreement with the Community, or authorizing ratification of a Treaty which would affect the functioning of the institutions."[6] Beyond the 28 September, 1958 referendum for the approval of the constitution, there have been only five, the last on 23 April, 1972.[7] In theory, the use of this power must be

[4] For an interesting discussion of this interpretation, see François Goguel and Alfred Grosser, *La Politique en France* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1980), 203–204.

[5] Henry W. Ehrmann, *Politics in France* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 254. In his news conference of 31 January 1964, de Gaulle actually added: ". . . if we were to adopt the American system, there would not be one. In a country like ours, the fact that the Head of State would also be a Premier and the impossibility for him to appeal to the electorate, while Parliament could not overthrow him would inevitably result in chronic opposition between the two untouchable powers." *Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, 19 May 1958–31 January 1964* (New York: French Embassy-Press and Information Division), 249.

[6] Dorothy Pickles, *The Fifth French Republic*, 3rd ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 125.

[7] This referendum concerned Great Britain's entry into the Common Market, which de Gaulle long opposed. The other referenda took place on 8 January 1961, 8 April 1962, 28 October 1962, and 27 April 1969.

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at the request of the prime minister or the Parliament; in fact, the call for a referendum has come from the president who had a lot to do with the wording of the question. While this device has fallen into disuse under the Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand presidencies and while the question of its retention has been debated in recent years, the power remains. However, it is important to remember that it was over his defeat in the 1969 referendum that Charles de Gaulle chose to resign.

Again, in the case of a disagreement with the legislature, the president also has the power to request an advisory opinion from the Constitutional Council on the constitutionality of certain acts of Parliament. In this nine-member council, by his power of appointment, the president controls three seats.

Finally, in the domain of foreign affairs, the president is granted extended powers by Article 52 of the constitution, which gives him the right to negotiate and ratify treaties and to be informed of all negotiations leading to the conclusion of an international agreement not subject to ratification. It is also in this domain that the most controversial powers conferred upon him are found—those in Article 16.[8] This article, which was inspired by the memory of France's collapse in 1940, states that when the institution of the Republic or the country's independence is threatened in a grave and immediate manner and when at the same time the regular functioning of the constitutional government authorities is interrupted, the president may, after consultation with the premier and the Constitutional Council, take whatever measure he deems necessary. However, while the president holds these sweeping powers, the National Assembly shall meet by right and may not be dissolved. This "terrible Article 16," as Maurice Duverger called it,[9] has raised fears, especially during de Gaulle's tenure, that it could become the instrument by which a dictatorship might be established in France.[10]

Beyond these great powers, the president of the Republic is given by Article 5 of the constitution the general roles of "arbitrator" to provide "for the regular functioning of the public authorities and the continuity of the State" and of "protector of the independence of the nation."

The powers of the second part of the executive, the prime minister, are defined in a general manner in the constitution's Title III, which is composed of only four short articles. While this section, in Article 20, states that the government decides and directs the policy of the nation and that it is responsible to parliament, in Article 21 it personally entrusts the prime minister with national defense and the execution of the laws. The premier is also put in "charge of the work of the Government." In principle, this constitutional provision means that the coordination of governmental action takes place not at the Elysée Palace, the office of the presi-

[8] Obviously the powers of Article 16 could be used in a period of domestic turmoil, although they were not during the crisis of May 1968.

[9] See Maurice Duverger, *The French Political System*, trans. by Barbara and Robert North (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958).

[10] For an interesting historical study of the French presidency, see Stéphane Rials, *La Présidence de la République* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981).

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dent, but at the Hôtel Matignon, the office of the prime minister. The Cabinet, however, while chosen by the premier, is appointed by the president; thus the ministers selected must be acceptable to the latter.

The prime minister is the member of the dual executive who is nearly in constant contact with parliament when it is in session, who has the right of legislative initiative, and who can engage the responsibility of the government before the National Assembly. In his relationship with the legislature, the prime minister undoubtedly is dominant, even if this dominance must not be seen in a simplistic fashion. It is exercised through the fact that the premier controls the agenda of the assembly, as well as the texts to be debated, and he is the leader of the majority in that body.[11] While the assembly can always resort to a motion of censure for a change of government and policy, this device has become "a ritual without much efficacy." Between 1959 and 1981, "the opposition used this weapon about 25 times, only once, on October 4, 1962, with success."[12]

When the role and weight of the prime minister in the Fifth Republic were publicly questioned in 1964 by no less than François Mitterrand, Georges Pompidou, who was them premier, stated:

> Do not deceive yourself: the role of the Prime Minister, far from being diminished, is considerably reinforced. . . . The support he receives from the double confidence which is indispensable to him—that of the Chief of State, without which he would be in any case paralyzed, and that of the National Assembly, on which his position depends at all times—and the stability that the balance of the two provides permit him to act and to find efficacy in continuity. Surely, the prerogatives of the Presidents of the Council of Ministers of the IVth Republic were not limited by the authority of the President of the Republic. But what could they do, regardless of their ability, when they found themselves most of the time at the head of heterogeneous governments where the parties divided power among themselves as if they were slicing up a pumpkin, governments which, barely born, were already threatened with death?[13]

Pompidou here was, of course, comparing the relationship between the legislature and the premier in the Fourth and Fifth Republics and found much improvement in the latter. Certainly, today the French prime minister is a much more important individual because of this improved relationship in which he clearly dominates. And all the presidents since 1958 have so far chosen as their first prime minister a man who had special ties with the parliamentary majority. This was the case of Michel Debré in 1959, Jacques Chaban-Delmas in 1969, Jacques Chirac in 1974, and André Mauroy in 1981.[14] And from 1986 to 1988, although Jacques Chirac

[11] See Goguel and Grosser, *Politique en France*, 185–186.

[12] Stéphane Rials, *Le Premier Ministre* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), 120. All translations of French sources are my own with the exception of the translation of the French constitution, which is by Dorothy Pickles.

[13] Quoted in ibid., 126.

[14] Charles Vallée, "The Relationship between the French President and the Prime Minister," unpublished paper delivered at the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration 1984 Conference, Bloomington, Indiana, 5.

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was the third prime minister of President Mitterrand, his choice was made for the same reason. Thus, as in England, what the French call the *fait majoritaire* (majority factor) is the basis of the premier's importance.

Yet it has been argued that this same majority factor has been at the basis of the president's dominance in the double-headed executive and that parliament is in fact controlled not so much by the premier himself but by the president through him. Indeed, the history of the Fifth Republic shows that presidents have after a while chosen as a second prime minister an individual who could be said to be the president's man. This was the case of Pompidou in 1962, Pierre Messmer in 1972, Raymond Barre in 1976, and Laurent Fabius in 1984.[15] It is the way François Mitterrand understood the system in 1964, when in his book, *Le Coup d'Etat Permanent*, he humorously argued: "There are ministers in France. It is even rumored that there is still a Prime Minister. But there is no longer a government. Only the President of the Republic orders and decides."[16] Ten years later, in July 1974, Jacques Chirac, prime minister of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, also affirmed the subordination of the premier to the president: "It is the Chief of State who is directly responsible for the general direction of policy; it is he who must give instructions for the daily work of the Government. This implies that there cannot be any discussions over the directions he gives us. Therefore, the Prime Minister, by definition, must agree with the initiatives of the President of the Republic or resign."[17]

In the dyadic system of the French executive, all analysts have long agreed that the prime minister is, as Stéphane Rials put it, "*le second personnage de l'exécutif.*"[18] All studies of the French Fifth Republic, early ones as well as more recent ones, emphasize the preeminence of the president. As Charles Vallée of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration put it, this preeminence is based first on law, second on the legitimacy conferred by the election mode, and third on the majority factor.[19] As far as Vallée's first two points are concerned, Charles de Gaulle had no doubts:

> In effect, the President . . . is the *man of the nation* . . . is obviously the only one to hold and to delegate the authority of the State. But, precisely, the nature, extent and duration of his task imply that he not be absorbed, ceaselessly and limitlessly, by the political parliamentary, economic and administrative combination of circumstances. On the contrary, this is the job, as complete and praiseworthy as it is essential, of the French Premier. Indeed, there could be no watertight separation between the two levels at which, on the one hand, the President, on the other, *he who seconds him* daily exercise their respective functions.[20]

[15] Ibid.

[16] François Mitterrand, *Le Coup d'Etat Permanent* (Paris: Plon, 1964), 98.

[17] Quoted in Goguel and Grosser, *Politique en France*, 214.

[18] Rials, *Le Premier Ministre*, 125. Rials's two companion books on the president and the prime minister in effect are studies demonstrating the preeminence of the president of the Republic.

[19] Vallée, "Relationship," 1–2.

[20] *Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle*, 248. This quote is from de Gaulle's ninth press conference held at the Elysée palace in Paris on 31 January 1964. (Emphasis added.)

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Indeed, in practice throughout the history of the Fifth Republic, the prime minister's tasks have clearly indicated his subordination to the president. As Vincent Wright has noted, these tasks have been fivefold: the initiation of policies in areas that did not interest the president, ensuring the overall coordination of government policy, providing a constant liaison with the parliament, maintaining friendly contact with the biggest party of the parliamentary majority, and the arbitration of conflicts with this majority coalition.[21] Until 1986, the prime minister was in fact the "second" of the president.

II

Because of this assumption of the predominance of the president in the French dual executive and because of its presumed necessity, tied to the parliamentary responsibility of the prime minister, practically all students of French politics have argued since 1959 that sooner or later the Fifth Republic would face a major constitutional crisis. Some analysts even went so far as to suggest that the system of this Republic, so tailored to fit the ideas and ambitions of one man, could not possibly survive the passing of its founding father, Charles de Gaulle. Nathan Leites of the University of Chicago stated in a 1964 Rand Corporation paper that when de Gaulle retired or died, the Fifth Republic would soon be replaced by a Sixth Republic.[22]

During the de Gaulle presidency, which lasted until 1969, while most analysts were not so rash as to make such a dire prediction, they certainly felt that the system was flawed, perhaps fatally so. This was indicated by their descriptions of the president-prime minister relationship. For example, Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown opined:

> The Prime Minister might find it tempting to seek the support of Parliament in order to oppose the President of the Republic. He may invoke his political responsibility to cope with the impressive array of weapons that the constitution gives to the President of the Republic. Thus, a conflict between a "responsible" Prime Minister and an "irresponsible" President is likely to occur under certain conditions.[23]

In her explanation of the French executive, Suzanne Berger agreed: "Despite the predominance of the President, the system will work *only* when the President and the government can work together, for each one has *sufficient powers to block the functioning of the state.*"[24] To work together, both parts of the executive had to be in political agreement. And to many other analysts, above all other imaginable conditions, the breakdown of the system logically had to occur when the presi-

[21] See Vincent Wright, *The Government and Politics of France*, 2nd ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1983), 79–80.

[22] See Nathan Leites, *Guesses About de Gaulle* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1964).

[23] Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, *The de Gaulle Republic, Quest for Unity* (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1960), 166.

[24] Suzanne Berger in Beer and Ulam, *Patterns of Government*, 381. (Emphasis added.)

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dent and the majority of the National Assembly would no longer be of the same political party. This was bound to take place some day due to the fact that presidential and legislative elections are not conducted at the same time because of the differences in terms of office—seven years for the president, five years for the Assembly unless dissolved earlier.

In 1977 the crisis so long awaited seemed about to take place. The parties of the Left, which had been in opposition to the regime since 1958, made great gains in the municipal elections, capturing 52 percent of the votes cast. With some excitement the French waited for the legislative elections scheduled for Spring 1978. In practically all quarters it was predicted that the results of the upcoming elections would for the first time bring to the National Assembly a majority of the Left, composed principally of a coalition of the Socialists and Communists who had been allied with each other since 1972, when they had produced a Common Program of Government. During 1977, the alliance of the Left unravelled somewhat, but predictions of its future victory went on unabated, and speculations about what this victory would mean for the future of the French Republic abounded.

All these speculations started obviously with the assumption that Mitterrand, as leader of the new majority, would become prime minister for a president who was the leader of the opposing parliamentary coalition and who still had three years left in office. This in itself would precipitate the crisis, but what would really aggravate it would be the implementation of the Common Program, much of which was incompatible with the regime of the Fifth Republic. At that time the well-known political scientist Raymond Aron reiterated an analysis he had made in 1973: "Either the President will try to compromise by supporting certain points of the program not incompatible with the present regime or, if the newly elected majority refuses its confidence to the government, the President must dissolve the Assembly and seek the arbitration of the country."[25] I also partook in these speculations, arguing that the second development of Aron's scenario was more likely and that if the new Assembly returned was similar to the one dissolved there could be a repetition of the MacMahon episode of a century earlier. Of course, what could also be expected in this case would have been President Giscard's resignation. My conclusion then was that either way "could mean the end of the Fifth Republic, which then would be replaced, according to the Common Program, by a regime akin to that of the Fourth Republic."[26]

In Fall 1977, two books appeared in France whose titles suggested both the inevitable electoral victory of the Left for 1978, but also the temporary or impossible nature under the rules of the Fifth Republic of the consequences of this victory: two opponents in the executive. These two books were very detailed scenarios of what might happen after Mitterrand became prime minister.

The first, entitled *Les Cent Jours de Mitterrand*, clearly labelled as a *roman*

[25] *L'Express*, 19-25 February 1973; see also *Le Figaro*, 15 March 1977.

[26] Jean V. Poulard, "The French Communist Party and the Popular Union" in Mortan Kaplan, ed., *The Many Faces of Communism* (New York: Free Press, 1978), 111.

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(a novel), was written by the well-known Alfred Fabre-Luce, who in his preface made clear that his intent in presenting a plausible day-to-day account of the likely development of a Mitterrand premiership was to persuade the French not to vote for the Left. This book, he said, could "in strongly depicting the future, give itself a chance to shape it. To shape it *or to prevent it* – for my readers, discovering with me the disorder that is about to take place, could indeed decide to reject it by their votes."[27] The story portrayed a France in turmoil, beset by occupations of plants and demonstrations reminiscent of the troubles of May 1968. Fabre-Luce conveniently ended his fable with Mitterrand dying in his sleep at the Hôtel Matignon at the end of one-hundred days. However, before bringing this surprising denouement, the book gave a hint that the Giscard-Mitterrand team was on the verge of replacing the Fifth Republic with a new system that would incorporate a proportional representation electoral law and a stronger position for the prime minister in relation to the president – a system on the same lines as that of the Fourth Republic.[28]

The second book, Philippe de Commines's *Les 180 Jours de Mitterrand*, unlike the first, which was in the form of a diary, gave a more detailed scenario in the historical style. Unlike Fabre-Luce, Commines predicted a clear win of the Left with an overwhelming majority in Parliament. Yet this story of a six-month government of the French Left was quite similar in its flavor, if not in its details, to the narrative of the first book. France was also presented in a state of turmoil, with terrorist acts from the Right and extreme Left, conflicts between Giscard and Mitterrand, strikes and Communist agitation. The conclusion of this book was, however, more realistic. The story ended with the Communists leaving the majority and Giscard dissolving the National Assembly. The president in a televised speech was made to say to the French: "If you elect again a majority of socialo-communist deputies, I will draw the proper conclusion and will resign from my office."[29] According to its author, the end of this scenario was only a temporary one.

It is impossible to say whether these two books[30] or other dire predictions had any influence on the outcome of the 1978 legislative elections. The fact is that the Left lost and the old majority was returned to the National Assembly, albeit by a very small margin of the popular vote. The constitutional crisis, if there ever was to be one, was postponed.

Until recently, practically no one in France or elsewhere believed that the political system of the Fifth Republic could function relatively smoothly unless both the president and the prime minister were supported by the same majority in Parliament – unless the two parts of the dual executive were in fact closely allied.

[27] Alfred Fabre-Luce, *Les Cent Jours de Mitterrand* (Paris: Julliard, 1977), 9.

[28] Ibid., 215.

[29] Philippe de Commines, *Les 180 Jours de Mitterrand – Histoire du 1er Gouvernement de l'Union de la Gauche, 3 Avril – 2 October 1978* (Paris: Pierre Belfond, 1977), 224.

[30] While Commines, unlike Fabre-Luce, did not specifically indicate his reason for writing his scenario, it can be assumed that he too wanted to influence the future.

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When the Left finally came to power in France in the presidential election of 1981, Mitterrand promptly dissolved the Assembly to get a parliamentary majority to support him. Mitterrand's desire in this case was amply fulfilled when his Socialist Party received a clear majority of seats, leaving the allied French Communist Party in the position of a very junior partner. Once again in 1981 the parliamentary importance of the system, the *force majoritaire*, was reiterated.

Perhaps, the fear of a constitutional crisis, especially in the 1970s, was not so much due to the conviction of an executive structure fatally flawed, but rather to the fact that the French Left, seemingly irreconciled with the system, had made clear in its Common Program of 1972 its intent to greatly modify the institutions of the Fifth Republic. As it turned out, after the Left captured both the presidency and the legislature, the constitution was untouched. The only reform of a truly political nature was the change in the electoral law from single-member districts with a majority provision to a proportional representation scheme.[31] After 1981, the Left and especially the Socialist Party understood that, after all, the institutions of the Fifth Republic had served them well. Indeed, it can be argued that these institutions, as well as the leadership of Mitterrand, brought the Socialist Party to the position it has acquired today in France.[32]

Whatever the case may be, for nearly thirty years there has been a wide consensus over the idea that the hybrid system of the Fifth Republic was in fact more of a presidential system than a parliamentary one, especially since the chief of state was elected by universal suffrage. It was widely believed that the logic of the governmental structures of that special system required an agreement of views between the president and the premier and, through the latter, the majority in the National Assembly. Logic seemed to require the president to resign or appeal to the electorate if he were confronted by a contrary majority. If the prime minister disagreed with the president who still had the support of the parliamentary majority, logic again required the premier to resign. It is the view that Jacques Chirac propounded in 1974. It is certainly the view that Charles de Gaulle held when he resigned over his defeat in the referendum of 27 April 1969. And it was also the view of Giscard's second prime minister, Raymond Barre, who argued before the legislative elections of 1986 against cohabitation and for the necessity "to change president in order to change policy."[33]

Still, some have argued that this was the wrong interpretation of the constitution, "the constitution was in theory supposed to function whether the President and the 'government' agreed or not."[34] Maurice Duverger has developed this view, using the authority of de Gaulle himself by making much of the great man's 1967

[31] This electoral system, to which France has again returned, provides for a two-round election if no candidate obtains a majority of the votes in the district in the first round.

[32] See François Borella, *Les partis politiques dans la France d'aujourd'hui* (Paris: Seuil, 1973), for a very interesting analysis of the effects of the institutions of the Fifth Republic on French political parties.

[33] *Le Monde Hebdomadaire*, 27 February–5 March 1986.

[34] Roger Morgan, "'La Cohabitation' or 'La Cohabitention'? The Fifth Republic Enters a New Phase" in *Government and Opposition* (Summer 1986): 260.

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quip (after a close legislative election) that "in fact it would have been amusing to see how one can govern with the constitution."[35] However, as Jean Massot has stated, "another interpretation of the General's intentions is possible, and . . . his statements as well as his actions in 1946 and 1969 [seem to indicate the General would have returned] to Colombey."[36] It is doubtful that de Gaulle believed in his quip or that "his" constitution could be strictly applied as Duverger and others interpret it. For it is clear that such an interpretation presupposes a "radical change in the image of the President of the Republic,"[37] although this new image is as yet far from being defined.

In fact, Maurice Duverger in his *Bréviaire de la Cohabitation* goes a bit far when he intimates that the French "citizens decided to abandon by their vote of March 16" 1986 the old regime of president and prime minister from the same political camp.[38] The 1986 legislative election cannot be argued to have represented a new popular interpretation of the constitution. Rather, it was the expression of a desire to end Socialist power and policies. That the French on the whole accepted cohabitation proves nothing on this score. As long as François Mitterrand would not resign, there was not much that anyone could do constitutionally to force him out of office. The result of the legislative election of 1981, on the contrary, tended to prove that the French people believed in what is sometimes known as the Gaullist interpretation of the constitution—that the regime to be both efficient and democratic must have a president with a supportive majority in Parliament and thus be in agreement with his prime minister.[39] It can be argued that the French reiterated this point of view, albeit not as forcefully, in 1988.

It is true that the constitution of 1958 offers quite a few ambiguities and thus different interpretations as most constitutions do. And these ambiguities have made cohabitation possible and have brought it about. Thus, although the general opinion was that the president and the prime minister had to be of the same political camp, a view gradually developed that perhaps this was not necessarily a *sine qua non* for the survival of the Fifth Republic. Some people began to discover in the constitution some flexibility as far as this issue was concerned. As Jacques Chaban-Delmas stated in an interview for *L'Express*, "the Constitution of 1958 is rather supple and ductile. It permits coexistence."[40] And that flexibility is due in part to the language of Article 20 which says: "The government decides and directs the policy of the nation" and not "the President decides the policy of the nation which the government implements," as Chaban-Delmas in 1962 had proposed it

[35] Maurice Duverger, *Bréviaire de la Cohabitation* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), 7.

[36] Jean Massot, *La Présidence de la République en France, Vingt ans d'élection au suffrage universel, 1965–1985* (Nancy: La Documentation Française, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, no. 4801, 1986–1), 130. Colombey was the home of General de Gaulle.

[37] Duverger, *Bréviaire*, 18.

[38] Ibid., 43.

[39] This is René Capitant's analysis. Capitant was minister of Justice from May 1968 to April 1969. See Charles Zorgbibe, *Le Chef de l'Etat en Question* (Paris: Atlas/Economica, 1986), 29–36.

[40] *L'Express*, 28 November-4 December 1986.

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should be rewritten. At that time de Gaulle had opposed the idea, because "he foresaw that one day a *demi-alternance* could happen and he wanted, even in such a case, that France continue."[41]

The language of Article 20 permits a policy to be both enunciated and implemented by only one part of the dual executive. The proposed amendment would have made a policy or governmental deadlock much more probable, even though the president of the Republic retains some very important reserved powers.

Cohabitation is most often understood simply as a situation where the president and the prime minister are leaders of opposing political coalitions with antagonistic programs. However, cohabitation means much more than that. It "implies that the President keeps the prerogatives which the constitution gives him, but also that the Prime Minister governs according to his own views."[42] In this situation, the president, while no longer predominant, remains nevertheless a strong president. Some say, following the constitution, "he becomes an arbitrator."[43] This is rather ambiguous. Perforce he must be an arbitrator between his own political views and those of the prime minister and thus can hardly be impartial. This is perhaps the reason why the idea of cohabitation—a term which significantly appeared only during the campaign preceding the election of 1986—was for many and for so long an impossible one.[44] However, in the 1970s, because of close elections, twice the idea (if not the word) of cohabitation came to the fore and was seriously discussed by the politicians concerned. The first time was the presidential election of May 1974; the second was the legislative election of March 1978.

In the 1974 presidential election, the two major candidates were Giscard and Mitterrand. The former was running for the first time for the position, leading a party that, while still allied to the parliamentary majority, had taken its distance from the Gaullists. The latter was making his second attempt in ten years, leading a reorganized and rejuvenated *Parti Socialiste* in alliance with the French Communist Party.

If Mitterrand had won in 1974, he would have faced a hostile parliamentary majority, which had been elected just a year earlier. During the campaign in a radio interview the Socialist candidate stated what he would do if he entered the Elysée Palace. First, he would name a government, and if the National Assembly rejected it, then he would dissolve the Assembly. The result of the new election would lead him to make a decision, Mitterrand said: "that is, to take scrupulously into account the verdict of universal suffrage and to choose, this time on a long

[41] Ibid. However, it seems to me that de Gaulle's opposition to Chalban-Delmas's proposal still cannot be construed to mean that the general believed that the system could work well with cohabitation. Probably if there was to be cohabitation, the situation should not turn out to be like that in which the United States government often finds itself, with the president faced by a hostile majority in Congress.

[42] Jean-Marie Colombani and Jean-Yves Lhomeau, *Le Mariage Blanc* (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1986), 207.

[43] Ibid., 210.

[44] Many people attribute the coining of the term cohabitation to Edouard Balladur, a close associate of Jacques Chirac. The term was used in an article by Balladur in *Le Monde*, 16 September 1983.

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term basis, a chief of government and to put together a government which will conform to the majority desired by the people."[45] Mitterrand subtly indicated that he would be prepared to "cohabit" (although he certainly did not use that word) with a contrary majority if this was the wish of the French people. As François Goguel and Alfred Grosser have remarked: "The idea was surprising."[46]

Thus, by the mid 1970s the "impossible idea" seemed worth trying in the minds of at least some politicians, eager to attain or to retain high office. And again in 1977, well in advance of the campaign for the legislative election of 1978, the sitting President Giscard affirmed that he planned to stay in office even if the Socialist-Communist coalition won a majority in the National Assembly. Reaffirming that stand in a speech at Verdun-sur-le-Doubs on 27 January 1978, Giscard warned the French people: "You can choose the implementation of the Common Program. It is your right. But if you choose it, it will be implemented. Do not think that the President of the Republic has in the Constitution the means to oppose it."[47]

Giscard clearly understood that there was nothing in the constitution that forced him to resign if the French people gave him a contrary majority in Parliament. Furthermore, he understood that, if he wanted to stay in office, there was not much he could do except let the new parliamentary majority and its leader implement their policies, as distasteful as they might be to him. This was the compromise that staying in office required of a president without a clear cut veto power. As it turned out, Giscard was not given the opportunity to preside over such an experience.

The first time cohabitation could have been tried was 1981, when Mitterrand was elected president of the Republic. He faced a National Assembly with a majority of the Right with still about two years to go in its term. However, Mitterrand, discarding his idea of 1974, did not attempt to nominate a prime minister right away and did not hesitate to promptly dissolve the Assembly. The result of the 1981 legislative election made it possible for the French system to continue to operate as it had since 1958.

III

Cohabitation finally became a reality in 1986 for the following reasons: it was made possible by the fact that presidential and legislative elections are held in France at different times; the 1986 legislative election returned to the National Assembly a majority clearly hostile to a president with still two years left in his term of office; this hostile majority had a fairly well defined leader in the person of Jacques Chirac; the idea of cohabitation had been developing in the minds of several top French politicians as a possibility since the mid-1970s; President Mitterrand decided

[45] Quoted in Goguel and Grosser, *Politique en France*, 211.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Quoted in Rials, *La Présidence de la République*, 98–99.

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to stay in office; the French people did not call for Mitterrand's resignation and also seemed to accept the idea of cohabitation; Jacques Chirac, as leader of the opposition to the president, accepted the offer of the post of prime minister; and both Mitterrand and Chirac, with an equal legitimacy which universal suffrage provided them, decided to make the best of this unprecedented situation.

While it is clear that the constitution of the Fifth Republic permits cohabitation, it does not follow that such a situation can be the best way to apply that constitution, that the French political system can operate just as efficiently as with a concordance of presidential and parliamentary majorities, or that in the long run it will not bring about some important alterations to the system. On the surface, cohabitation between Mitterrand and Chirac seemed to have worked, especially since no great constitutional crisis or dire controversy arose. Yet, cohabitation might not necessarily take the configuration that the Mitterrand-Chirac duo did, as Charles Zorgbibe has demonstrated in presenting several different scenarios in his book *Le Chef de l'Etat en Question.* In fact, cohabitation has put some strains on the working of the Fifth Republic's institutions.

Cohabitation began on 20 March 1986, four days after the legislative election, with President Mitterrand nominating Jacques Chirac as prime minister of a government of the Right. The decision was not made without some debate in Mitterrand's entourage about other candidates who might as well represent the new majority. The names of Giscard, Chaban-Delmas, Alain Peyrefitte, and others were mentioned. However, none could be said to represent *La Droite* (the Right) as well as Chirac did.

Chirac had been the popular mayor of Paris for nearly ten years, was the uncontested leader of the strongest party of the new majority—the *Rassemblement Pour La République* (RPR)—and was clearly the leader of the opposition to the Socialists. The choice ultimately then had to be Chirac. Mitterrand delayed four days to reemphasize the fact that he, as the president, had the power to choose the prime minister. On 2 March 1986, Mitterrand clearly made the point in an interview. "Nobody will designate the Prime Minister for me, believe me! . . . Of course, it is necessary to nominate somebody who will have all the chances to have the majority of the National Assembly [behind him] right away."[48] The tone had been set. Cohabitation must not really mean a change in the president's powers or a political system change for France.

It had been said that Chirac hesitated a bit before deciding to accept the nomination. Raymond Barre, a leader of the French Center-Right and a rival of Chirac, had branded the idea of cohabitation as an aberration that should not be tried. Chirac had to weigh the potential influence Barre's position might have on his presidential aspirations. In the end, Chirac opted for cohabitation. The counsel of his close associate, Edouard Balladur, might have been the decisive argument: "If you go to Matignon and fail you will not become President. But if you do not go, you will never be!"[49]

[48] Quoted in Colombani and Lhomeau, *Le Mariage Blanc*, 29.
[49] Ibid., 33.

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One can speculate about the motivations of Mitterrand and Chirac in their option for cohabitation: the love of power, the defense of a certain political philosophy or of a certain notion of the French national interest. Certainly, as Michael Harrison had stated, Mitterrand's main interest was to complete his full term of office. A second priority was to retain as much power in office as possible and to foster a political climate beneficial to a Socialist revival.[50] Chirac's main objective was to erase five years of management by the Left, even if it meant speeding things up by legislating outside of parliamentary procedures through the use of decrees.[51] However, Chirac was willing to compromise and nominated for minister of Foreign Affairs and minister of Defense, Jean-Bernard Raimond and André Giraud, each without a highly partisan political profile and with whom the president could easily work.

It seems that the relative proximity of the next presidential election in two years was an important factor. Each protagonist planned to run in that election and based his decision for cohabitation on the idea that the French public expected it of him. Both seem to have felt that whomever was perceived as the precipitator of a constitutional crisis would have to pay for it at the polls in 1988.

Thus, cohabitation, or coexistence as Mitterrand preferred to call it, began. The president based his position squarely on Article 20 of the constitution. As he explained in an interview in November 1986, "if the Prime Minister had not thought of it, I would have reminded him of Article 20. I only am responsible and only want to be responsible for actions that I initiate or that I approve. For the rest, as any citizen, I follow the law voted by Parliament."[52] Mitterrand's position did not mean that he was ready to submit totally to the will of the new majority in renouncing the program for which he had been elected five years earlier. Certainly he was not prepared to become a figurehead—a president only destined, as the saying went, to "inaugurate chrysanthemums." "I am not René Coty," Mitterrand had warned.[53]

The first meeting of the government with the president took place on 22 March 1986 in front of television cameras in an atmosphere reported as "icy." The second meeting, four days later on the regular Wednesday, was not much warmer. The president made it clear that he would not cooperate on certain issues. Specifically, he said that he would not sign *ordonnances* (decrees) dealing with social policies that did not present progress in relation to what was already in place.[54] This would force the government to present those issues to Parliament for a vote and thus delay the promulgation of the policies desired by the majority.

[50] Michael Harrison, "France in Suspense," *SAIS Review* (Winter/Spring 1986): 102.

[51] Bernard Mazieres, "France Turns to the Right," *Europe*, April 1986, 35.

[52] *Le Point*, 10 November 1986.

[53] Colombani and Lhomeau, *Le Mariage Blanc*, 10. Coty was the second and last president of the Fourth Republic.

[54] *Le Point*, 31 March 1986. In France, the Parliament can authorize the government to issue decrees for the implementation of its program. However, the president's signature is necessary for them to become effective.

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From this inauspicious start, as the practice of coexistence developed, each of the two parts of the double executive drew from the constitution a certain number of prerogatives. As Jacques Fournier has remarked: "On the basis of these prerogatives, the President and the Prime Minister adopt certain positions, which are sometimes divergent, and develop strategies manifestly different. Each affirms an autonomous existence."[55] However, while the prime minister and his government might decide and direct governmental policy, there are certain areas where they indeed need, because of constitutional requirements, the cooperation or acquiescence of the president. In that sense the president can have more of an autonomous existence than the prime minister.

Mitterrand's strategy was to use these constitutional requirements to reaffirm the important position of his office in the French political system and to prevent, or at least delay, certain decisions that the prime minister and his cabinet wanted to take. In this, again according to Jacques Fournier, the president has three "levers": the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers; Article 13 of the constitution; the particular prerogatives of the president in matters pertaining to defense and diplomacy.[56]

As chairman of the Council of Ministers, the president controls the agenda of each meeting. While this prerogative does not permit him to oppose all projects of the government unless he wants to paralyze it, it gives him some means of negotiation. Furthermore, it permits him to make known to the general public his reservations about this or that legislative proposal. If a legislative proposal he opposed is nevertheless passed by Parliament, he can ask that body for a second debate or he (or sixty of his supporters in Parliament) can send that legislation to the Constitutional Council for its review. However, he cannot refuse to promulgate a law that might have passed these hurdles.

Under Article 13, the president is given the option to refuse his signature to *ordonnances* that Parliament can authorize the government to issue for the implementation of its program. Such refusal not only indicates the strong opposition of the chief of state to certain policies but also forces the government to seek the approval of Parliament through specific legislation and thus to engage the responsibility of the majority. Similarly, civil or military appointments require the president's signature.[57]

As far as defense and foreign affairs were concerned, the president under cohabitation continued to have a predominant position, although the constitution in this domain offers many ambiguities. Article 20 says that the government disposes of the armed forces, and Article 21 that the prime minister is responsible for national defense; while Article 15 says that the president is the chief of the armies. Yet, the "two ramparts of the President have been in this domain the [nuclear] bomb and protocol."[58]

[55] Jacques Fournier, "Politique gouvernementale: les trois leviers du Président," *Pouvoirs*, no. 41, 1987, 64.

[56] Ibid., 65.

[57] See *Dictionnaire de la Constitution*, 4th ed. (Paris: Ayas, 1986), 58.

[58] Fournier, "*Politique gouvernementale*," 70.

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Thus, firmly based on constitutional provisions, cohabitation between Mitterrand and Chirac, to the surprise of some and to the chagrin of others, endured. However, because the relationship between the two men was at best distant,[59] often antagonistic and at times tumultuous, this peculiar situation was sometimes rebaptized cohabitension.

As expected, the tensions arose first and foremost over domestic policies. One such episode that severely strained cohabitation was the question of the privatization (or *re*privatization) of industries and banks, which were nationalized by the Socialist government between 1981 and 1986. On 9 April 1986, the president warned that he would not sign *ordonnances* concerning the privatization of enterprises nationalized before 1981, nor those "which would lead to measures contrary to the democratization of the public sector."[60] As promised, on 14 July 1986, Mitterrand declared that he would not sign the *ordonnances* proposed by the government authorizing the privatization of sixty-five industrial and financial firms, basing his refusal on the necessity to preserve national independence. He further stated that it was for the Parliament to take responsibility. On 16 July, after the regular meeting of the Council of Ministers where Mitterrand made good his threat, Chirac appeared on television to announce that the measure would be submitted to Parliament. The prime minister also politely but pointedly called Mitterrand's concerns without any foundation and termed the president's refusal to sign without precedent: "It is the first time" that a president "goes against the clearly expressed will of the majority of the French people."[61] Ultimately, Chirac had his way even when the law on privatization was referred to the Constitutional Council for review.

Another dispute of importance between the two main actors was the question of a return to the two-round, single-member district electoral law. The law was passed by Parliament, and the necessary reapportionment of the 577 electoral districts for the National Assembly was the object of an *ordonnance*. In this case, the president refused to sign, forcing the government to transform its text into a legislative proposal, which after passage was referred to the Constitutional Council. Again the prime minister won his case. In this episode, Louis Favoreu, a law professor at the University of Aix-Marseille, has argued that the president made a tactical error. The redistricting issue was favorably reviewed by the Constitutional Council, because that body looked at the overall project rather than at its details. If the president had signed the *ordonnance*, the *Conseil d'Etat* (Council of State—the supreme administrative jurisdiction) would have probably reviewed more strictly the details of the new districts, an action that might have benefited Mitterrand's allies. Favoreu concluded:

> The refusal of the President to sign decrees has attracted attention to the fact that he is the only one to exercise uncontrolled power. . . , he is not responsible to anybody,

[59] Before 1986 the two men barely knew each other. See Thierry Pfister, *Dans les coulisses du pouvoir, La comédie de la cohabitation* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1986), 40.

[60] Colombani and Lhomeau, *Le Mariage Blanc*, 220.

[61] Ibid., 231; and *Time*, 28 July 1986.

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> unlike de Gaulle, who, through the referendum, was responsible to the people. In a period of "cohabitation," this is not so obvious because the President is hidden behind the Premier.[62]

The obstructions of the president forced the prime minister to turn to his majority in the National Assembly again and again. This, of course, meant delays to the implementation of the program of the Right, the desired intent of Mitterrand. However, to reduce the delays, the premier had recourse again and again to the provisions of Article 49–3 which states:

> The Prime Minister may, after deliberation in the Council of Ministers, pledge the responsibility of the Government before the National Assembly on the passing of all or part of a Bill or a motion. In this case, the Bill or part of Bill or motion is regarded as having been passed, unless a censure motion, put down within the following 24 hours is passed in the conditions provided for in the previous paragraph.[63]

Between April and August 1986, Chirac engaged the responsibility of his government five times in this manner and continued the practice till 1988.

While this practice and that of writing *ordonnances* were termed abusive by the president and the "friends" of Parliament, because it limits the deliberative functions of that body, I believe it entered into the calculations of Mitterrand. The president probably hoped that an often repeated use of Article 49–3 might ultimately divide the 1986 majority, which, not counting the thirty seats of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front, held this title by a mere three votes. In such a case, Mitterrand's margin of maneuver would have been increased. However, such a development did not take place. The majority dutifully followed its leader.

In November 1986, Edouard Balladur, the finance minister, argued that there was nothing in the constitution that limited a recourse to Article 49–3 or the right of Parliament to give to the government the right to legislate by *ordonnances*. The close friend of Chirac added: "It is not a bad idea, from time to time, for the government to find out on whom it can count, and that everyone be made to face his responsibility."[64] On the question of the *ordonnances*, he also opined that the constitution implied that the president must sign them if they are approved by the Council of Ministers, concluding with some irony: "But it is true that there is no authority able to decide against the thinking of the President of the Republic."[65]

Other parts of Chirac's program, such as the abolishment of the wealth tax, the easing of governmental restrictions on dismissing employees, the lifting of price controls, and the privatization of state-owned television stations, went through similar battles. The prime minister managed to come out victorious over the president. The major defeat or retreat of Chirac's government occurred over educational reforms, not so much because of the president's opposition but because

[62] *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 25 May 1987, 9.
[63] Translation by Dorothy Pickles.
[64] *Le Point*, 1 December 1986.
[65] Ibid.

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of popular pressures in the form of street demonstrations and strikes in December 1986.

In military and foreign affairs, because a broad policy consensus existed among the French people and the major political parties, cohabitation was not expected to cause any problem. This was soon confirmed in April 1986 by the agreement between Mitterrand and Chirac not to permit American planes to overfly France on their way to raid Lybia.[66] As Mitterrand noted, what happened to French foreign policy under cohabitation "has a name: continuity. If it were otherwise, I would not be associated with it."[67]

However, in practice the conduct of foreign affairs demonstrated, as in the case of domestic policies, that cohabitation truly meant a continuous struggle between the president and the prime minister over who should have preeminence. The struggle in this domain sometimes tended to turn to comedy and often embarrassed officials of other nations, especially during high-level international conferences.

The battle over the conduct of French diplomacy began with the surprise announcement in April 1986 that the prime minister, without having consulted the Elysée, had decided he would join the president at the Tokyo summit of industrialized nations. The Japanese, taken aback, were not too cooperative, and Chirac was not given a seat for the official dinner on the first day. The prime minister then decided to leave Paris a day after the president, using a regular flight to make the point that with a retinue of eighty-seven people, Mitterrand's use of a Concorde was a bit extravagant. In Tokyo, Chirac in his meeting with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone suggested that the president of the Republic no longer defined French foreign policy and that his role was only formal.[68] While there was later on the part of Chirac's staff a "clarification" of that statement, the following month the prime minister publicly criticized the president's position on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as too negative. However, the president's policy remained unchanged.

In European relations, Chirac's skirmishes against his rival led him to attempt a closer relationship between himself and the conservative chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl. When Kohl paid a visit to the Elysée, François Bujon, a member of Chirac's staff, declared that "Kohl had gone to the wrong address."[69] This statement angered the Germans who based their relationship with France on a treaty that states that the highest level of the relations between the two countries is to be between the chancellor and the president of the Republic. Nevertheless, someone at Matignon retorted that "the Germans were slower to understand than others."[70] This episode demonstrated that cohabitation, even with a general consensus present, posed a liability to France's international relations.

[66] Giscard d'Estaing, the leader of the second party of the majority, the *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF), criticized the decision of the French government.

[67] *Le Point*, 10 November 1986.

[68] See Pfister, *Dans les coulisses du pouvoir*, 239–240.

[69] Quoted in ibid., 244.

[70] Ibid.

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Another example of Chirac's claim to be the equal of the president in foreign affairs was his insistence on being present at the Hague European Council in June 1986. The Dutch, unlike the Japanese, agreed to furnish two seats to the French, but only two seats. The result was that French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond was cut out of the delegation, an unprecedented break in a long-standing tradition of a close working relationship between the chief of state and the head of the Quai d'Orsay.

Other results of cohabitation were a good amount of disagreement and deadlock over the nomination of ambassadors. Here, the problem was compounded by the fact that after 1981 the Socialists began to make political appointments (*à l'américaine*) rather than choose career diplomats as had always been the tradition in France. The first instance of such disagreement occurred over the replacement of Eric Rouleau, a Socialist appointee, as ambassador to Tunisia. The president used his prerogative to refuse to put the question on the agenda of the Council of Ministers.[71] Thus, cohabitation had a nefarious effect on the filling of both important diplomatic and administrative posts.

Under cohabitation, it is clear, as Jacques Fournier has remarked, that

> the President of the Republic no longer possesses [as much] liberty of action. No important decision is taken without his approval. But it is no longer possible for him . . . to define alone a certain number of fundamental orientations as General de Gaulle had done on several occasions. . . . The President is thus necessarily forced to compromise on certain points. He continues to direct foreign policy, but no longer has full control over it.[72]

One major reason for this is the fact that all ministries depend on Matignon and not on the Elysée Palace. The latter is not to be compared to the American White House. All administrative power rests with the office of the prime minister. The Elysée is actually a small place with a small staff. Its strength is almost purely political.

There were times when cohabitation came close to the breaking point. Yet it endured. The most important reason must be found in the attitude of the French public, which both sides courted. A poll taken on the day of the 1986 legislative election showed that 42 percent of the French believed that the president should not resign if the UDF-RPR (the Right) obtained by itself a majority in the National Assembly. Of the 49 percent who wanted him to resign, 20 percent wanted him to run again, and 29 percent did not want him to run again.[73] The initial feeling of the French tended toward an acceptance of cohabitation. Another poll taken by SOFRES for *Le Point* a month later indicated an overwhelming support for cohabitation. Seventy-one percent of the French wished to see cohabitation last until the presidential election of 1988, although 45 percent (against 39 percent)

[71] *Le Point*, 2 June 1986.
[72] Fournier, "Politique gouvernementale," 71.
[73] *Le Point*, 17 March 1986.

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felt that this situation was unlikely to last that long.[74] Throughout 1986 this percentage grew, reaching 79 percent in December. However, by February 1987 that figure had dropped to 65 percent. At the same time, 70 percent of the French were convinced that cohabitation would last until April 1988.[75]

The curves of public opinion as to whether cohabitation worked well and whether it was a positive period for France went from a high of 71 percent and 56 percent respectively in October 1986 to 45 percent and 36 percent in February 1987—a rather sharp decline. By then, 45 percent of the French felt that cohabitation had been a rather negative period for France.[76] This important change of attitude may have been due to the troubles of December 1986, which some with much exaggeration likened to May 1968. What did become clear by the beginning of 1987, as *L'Express* noted, was that if the French wanted "that cohabitation last its term, *a priori*, they [did] not wish to see the experience renewed."[77]

At least at the beginning of cohabitation the French were somewhat perplexed about what it meant in terms of which part of the double executive had acquired preeminence. In April 1986, 40 percent of the French felt that Mitterrand was the "real chief" of the executive and 45 percent felt it was Chirac. At the same time, 47 percent believed that Chirac benefited the most from the situation, while 28 percent believed Mitterrand did.[78] By February 1987, 40 percent felt Raymond Barre benefited the most, while 29 percent felt it was Mitterrand, and 18 percent felt it was Chirac.[79] Curiously, throughout most of the period of cohabitation, the popularity of the president remained relatively high, while that of Chirac had its ups and downs. Perhaps this can be explained by the differences in the personalities of each man and/or the fact that governing, with all the liabilities it implies, had become mostly the province of the prime minister. Whatever the case may have been, for the two main players in the game of cohabitation, the important rule was that the French electorate indeed did not wish to see that game end before the time was up, as dissatisfied as they may have become with it. Both players agreed implicitly with what became known as "Balladur's theorem" about their struggle. This is the rule of "whoever draws first is dead."[80]

IV

Many in France have argued that the period of cohabitation demonstrated the flexibility of the Fifth Republic's constitution, that France could still be effectively governed under such a situation, and that the institutions of the Republic were not altered by it. As Eric Zemmour remarked in *Le Quotidien de Paris*, it could be said:

[74] Ibid., 21 April 1986.
[75] Ibid., 23 February 1987.
[76] Ibid.
[77] *L'Express*, 16–22 January 1987.
[78] *Le Point*, 21 April 1986.
[79] Ibid., 23 February 1987.
[80] Ibid., 26 January 1987.

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> The government governs, the President presides, the ministers manage their ministries, the majority votes and passes the bills that the government presents to it and the opposition opposes. In vain. Truisms for a change which is not really a change? Yes, if one was expecting a change with a capital C, a radical change, the final catastrophe.[81]

Nevertheless, cohabitation did have some important consequences. Most crucial, it seems to me, was the fact that it revealed itself as a continuous struggle between the president and the prime minister. To be sure, that struggle was tempered by the lure of the approaching presidential election and Balladur's theorem. But as *Le Point* reported in September 1986, "the strategy of each of the protagonists is . . . clear: strike down the adversary. But the tactic is tangled up on an operations theater where the Constitution is a demanding honor code and public opinion a constraining umpire."[82] This struggle affected the efficiency of the system and affected France's international relations in a negative manner in the face of a broad consensus on foreign policy.

In this struggle, the president's position lost some of its stature and prestige. While he still presided over France, he no longer governed it as he had done until 1986. As Alain Griotteray noted: "the lesson is clear. Power has had a change of address."[83] To put it a bit simplistically, the episode of cohabitation meant an end to the system whereby the president clearly and singly handled foreign and military affairs and outlined domestic policy, leaving to the prime minister the job of implementing the details.

In his opposition to cohabitation, Raymond Barre had predicted this passage of the executive power across the Seine from the Elysée to Matignon. He felt that in this situation the presidential republic was ridiculed, that the spirit of the institutions was contravened since the chief of the government came to have more influence than the chief of state. Cohabitation to him was a reversal against the nature of the hierarchy of power. It was a presidential abdication.[84]

Of course, President Mitterrand did not abdicate, but it is undeniable that his authority was undermined and diminished. This development was not simply the work of the prime minister alone but of the premier *and* the Parliament. Even though the majority in the National Assembly was extremely well disciplined and obedient to the prime minister, some feared in this another potentially detrimental consequence of cohabitation—a resurgence of Parliament. And in France, such a prospect conjures a return to the political fragmentation and instability of the Fourth Republic, the regime of political parties, which the Gaullist system had ended.

On this point it is difficult to come to clear-cut conclusions. However, it is important to remember that, while the French have been more and more accustomed under the Fifth Republic to think of their political landscape as being divided in

[81] *Le Quotidiem de Paris*, 25 May 1987, 8.

[82] *Le Point*, 29 September 1986.

[83] Alain Griotteray, "La cohabitation, intermède ou enlisement," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, September 1986, 583.

[84] See Alain Duhamel, *Le Ve Président* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), 27.

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two—*La Gauche* and *La Droite*—French parliamentary groups are still coalitions of several distinct parties. As in several instances prior to the advent of cohabitation, Chirac's government included as ministers leaders of other parties than his own, such as François Léotard of the UDF and Pierre Méhaignerie of the CDS.[85] Indeed, in May–June 1987, a dispute arose between Chirac and Léotard (minister of Culture) over the latter's excessive expense of time on his party's affairs, which the premier said affected his ministerial duties. The dispute, conducted in the public eye, threatened the government for a short while and was patched up by the beginning of the summer, but not before Léotard stated that he would not support Chirac in the presidential election of 1988. What could this imbroglio portend for the future of the Republic? Where could it have led if, after the experience of cohabitation, the president had not been a Socialist? Without a common "enemy," might not the majority coalition have dissolved? These questions are difficult to answer but undoubtedly were in the minds of those who did not want to see cohabitation ever again renewed.

One change in the French political system that has occurred under cohabitation is the role of the Constitutional Council. This Council of nine judges, contrary to the French juridical tradition of the sovereign law, is a creation of the Fifth Republic. Not exactly comparable to the U.S. Supreme Court, its purpose was to limit the assaults of Parliament against the government.[86] As already mentioned, laws passed by the National Assembly can be challenged in this court by either the president or the parliamentary opposition. After March 1986, the recourse to the Constitutional Council increased tremendously (although the Right between 1981 and 1986 had also used it extensively) to the point that many French analysts believe that that body has become a new and important actor in the political game in the same way the judiciary is in the United States. The Constitutional Council has thus become the true arbitrator, a role which had been so often said to legitimately belong to the president.

The major conclusion one can draw from this analysis of the experience of cohabitation is that it affected primarily the institution of the French presidency—the key institution of the Fifth Republic's system. The political system did not truly change, but it was no longer operating the same way it did between 1958 and 1986. To many French politicians and analysts, the main danger of the cohabitation experience was its depreciation of the role, prestige, influence, and effectiveness of the presidency.

"The history of cohabitation or more precisely the stories of cohabitation," says Thierry Pfister, illustrate "the fissures that undermine our institutional structures. [The question is whether] the problem of [the French] institutions, which seemed to have been resolved during the past twenty years, is again being raised."[87] And,

[85] *Centre des démocrates sociaux*—Center of Social Democrats.

[86] *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 25 May 1987, 9. For a good explanation of the Constitutional Council, see Pickles, *Fifth French Republic*, 35–38.

[87] Pfister, *Dans les coulisses du pouvoir*, 308.

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indeed, suggestions for reform or change of the system were heard. Giscard d'Estaing and others have proposed the reduction of the president's term of office from seven to five years to make it coincide with the parliamentary term. But this is hardly a solution because of the president's power to dissolve the National Assembly. Presidential and legislative elections could again not coincide and the option of cohabitation recur. Another suggestion has been to transform the system into a truly presidential one. These suggestions and others are unlikely to find much support, for they would be too much of a break with the French political tradition.

Before the elections of 1988, the politicians of the French Right clearly wanted a return to the traditional functioning of the Fifth Republic. The politicians of the Left, even with their reservations, probably agreed with the former Socialist minister of national education, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, when he stated in January 1987: "I am not an advocate of reforms at every corner. . . . After all, the Constitution of 1958 did not work too badly and has been flexible."[88]

The French political scientist Jean Massot, in his analysis of the French presidency, which he finished shortly before the advent of cohabitation, concluded: "What is certainly learned by a reading of the constitution and by an examination of the practice during twenty-seven years is that the collaboration between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister is essential to the survival of the institutions of the Fifth Republic."[89]

V

Jean Massot's conclusion implied the necessity of a political agreement between president and premier. While there was a constant struggle between Mitterrand and Chirac under cohabitation, there had to be and there was a minimum of collaboration between them. If this had not been the case, the experiment would have ended relatively early.

The French political system after Spring 1986 operated quite differently from the way it did for twenty-eight years after its creation, with seemingly a loss of prestige and influence of the president of the Republic in relation to the prime minister, a greater role for the Constitutional Council, and an assertion of independence of the premier and his majority in Parliament. But it cannot be said that that system changed in a fundamental sense. The prime minister was no longer the *second personnage* of the executive, but he did not become the first. The president of the Republic was not reduced to a mere figurehead.

In 1977, in a brilliant article on the consequences of a situation similar to that which occurred after March 1986, Olivier Duhamel demonstrated that the French system as it is presently constituted had a wide choice of responses. Each of the ten responses outlined could, according to Duhamel, ultimately lead to a system

[88] *L'Express*, 16–22 January 1987.
[89] Massot, *La Présidence*, 185.

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change, even the one he described as *gouvernement de compromis*, which would lead to what he called the "dualist Fifth Republic."[90] If a *gouvernement de compromis*—which is, of course, now known as cohabitation—can be considered a system change to a "dualist republic," it must also be considered a mild change, in the sense that it is likely to be temporary. The system could always revert to its original *modus operandi* with a predominant president and a subservient prime minister when the presidential and parliamentary majorities again coincided.

Before the presidential and legislative elections of 1988, I wrote that if President Mitterrand was reelected, a dissolution of the National Assembly would most certainly occur. Indeed, Mitterrand, flushed with a great victory that brought him 54 percent of the votes, hoped that a Duhamel remark would prove correct: "people, when they are asked to repeat themselves, tend to do so with renewed vigor."[91] However, a repeat of 1981 did not take place. The results of the legislative election did not provide a majority of seats to either the Right or the Socialists. Mitterrand was nevertheless able to have a Socialist prime minister, Michel Rocard. And since his appointment, the new premier has managed to get the support of a majority of the National Assembly with the help at times from the Centrist deputies and at times from the Communists.

The experience of cohabitation and the results of the 1988 elections may ultimately bring about a change in the relationship between the president and the prime minister whereby the latter might become more the equal of the former. Such a trend was already discernible during the Giscard presidency with Raymond Barre as prime minister.[92] However, only time will tell whether such a change might take place. It will depend largely on the personalities of the two men involved. So far in the second *septennat* of Mitterrand, such a change does not seem to be taking place. Today, even though it is well known that Michel Rocard and François Mitterrand have had important political differences, the French double executive seems to have returned to its original *modus operandi*.

To conclude, it cannot be said at this time that the experiment of cohabitation has been truly a system change for France or that it was leading to one. Cohabitation has shown that it was a workable political arrangement under the 1958 Constitution and that it led neither to deadlock and immobility nor to a dire constitutional crisis. Furthermore, cohabitation may in the final analysis have demonstrated that the French Constitution of 1958 is so structured that a system change is actually difficult to accomplish.

[90] See Olivier Duhamel, "La Constitution de la Ve République et l'alternance," *Pouvoirs*, No. 1 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), 47–71.

[91] Ibid., 57.

[92] See Goguel and Grosser, *La Politique en France*, 215.

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Subgovernments as Determinants of Political Viability

DANIEL McCOOL

The subgovernment model of policy making has been in popular usage for more than twenty years and has been relied upon to explain a great deal of policy output.[1] Briefly, the theory holds that tripartite alliances formed between congressional committees or subcommittees, interest groups, and government agencies are all concerned with the same substantive policy. Their relationship is mutually advantageous; through the expenditure of government funds for their common policy interests the legislator gains political support; the government agency increases its budget, power, and personnel base; and the interest groups receive government largess. These three-sided alliances are also known as iron triangles, policy whirlpools, cozy little triangles, and subsystems.

As James Anderson pointed out, "political scientists have devoted considerable attention to the examination of political subsystems."[2] But despite the popularity

[1] Douglass Cater, *Power in Washington* (New York: Random House, 1964); J. Leiper Freeman, *The Political Process*, rev. ed. (New York: Random House, 1965); Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics* 16 (July 1964): 677–715.; Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969); Theodore Lowi, "Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice," *Public Administration Review* 33 (July/August 1972): 298–310.; Emmette S. Redford, *Democracy in the Administrative State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Dorothy James, *The Contemporary Presidency*, 2d ed. (New York: Bobs-Merrill, 1974); Lawrence Dodd and Richard L. Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979).

[2] James Anderson, *Public Policy-Making*, 3d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984), 40.

DANIEL McCOOL is an associate professor of political science and director of public administration education at the Center for Public Policy and Administration, the University of Utah. He is the author of *Command of the Waters: Iron Triangles, Federal Water Development, and Indian Water.*

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of the theory, scholars have "uniformly shied away from modelling the kind of three-way inter-action routinely described in the empirical literature."[3] Most references to subgovernments provide only a brief description of some basic characteristics[4] or take the form of a case study.[5] As a result, the subgovernment concept remained ambiguous and conceptually elusive.

In recent years, however, there has been a trend toward a more theoretical approach to the study of subgovernments. Keith Hamm reviewed subgovernment literature by using an analytical scheme consisting of six dimensions.[6] Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin examined subgovernments within a larger framework of policy typologies.[7] And Jonathan Bender and Terry Moe's work "explicitly models" a form of subgovernment activity that emphasizes bureaucratic politics.[8] Others have critiqued the traditional notion of subgovernments and offered alternative conceptualizations. Hugh Heclo's oft-cited concept of "issue networks" relies on the argument that the traditional notion of subgovernments failed to account for the complexity and integration of contemporary policy making.[9] Kenneth Meier identified a number of additional subgovernment participants in the regulatory arena,[10] and Paul Sabatier has developed a concept of subgovernments based on competing advocacy coalitions.[11] Some of these concepts have been tested via case studies;

[3] Jonathan Bender, and Terry Moe, "An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics," *American Political Science Review* 79 (September 1985): 755.

[4] Theodore White, *The Making of the President 1972* (New York: Bantam Books, 1972), 71–72; Peter Woll, *Public Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1974), 51–52; Robert Lineberry, *American Public Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 55–56; Dodd and Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State*, 103–104; Ronald Hrebenar and Ruth Scott, *Interest Group Politics in America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 165–166; Walter Held, "Decision Making in the Federal Government: The Wallace S. Sayre Model" in Frederick Lane, ed., *Current Issues in Public Administration*, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1982), 38–54; Jane Bayes, *Ideologies and Interest Group Politics* (Novato, Calif.: Chandler and Sharp, 1982), 22, 71–80; James Anderson, *Public Policy-Making*, 3d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984), 40–41; Charles Jones, *An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy*, 3d ed. (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1984), 247–248; James Anderson, David Brady, Charles Bullock III, and Joseph Stewart, Jr., *Public Policy and Politics in America*, 2d ed. (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1984), 23–24.

[5] Arthur Maass, *Muddy Waters* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951); Cater, *Power in Washington*; Freeman, *Political Process*; Theodore Lowi, "How the Farmers Get What They Want" in Theodore Lowi and Randall Ripley, eds., *Legislative Politics, U.S.A.*, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), 184–91; Roger H. Davidson, "Policymaking in the Manpower Subgovernment" in M.P. Smith, ed., *Politics in America* (New York: Random House, 1974), 82–106; A.L. Fritschler, *Smoking and Politics*, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983).

[6] Keith Hamm, "Patterns of Influence Among Committees, Agencies, and Interest Groups," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 8 (August 1983): 379–426.

[7] Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, *Bureaucracy and Policy Implementation* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1982); Ripley and Franklin, *Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy*, 4th ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1987).

[8] Bender and Moe, "Adaptive Model," 755.

[9] Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 94–105.

[10] Kenneth J Meier, *Regulation* (New York: St. Martin's, 1985).

[11] Paul Sabatier, "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and Policy Change: An Advocacy Coalition Framework," *Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization* 8 (June 1987): 649–692.

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Tim Miller examined water development policy,[12] Charles Davis and Sandra Davis studied public lands policy,[13] and Lauriston King and W. Wayne Shannon investigated the subgovernment dealing with the Sea Grant program.[14] And still others, notably Hamm, have measured the extent of subgovernment activity at the state level.[15]

Relying upon these various concepts of subgovernments and the literature concerning the most common subgovernment participants, this article identifies the variables that affect subgovernment political viability, which is defined as the ability to influence policy in a manner favorable to the goals of the subgovernment. The goal is to create a yardstick by which subgovernments can be measured to help determine the validity and applicability of the various subgovernment concepts. Thus it provides a way to test the proposition that traditional subgovernments are being replaced by other policy-making entities such as issue networks or advocacy coalitions.

The main body of the article examines the policy environment and the three principal participants that one would expect to find in the traditional subgovernment. A number of variables are identified that according to the literature affect the subgovernment's political viability. The absence of these conditions in a specific subgovernment may indicate that an alternative explanatory concept, possibly one of those cited above, may offer a more appropriate theoretical framework. A final section of the article discusses the impact and significance of recent subgovernment research.

The General Policy-making Environment

Distributive Policy

According to most sources, subgovernments are most adept at making distributive policy.[16] This type of policy output is characterized by concentrated benefits

[12] Tim Miller, "Recent Trends in Federal Water Resource Management: Are the 'Iron Triangles' in Retreat?" *Policy Studies Review* 5 (November 1985): 395–412; Tim Miller, "A Methodology for Identifying Policy Subsystems in the Field: The Case of Water," paper presented to the Western Social Science Association meeting, 1986, Reno, Nevada; also see Daniel McCool, *Command of the Waters: Iron Triangles, Federal Water Development, and Indian Water* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1987).

[13] Charles Davis and Sandra Davis, "Analyzing Change in Public Lands Policymaking: From Subsystems to Advocacy Coalitions," paper presented at the American Political Science Association meeting, 1986, Washington, D.C.

[14] Lauriston King and W. Wayne Shannon, "Political Networks in the Policy Process: The Case of the National Sea Grant College Program," *Polity* 19 (Winter 1987): 213–231.

[15] Keith Hamm, "The Role of 'Subgovernments' in U.S. State Policy Making: An Exploratory Analysis," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 11 (August 1986): 321–51.

[16] David Price, "Congressional Committees in the Policy Process" in Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978), 156–185; Kenneth J. Meier, *Politics and the Bureaucracy* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1979), 90; Roger H. Davidson, and Walter Oleszek, *Congress and Its Members*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985); Ripley and Franklin, *Congress*, 89–99; Randall B. Ripley, *Policy Analysis in Political Science* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1985), 79–80.

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and dispersed costs.[17] Thus the former are highly visible while the latter are sufficiently disaggregated "as to be nearly invisible."[18] This permits policy makers to take credit for the expenditure of government funds without being held directly responsible for the costs imposed. This combination of locally concentrated benefits and dispersed costs creates an atmosphere conducive to long-term, stable relationships among policy makers who benefit from such policies.[19]

Typically, such long-term, mutually beneficial relationships tend to favor the status quo and result in an incremental style of decision making that does not disturb existing alliances and advantages. In Guy Peter's terms, they "regularize the political environment."[20] During "normal political times"[21] this type of policy making takes place in an atmosphere of low visibility, meaning that most of the activity of the subgovernment does not attract a lot of attention from the press, the president, or other policy makers.[22] This helps to conceal the connection between costs and benefits, which is an important facet of distributive policy.

Conflict, either from within or from outside sources, can disturb the harmonious functioning of a subgovernment.[23] The typical response to such a threat is what can be termed cooptation through allocation; additional benefits are awarded to those who object to the policy. Not all subgovernments deal exclusively with distributive policy,[24] but this is the policy type that best fits the traditional conception of subgovernment policy making.

Meier has developed a revised subgovernment model that is tailored to regulatory policy.[25] If we assume the validity of Lowi's policy typology,[26] then we would expect the participants – and their interactions – in the regulatory arena to be distinct from policy making in the distributive arena. Hence, Meier has adapted the subgovernment concept to fit the unique policy environment of regulatory policy.[27]

The Norm of Reciprocity: Logrolling

A second element in the general policy environment of subgovernments concerns the norm of reciprocity, often explained with the classic apothegm, "You scratch

[17] Lowi, "American Business."

[18] John Ferejohn, *Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947–1968* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974), 5.

[19] Ripley, *Policy Analysis*, 81.

[20] Guy B. Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1984), 158.

[21] Meier, *Politics*, 51.

[22] Douglas Yates, *Bureaucratic Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 87.

[23] Abner J. Mikva, and Patti B. Saris, *The American Congress* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1983), 301; Ripley and Franklin, *Congress, the Bureaucracy*, 8–10.

[24] David Stockman, "The Social Pork Barrel," *The Public Interest* 39 (Spring 1975): 3–30; Roger H. Davidson, "Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policy Making" in Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress*, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 99–133; Davidson and Oleszek. *Congress and Its Members*, 414; Ripley and Franklin, *Congress*, 210.

[25] Kenneth J. Meier, *Regulation* (New York: St. Martin's, 1985).

[26] Lowi, "American Business" and "Four Systems of Policy."

[27] Also see William Gormley, "Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System," *Polity* 18 (Summer 1986): 595–620.

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my back and I'll scratch yours."[28] In Congress the norm is implemented through a variety of logrolling strategies that permit legislators to trade votes, sometimes across issues and over time, to their mutual advantage.[29] An important corollary to logrolling is the idea of mutual noninterference; each legislator does not attempt to pass judgement on the pet projects of his colleagues; or in J. Leiper Freeman's words, "they play the game according to the longstanding custom of live and let live."[30] Reciprocal vote-trading across time and issues, or what Roger Davidson calls "sequential accommodation,"[31] creates a reservoir of potential votes that can be tapped at any time for a pet project or program.[32] Thus the distributive output of subgovernments tends to be self-perpetuating as legislators take their turn, first in supporting a colleague and then requesting support in return.

In regard to subgovernment theory, the concept of reciprocity can be extended to include all participants, not just members of Congress. The subgovernment functions on the basis of reciprocal benefits that symbiotically accrue to all participants. Thus there must be a give-and-take process where each participant is willing to aid the others in return for continued benefits.[33] This all-inclusive reciprocity is probably more likely when there is circulation of personnel among participants—a phenomenon noted by some scholars.[34]

Reciprocity is more difficult to achieve in an era of fiscal constraint. Reciprocal logrolling requires sufficient largesse to distribute to all interested parties. Under conditions of budgetary duress it may be necessary to rely upon some other form of conflict resolution and adjustment. Compromise, a sharing of largesse, or a stricter criteria for funding allocation may be necessary. This could disrupt the functioning of the subgovernment and threaten its viability. There is a need for research that investigates the impact of recent domestic budget cuts on specific subgovernments to determine how they respond to such fiscal challenges.

Autonomy

A third characteristic of the general policy environment that appears to have an impact on subgovernment viability is autonomy.[35] According to the theory, subgovernments exist as relatively independent policy-making units, and interference from those outside the subgovernment is minimal under normal circumstances.

[28] Richard F. Fenno, *The Power of the Purse* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), 949; Stephen Horn, *Unused Power* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), 88–92.

[29] Lewis A. Froman, *The Congressional Process* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 25–26; Davidson and Oleszek, *Congress and Its Members*, 394–395.

[30] Freeman, *Political Process*, 54.

[31] Roger H. Davidson, "Breaking Up Those 'Cozy Triangles': An Impossible Dream?" in Susan Welch and John G. Peters, eds., *Legislative Reform and Public Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 30.

[32] Dodd and Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State*, 10.

[33] See, for example, the discussion of allocation strategies in Douglas R. Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 63–68.

[34] Hamm, "Patterns of Influence"; *National Journal*, 28 March 1981, 518.

[35] Davidson, "Policymaking," 82–106; Hamm, "Patterns of Influence," 381, 393; Ripley and Franklin, *Bureaucracy*, 10.

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There are three facets to this autonomy. First, the relevant congressional committees and subcommittees must be relatively free from interference from the rest of the legislature. However, this trait of the subgovernment's policy-making environment conflicts with the notion that subgovernments capitalize on the prevailing norm of reciprocity. Steven Smith and Christopher Deering note that "While autonomy is a word occasionally mentioned to describe the role of subcommittees on constituency committees [that is, those most likely to be involved in a subgovernment], it certainly is not true that these subcommittees are insulated from nonsubcommittee members . . . . Without exception, constituency committee's subcommittees appear to be consciously willing to listen to and take into account the other members' demands."[36] Thus the autonomy of subgovernments is conditional; participants can influence policy to meet their own needs with relative impunity as long as they are also careful to systematically acquiesce to the needs of their legislative colleagues. A powerful subgovernment is one that can protect its autonomy by meeting the needs of others in addition to its own needs.

A second facet of subgovernment autonomy concerns bureaucratic relationships. The administrative agency involved in a subgovernment must be relatively free from interference from a parent department or other agencies that may oppose the goals of the subgovernment. Interference from a parent department that represents the interests of the president or another agency with a conflicting mission can diminish a subgovernment's ability to allocate public resources to meet its own needs.[37]

A third facet of autonomy concerns the president. According to subgovernment theory, the influence of the chief executive is minimized because his national perspective on policy often conflicts with the local orientation of subgovernment output.[38] Efforts to expand executive review over subgovernment policy making often involve executive orders that attempt to curb subgovernment autonomy; or the president may request legislation for the same purpose. But if the subgovernment is adequately serving the needs of Congress, legislators will be motivated to resist presidential incursions into subgovernment domains.[39]

The alleged autonomy of subgovernments has been the focus of much of the recent critical and revisionist thinking in regard to the concept. Heclo argued that the original formulation was "disastrously incomplete" because it fails to integrate each policy arena into a larger network of participants with various degrees of interest, influence, and dependence.[40] Sabatier also stresses the impact of factors

[36] Steven Smith and Christopher Deering, *Committees in Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 144.

[37] Fenno, *Power of the Purse*, 368–369; Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 215–216.

[38] Frederic Malek, *Washington's Hidden Tragedy* (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 173–174; David J. Vogler, *The Politics of Congress*, 4th ed. (Boston: Ally and Bacon, 1983), 286–287; Price, "Congressional Committees," 96; Dodd and Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State*, 96; Ripley and Franklin, *Congress*, 59–61.

[39] Thomas Murphy, *Contemporary Public Administration* (Itasca, Ill.: F.E. Peacock, 1981), 283.

[40] Heclo, "Issue Networks," 88.

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external to the subgovernment, suggesting that they are very much influenced by exogenous sociopolitical developments.[41] Hamm's study of state-level subgovernments found low levels of autonomy across most issues, leading him to conclude that the "iron triangle description is often too narrow."[42] Miller and Davis and Davis discovered important external inputs to the subgovernments they investigated.[43] On the other hand, the Sea Grant subgovernment studied by King and Shannon operates in a fairly autonomous fashion.[44] And William Gormley concluded that "in many respects, the politics of regulation is even more closed than the iron triangle metaphor would suggest.[45] It would probably be safe to assume that autonomy varies across subgovernments, time, and perhaps other dimensions.

The question of autonomy is important beyond its role in the various models that have been discussed; it has a direct affect on other significant attributes of the traditional subgovernment. For example, such policy-making entities are supposed to be characterized by low visibility and low conflict. These factors are closely related to the level of autonomy. This relationship becomes most obvious when interests outside the triangle (or dissident internal forces) attempt to force a change in policy. To use E. E. Schattschneider's well-known phrase, they "expand the scope of the conflict" by bringing more interests into the controversy.[46] This increases visibility and interferes with the quiet, behind-the-scenes activity that is usually associated with subgovernment activity.

Implementability:

A final set of factors that comprise the general policy environment concerns the implementability of subgovernment output. A considerable literature on implementation has been developed in recent years, most of which concerns post-policy-formulation activities by administrative agencies. Many of these studies deal primarily with regulatory policy[47] or social policy.[48] This literature is relevant to a discussion of subgovernment political viability because the model is reciprocal; subgovernment output helps sustain the conditions that nurture political viability, which in turn create the political power necessary to produce such outputs. Hence, the implementability of these outputs is of critical importance. However, the emphasis here is somewhat different than that found in the general literature on implementation.

[41] Sabatier, "Knowledge."

[42] Hamm, "Role of 'Subgovernments'," 348.

[43] Miller, "Recent Trends"; Davis and Davis, "Analyzing Change."

[44] King and Shannon, "Political Networks."

[45] Gormley, "Regulatory Issue Networks," 619.

[46] E.E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1960).

[47] See, for example, Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, *Implementation and Public Policy* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1983).

[48] See, for example, Charles Bullock and Charles Lamb, *Implementation of Civil Rights Policy* (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1984).

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Judging from the traditional theory of subgovernments, the important element appears to be what might be termed "disaggregated deliverability," meaning that congressmen in their capacity as subgovernment participants must maintain (or at least appear to maintain) control over subgovernment output through both the formulation stage and the implementation stage in order to claim credit for specific policy output. Credit claiming, which is a critical element in the functioning of subgovernments, emphasizes individual accomplishment; a congressman must "peel off pieces of governmental accomplishment for which he can believably generate a sense of responsibility."[49] And indeed, there is evidence that Congress has reserved for itself the prerogative of control over distributive expenditures throughout implementation.[50] Hence, implementability here refers to the potential for subgovernment output (that is, distributive benefits) to be allocated in a manner that satisfies the goals of the subgovernment participants.

Factors affecting the implementability of subgovernment output can be classified into three categories: specificity of goals, program legitimacy, and level of support/opposition. In terms of specificity of goals, subgovernments present a somewhat ambiguous situation. The literature on implementation stresses the need for clarity and consistency in the formulation of goals.[51] But this may not be applicable to subgovernments, where the primary output is the distribution of benefits: a political reward for members of Congress, increased budgets and power for bureaucrats, and federal largesse for relevant constituencies. The most important attribute of subgovernment goals – at least insofar as implementability affects political viability – is the extent to which goals are structured to maximize the distribution of benefits. Clarity is important only to the extent to which it affects the ability of subgovernment participants to deliver and receive benefits. For example, a member of Congress may prefer legislation that very clearly establishes a program with readily identifiable beneficiaries in order to enhance the potential for credit claiming with those beneficiaries. Conversely, a vague mandate may permit some legislators to claim credit for benefits for which they were were not responsible. Similarly, goal consistency is important to the stability of subgovernments and permits a long-term system of expectations. But if consistency stifles expansion of benefits into new areas or prohibits the subgovernment from responding to changing political conditions, then it could be detrimental to the implementability of subgovernment output. In short, output goals must be sufficiently specific to establish the link necessary for credit claiming; but they must also be sufficiently vague to permit expansion of benefits.

[49] David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 53.

[50] Redford, *Democracy in the Administrative State*, 92; Ripley and Franklin, *Bureaucracy*, 89–90.

[51] Donald S. Van Meter, and Carl E. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process," *Administration and Society* 6 (February 1975): 466; Mazmanian and Sabatier, *Implementation*, 41; George C. Edwards III, *Implementing Public Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980), 26; Bullock and Lamb, *Implementation of Civil Rights*, 5.

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A second factor that affects implementability concerns the potential role of case law. Because of the difficulty of implementing court-mandated policies, case law seldom provides subgovernments with desirable new opportunities.[52] More often, case law creates restrictions that impede or limit the normal operation of the subgovernment. Thus subgovernment political viability is enhanced when policy output is the result of a congressional mandate that is not burdened with restrictive case law.[53]

A final variable affecting the implementability of subgovernment output concerns the relative level of support and/or opposition, or as Donald Van Meter and Carl Van Horn phrase it, "the degree of conflict or consensus over goals . . . ."[54] It is important to conceptualize support and opposition as a ratio; it is the relative power of each that determines policy output. Bender and Moe note that excessive growth of bureaucratic budgets "is due not to the agency's lust for revenues, but to a power mismatch in the bureau's environment."[55] If subgovernment autonomy is as limited as some scholars have suggested, then otuside levels of support and opposition are even more important. However, most analysts appear to agree that it takes prolonged and concentrated opposition or a crisis to depose an entrenched subgovernment.[56]

It should also be noted that a subgovernment's influence over policy may vary across policy stages; Lance deHaven-Smith and Carl Van Horn's case study of the veteran's subgovernment found that many of the consensual relationships that occurred in the formulation stage did not persist through the implementation stage.[57] Hence, it appears that the successful subgovernment must maintain its influence throughout implementation if it is going to remain politically viable.

A final variable affecting the general policy environment of subgovernments consists of feedback loops. As noted above, a reciprocal relationship appears to exist between political viability and the continued distribution of subgovernment largesse. When goods and services are distributed to constituent beneficiaries, they build support, which feeds back into the policy-making process. This in turn generates a favorable political environment and reinforces the subgovernment's

[52] Robert T. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood, *The Politics of Policy Implementation* (New York: St. Martin's, 1980), 85–107; Charles A. Johnson, and Bradley C. Canon, *Judicial Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Congessional Quarterly Press, 1984).

[53] Not all case law is restrictive. Shapiro argues that in some situations a new subgovernment can form when Congress creates new rights and then withdraws, leaving the courts, administrative agencies, and interest groups in control of policy. Of course, such a development is based on statutory law, and the principal point being made here is that a subgovernment that is without a clear statutory foundation and dependent on case law is at a distinct disadvantage. See Martin Shapiro, "The Courts vs. the President," *Journal of Contemporary Studies* 7 (Winter 1981): 1–20.

[54] Van Meter and Van Horn, "Policy Implementation," 459.

[55] Bender and Moe, "Adaptive Model," 763.

[56] Davidson and Oleszek, *Congress and Its Members*, 413–414; Ripley and Franklin, *Congress*, 98; Ripley, *Policy Analysis*, 116; See also *The National Journal*, 28 March 1981, 518.

[57] Lance deHaven-Smith and Carl Van Horn, "Subgovernment Conflict in Public Policy," *Policy Studies Journal* 12 (June 1984): 627–42.

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rationale for existence. This results in the continued distribution of benefits, and so on. In short, success is cumulative for subgovernments.

The need for a fairly constant flow of largesse again emphasizes the importance of budgetary constraints. If budget cuts eliminate or severely curtail the necessary largesse, they create a threat to the continued political viability of the subgovernment. More research is needed to see how tenuous the feedback loop can become before the participants lose their incentive to participate and the subgovernment collapses from lack of sustenance.

In sum, there appears to be an optimal policy environment for the classic subgovernment portrayed in the literature. It is difficult to determine if the variables identified in this section are necessary, or simply conducive to subgovernment political viability. Taken together, however, they constitute a political milieu that favors the maintainence and growth of subgovernments.

The Participants

The three basic participants in the classic subgovernment – congressional committees and subcommittees, administrative agencies, and interest groups – vary in terms of their ability to fit into the general policy-making environment. This affects the political viability of the subgovernment.

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees

Creation of Specialized Committee/Subcommittee. When the theory of subgovernments was first developed, the policy-making nexus in Congress was at the committee level. For example, two early studies of subgovernments focused on the pivotal role of committees.[58] Since that time, however, power in Congress has shifted substantially to subcommittees, especially in the House.[59] So if the theory of subgovernments is valid, we should be able to trace this change in longstanding subgovernments. In other words, the classic subgovernments had to successfully transfer their primary legislative locus from the committee to the subcommittee level. Thus, for the modern subgovernment we would expect to see at least one subcommittee devoted to the narrow policy interests of the subgovernment.[60] The political viability of the relevant subgovernment is maintained if the subcommittee retains its narrow focus. If other interests and policy areas are added, it creates a greater potential for conflict among subcommittee members.[61]

[58] Cater, *Power in Washington*; Freeman, *Political Process*.

[59] Davidson, "Breaking Up," 31; Leroy N. Rieselbach, *Congressional Reform* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 50 & 82.

[60] To avoid redundancy I will primarily use the term "subcommittee" in the following paragraphs. This is not intended to imply that committees are excluded altogether and no longer important. Although they have lost much of their power to subcommittees, they still play an important role in policy making.

[61] Smith and Deering, *Committees*, 107, 116; David J. Vogler and Sidney Waldman, *Congress and Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985), 63.

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According to subgovernment theory, some subcommittees are more useful than others. As Fenno and others have pointed out, different subcommittees have different roles, reputations and goals.[62] The type of subcommittee that appears to be most relevant to the theory of subgovernments has been variously labeled as "pork,"[63] "pork and interest,"[64] "constituency,"[65] or "distributive"[66] subcommittees. These are the subcommittees that are most adept at distributive policy making.

There has been a lengthy debate in the literature as to whether service on such subcommittees results in more expenditures in the districts of members.[67] But empirical research to date has produced, at best, "mixed findings."[68] This is due in part to "flawed" methodology,[69] and to the pervasive impact of reciprocity and logrolling, which would tend to hide the actual impact of each logroll when aggregate funding data is examined. However, the important factor as far as subgovern-

[62] Fenno, *Power of the Purse*.

[63] William Morrow, *Congressional Committees* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), 43.

[64] Roger H. Davidson, "Representation and Congressional Committees," *The Annals* 411 (January 1974): 51.

[65] Fenno, *Power of the Purse*, 86; Smith and Deering, *Committees*, 84; Vogler and Waldman, *Congress*, 62–66.

[66] Leonard G. Ritt, "Committee Position, Seniority, and the Distribution of Government Expenditures," *Public Policy* 24 (Fall 1976): 480.

[67] For the debate as to whether committee membership actually results in increased expenditures in the home district or state see Charles Plott, "Some Organizational Influences on Urban Renewal Decisions," *American Econometric Review* 58 (May 1968): 306–21; Carol F. Goss, "Military Committee Membership and Defense-Related Benefits in the House of Representatives," *Western Political Quarterly* 25 (June 1972): 215–33; Ferejohn, *Pork Barrel*; Gerald S. Strom, "Congressional Policy Making: A Test of a Theory," *The Journal of Politics* 37 (August 1975): 711–35; Barry Rundquist, and John Ferejohn, "Observations on a Distributive Theory of Policymaking: Two American Expenditure Programs Compared" in Craig Liske, William Loehr, and John McCamant, eds., *Comparative Public Policy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), 87–108; Ritt, "Committee Position"; Barry Rundquist, and David Griffith, "An Interrupted Time-Series Test of the Distributive Theory of Military Policy-Making," *Western Political Quarterly* 29 (December 1976): 620–26; Douglas R. Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy* (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1979); J. Theodore Anagnoson, "Politics in the Distribution of Federal Grants: The Case of the Economic Development Administration" in Barry S. Rundquist, ed., *Political Benefits* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1980); Bruce Ray, "Congressional Promotion of District Interests: Does Power on the Hill Really Make a Difference?" in Rundquist, ed., *Political Benefits*. A related question concerns whether increased expenditures actually have an impact on voters. For that debate see Glenn Parker and Roger Davidson, "Why Do Americans Love Their Congressmen So Much More Than Their Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 4 (February 1979): 53–61; John Johannes, and John McAdams, "The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is it Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Election," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (August 1981): 513–42; Morris Fiorina, "Some Problems in Studying the Effects of Resource Allocation in Congressional Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (August 1981): 543–67; and Paul Feldman and James Jondrow, "Congressional Elections and Local Federal Spending," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (February 1984): 147–64. Also see James Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 442–447.

[68] Hamm, "Patterns of Influence," 397.

[69] Ray, "Congressional Promotion," 7; also see Arnold, *Congress*, 217–224.

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ments are concerned is whether membership on a constituency subcommittee is *perceived* to be an effective way to win votes through the distribution of federal benefits to home districts or states. And such a perception is "deeply ingrained in the folklore of politics,"[70] especially among legislators: ". . . candidates themselves almost universally believe that their allocation decisions have electoral consequences."[71] One measure of this perception among legislators is the extent to which they seek membership on constituency subcommittees. There is considerable evidence that "bringing home the bacon" is an important factor when legislators request subcommittee assignments.[72] In fact, recent evidence indicates that constituency service and reelection are the "most frequently mentioned reasons for preferrirng particular committees."[73] The importance of such perceptions is enhanced if, as some have argued, reelection has become the predominant goal of incumbents.[74]

It is important to note the potential for what Lawrence Dodd and Richard Schott call "dual subsystems" – one involving authorization subcommittees, the other including members of the appropriations subcommittees.[75] In the authorization stage, a member of Congress can claim credit for statutory approval of a project or program designed to benefit constituents. Since authorization requires no actual allocation of finite resources, a popular project proposal can be approved without regard to the limits of fiscal reality. In other words, the authorization stage assumes a non-zero sum attitude; one project need not come at the expense of another, since no money is actually spent. This creates a large potential for subgovernment activity.

However, converting the promise of authorization into the reality of constituent benefits requires funding, and this is where the second subsystem comes into play. Unlike the authorization stage, appropriation requires difficult choices from among projects and programs. Although these perceptions are often perceived as non-zero sum, because of the nature of distributive policy (concentrated benefits/dispersed costs), they involve in actuality trade-offs and compromises. In order to meet the needs of many legislators and the norm of reciprocity, the general tendency is to respond to budgetary limitations by allocating small amounts to a large number of projects and then to strive for increased funding in subsequent years.

[70] Feldman and Jondrow, "Congressional Elections," 160.

[71] Fiorina, "Some Problems," 545; also see Richard Beth, "Recent Research on 'Incumbency Advantage' in House Elections: Part 2," *Congress and the Presidency* 2 (Autumn 1984): 211–224; and D.R. Kiewiet and Mathew McCubbins, "Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection," *The Journal of Politics* 47 (February 1985): 59–82.

[72] David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process," *The American Political Science Review* 67 (September 1973): 889–905; Fenno, *Power of the Purse*; Charles Bullock, "Motivations for U.S. Congressional Committee Preferences: Freshmen of the 92nd Congress," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1 (May 1976): 201–212; Vogler and Waldman, *Congress*, 65.

[73] Smith and Deering, *Committees*, 84–85.

[74] Mayhew, *Congress*; Fiorina, *Congress*.

[75] Dodd and Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State*, 224.

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Since the appropriations subcommittees are in a sense the bottleneck for the distribution of funds, it is important to examine how these subcommittees have changed over the years and how those changes affect their potential role in subgovernments. Traditionally, the Appropriations Committees have been less receptive to distributive expenditures than the authorization committees,[76] partly because of the differences outlined above. But during the years when the theory of subgovernments was initially formulated and given credence, the roles of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees were different from each other and from what they are today. The traditional role for the House Appropriations Committee (and its relatively autonomous subcommittees) was that of budget protector.[77] The House Appropriations Subcommittees—especially those with a high potential for distributive policy making—were purposefully stacked against narrow regional interests by congressional leaders to combat what Richard Fenno called the "interest-sympathy-leniency syndrome."[78] In contrast, the Senate acted as an "appeals court" in an efffort to restore cuts imposed by the House subcommittees.[79] Hence, for a subgovernment to be successful, it needed friends on the relevant House appropriations subcommittee to minimize cuts; it also needed supporters on the Senate side to help mitigate the "damage" done by the House.

In recent years these roles have changed significantly, and in a way that is of critical importance to subgovernments. Beginning in the early 1970s a series of congressional reforms, especially in the area of budgeting, ultimately led the appropriations subcommittees to at least partially abandon their traditional function of limiting distributive expenditures. Allen Shick has written that the 1974 Budget and Accounting Act "implicitly redefined the role of the appropriations committees. They are no longer regarded as protectors of the purse; rather they are cast as claimants. . . ."[80] Other reforms have had a similar effect.[81] Both chambers have been affected, but the changes have been most notable in the House.[82]

These alterations in the traditional role of appropriations mean that subgovernments now have an ally where they used to find opposition. They also complicate

[76] Morrow, *Congressionl Committees*, 67.

[77] Fenno, *Power of the Purse*, 141–145, 365; Robert Thomas, and Roger Handberg, "Congressional Budgeting for Eight Agencies, 1947–1972," *American Journal of Political Science* 18 (February 1974): 179–87.

[78] Fenno, *Power of the Purse*, 144–145 & 365.

[79] Ibid., 587; Richard F. Fenno, *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little, Brown and Cole, 1973), 160, 184; Thomas and Handberg, "Congressional Budgeting."

[80] Allen Shick, "The Three-Ring Budget Process: The Appropriations, Tax, and Budget Committees in Congress" in Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 288–329.

[81] Smith and Deering, *Committees in Congress*, 186.

[82] Price, "Congressional Committees," 167. In some situations the traditional role of the appropriations subcommittees has been restored in recent years. Because of fiscal constraints, authorization subcommittees have often been much more generous than appropriations. When authorization subcommittees cannot agree on the specifics of substantive legislation, they essentially pass the buck to the appropriations subcommittees by permitting them greater discretion in funding programs. As a result, appropriations is once again placed in the position of budgetary watchdog.

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their task, however, because the responsiblity for budget monitoring is now dispersed among the budget committees, the House and Senate at large, and sources outside the Congress such as the Office of Management and Budget. To remain politically viable, it would appear that subgovernments would have to respond to these changes. This could be accomplished, at least in part, by continued reliance on the norm of reciprocity; but it seems fairly evident that subgovernments will need to seek a wider power base in Congress in order to compensate for the increased fragmentation of the appropriations process.

Committee/Subcommittee Packing. According to subgovernment theory, political viability can be enhanced by committee packing. This means that a concerted effort is made to insure that the membership of the subcommittee is supportive of the goals of the subgovernment. This can be accomplished in two ways. First, members of the subcommittee who are not supportive can be coopted through allocation—that is, induced to support the subgovernment by making them beneficiaries. Second, the subcommittee can be packed by recruiting only those legislators who are supportive of, or at least not antagonistic to, the subgovernment.[83]

The subcommittee can be packed a number of ways, depending upon the characteristics of the policy and the population of beneficiaries. For example, a social program might result in a subcommittee packed along socioeconomic lines.[84] Other examples include overrepresentation based on ideological distinctions, sociocultural values,[85] or occupation.[86] But judging from the literature, the most common form of subcommittee packing is regional or geographic overrepresentation. This should not be surprising, since "geography is the hallmark of distributive politics."[87] Indeed, there are numerous examples of regional overrepresentation.[88]

In sum, subcommittee packing accomplishes two things. First, overrepresentation by region, ideology, or issue position maximizes opportunities for credit claiming by placing legislators in a position to direct the allocation of benefits to their constituents. Second, it populates the subcommittee with legislators who substantially agree on policy questions relating to such benefits. This helps to min-

[83] Hamm, "Patterns of Influence," 386; Hamm, "Role of 'Subgovernments'," 324–325.

[84] Barry Rundquist, "On the Theory of Political Benefits in American Public Programs" in Rundquist, ed., *Political Benefits*, 233.

[85] Freeman, *Political Process*.

[86] Rundquist, *Political Benefits*, xvii.

[87] Barry Weingast, Kenneth Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen, "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," *Journal of Political Economy* 89 (1981): 644.

[88] Horn, *Unused Power*, 30–32; Barbara Hinckley, "Policy Content, Committee Membership, and Behavior," *American Journal of Political Science* 19 (August 1975): 547–548; Davidson, "Policy Making," 111; Smith and Deering, *Committees*, 106, 117; for a view of the limits to regional overrepresentation see Rundquist and Ferejohn, "Observations on a Distributive Theory," 95–96, 102–103; Jon R. Bond, "Oiling the Tax Committees in Congress, 1900–1974: Subgovernment Theory, the Overrepresentation Hypothesis, and the Oil Depletion Allowance," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (November 1979): 651–664.

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imize conflict and visibility, which in turn permits the subgovernment to function in a manner advantageous to all participants.[89]

Control of Chair. Another way a subgovernment can enhance its political viability is through control of the committee or subcommittee chair. Committee chairs were at one time so powerful that Woodrow Wilson referred to them as "petty barons." This power remained virtually intact until the early 1970s, when they still held a firm grip on policy making, especially distributive policy making.[90] Since that time, their power has waned considerably, much of it transferred to subcommittee chairs. Still, both committee and subcommittee chairs can have a considerable impact on the political fortunes of a subgovernment: ". . . most committee and subcommittee leaders can be expected to retain their slots and to enjoy a great deal of latitude in implementing their own priorities and preferences."[91] Congressman Jamie Whitten, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, recently explained how his position as a committee chair helped him to obtain distributive benefits for his district and the districts of his friends: "Everything is in someone's district. . . . I've got the position in Congress I most want. It doesn't mean you can run the [Appropriations Committee]. It just means you've got the first say."[92] In short, subgovernments must still cultivate the support of the chairs of full committees.

Even more important is the contemporary role of the subcommittee chairs.[93] The fragmentation of power in Congress has resulted in increased power and autonomy for these leaders, a change that may have strengthened subgovernments:

> With the shift of power to subcommittees and subcommittee chairs, and with subcommittees being the focus of a small number of particularized groups, the nature of committee leadership has changed. The power of subcommittee chairs rests not on their ability to balance numerous contending interests, but on their attention to a few particularized policy areas. As a result there is considerable pressure for subcommittee chairs . . . [to] build careers tied to narrow clientele groups.[94]

Another reason why committee and subcommittee chairs are important to subgovernments concerns the influence of the president. Under normal conditions his impact on the subgovernment is relatively minimal, but a chair that is com-

[89] It has always been assumed that committee packing was an effective way to control policy, but recent evidence may indicate that it is not. Bender and Moe found that "The wisdom and efficacy of the capture of committees by interest groups are . . . overemphasized. Groups can indeed capture legislative committees, but their corresponding influence over policy may be short-lived and misleading. . . ." Bender and Moe, "Adaptive Model," 1202.

[90] James T. Murphy, "Political Parties and the Porkbarrel: Party Conflict and Cooperation in House Public Works Committee Decision Making," *American Political Science Review* 68 (March 1974): 176.

[91] Price, "Congressional Committees," 172.

[92] *Wall Street Journal*, 31 May 1985.

[93] Smith and Deering, *Committees in Congress*, 167.

[94] Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, "The House in Transition: Change and Consolidation" in Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978), 46.

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mitted to the president and his nationally-oriented budget goals could cause problems for a subgovernment.[95]

In sum, the congressional corner of the subgovernment triangle appears to be strongest when a committee or subcommittee is devoted exclusively to a distributive policy area, and it is packed with legislators, including the chairman, that are strongly committed to the goals of the subgovernment.

Administrative Agencies

Administrative agencies form the second set of participants in a subgovernment. There are many variables that affect the political power of an agency, but this section will discuss only those that, judging from the subgovernment literature, appear to be most critical to the political viability of the subgovernment.

Mission. While it is possible for agencies with regulatory or redistributive missions to participate in subgovernments, it is apparently not that common. Hence, the agency with a mission that readily lends itself to the needs of distributive policy making has the greatest potential for thriving in such an environment. The distribution of goods or services helps to create a "dependence relationship" where Congress depends on the agency to distribute federal largesse.[96] As Francis Rourke points out, some agencies such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and those involved in military procurement provide "a source of hard currency in administrative relations with Congress. Many other agencies, however, have only modest favors to award in return for legislative support. . . ."[97] Thus, a mission that fits the distributive policy-making mold is more likely to lead to the close ties that characterize subgovernments.

Another important facet of agency mission is expandability. Subgovernments function best under conditions of low conflict, and one of the mechanisms used to reduce conflict is cooptation through allocation. It is critical that an agency's mission can be expanded to accommodate the needs of potential opponents, even if those needs require the subgovernment to initiate new areas of activity to satisfy those who would otherwise create conflict.

Administrative Organization. A second variable that affects the political power of an agency participating in a subgovernment concerns the administrative structure of the agency. Subgovernments thrive on stability. Hence, an agency that is often reorganized or shuffled about the bureaucracy will lack this requisite stability. Also, certain forms of organization lead to greater autonomy, another important characteristic of subgovernments. An agency that is closely controlled by a parent department or another agency will lack this necessary autonomy. An-

[95] Randall B. Ripley, *Congress*, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 224–225.

[96] Kenneth J. Meier, "Measuring Organizational Power," *Administration and Society* 12 (November 1980): 359.

[97] Francis E. Rourke, "Political and Bureaucratic Elites" in Rourke, ed., *Bureaucratic Power in National Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), 123.

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other element of organization concerns the agency's ability to organize its internal operating procedures to maximize cohesiveness, minimize internal conflict, and provide an effective implementation strategy. The absence of such a procedure encourages divisiveness and impedes implementation.[98]

Professionalism. Professionalism is the third variable that affects agency participation in a subgovernment. In the most general sense this refers to what Max Weber called the "sphere of competence." In terms of subgovernments the concept can be broken down into two dimensions:—professional expertise/information and professional image.

Expertise concerns among other things the ability of an agency to generate valid, reliable information and then apply it in a professional manner to the problem at hand.[99] In a technically advanced society it is difficult to overstate the importance of information. Indeed, we often refer to the present era as the "information age." Thus information is power, and this is especially applicable to the distributive policy-making activity of subgovernments: "The currency of power in distributive policy decisions seems to be one of technical information and expertise."[100] An agency that cannot generate reliable data about its programs and accomplishments will be ineffective in fulfilling its role in a subgovernment.[101] Highly technical scientific information is especially effective in impressing both political supporters and potential opponents.[102] It can also be used as a tool to aid in enforcement activities;[103] a show of expertise increases the potential for agency autonomy.[104] In short, information is a critically important resource, and it requires considerable expertise to generate reliable, credible information that is useful in the policy-making process.

In reference to bureaucracy, the term "expertise" usually refers to the agency's scientific or technical abilities. But participation in subgovernment politics also requires considerable political expertise. Hence, the term should be construed in a liberal sense to include the skills of "administrative statecraft"[105] and the "strategic sensitivity"[106] necessary to participate in a political milieu. This includes the ability to manipulate and coopt potential opposition,[107] maximize budgeting

[98] Van Meter and Van Horn, "Policy Implementation Process," 471; Edwards, *Implementing*, 125–146.

[99] Meier, *Politics*, 62; William Browne, *Politics, Programs, and Bureaucrats* (Port Washington, N.Y.: National University Publication/Kennikat Press, 1980), 101; Peters, *Politics of Bureaucracy*, 188; Rourke, *Bureaucracy*, 92–96; Rieselbach, *Congressional Reform*, 132.

[100] Vogler, *Politics of Congress*, 287–288.

[101] Keith Hamm, "U.S. State Legislative Committee Decisions: Similar Results in Different Settings," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 5 (January 1980): 31–54.

[102] Francis E. Rourke, *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy*, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1984), 92–97.

[103] Van Meter and Van Horn, "Policy Implementation," 476.

[104] Meier, "Measuring Organizational Power," 370–371.

[105] Rourke, *Bureaucracy*, 108.

[106] Hamm, "Patterns of Influence," 397.

[107] Phillip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966); Paul Culhane, *Public Lands Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press/Resources for the Future, 1981).

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success,[108] and generate widespread political support. Of course the concept of subgovernments assumes a high level of political support among congressional subcommittees and interest groups, but politically astute agencies can engage in specific activities designed to maintain and strengthen these alliances. For example, most agencies now have a congressional liaison office that keeps in close contact with legislators.[109] An agency needs to cultivate individual congressmen who are willing to lobby colleagues, since legislators are the "most effective lobbyists" on Capitol Hill.[110] In addition, the politically adept agency will use its information base to generate publications and publicity that portray the agency in a favorable light. Finally, an agency's political expertise is to some degree the product of politically savvy leadership.[111]

The second facet of professionalism concerns image, which has both an internal and external dimension. The internal dimension is a product of the agency's perception of its own professionalism. Agency employees who perceive their agency to be highly professional and effective are more likely to develop a sense of devotion to the organization and its mission. In James Wilson's terms, they develop "a genuine belief in the rightness of its mission that is expressed as a commitment . . . ."[112] This in turn leads to a sense of "organizational *esprit*"[113] and a coherent agency ideology.[114]

The other dimension of professional image is derived from external sources. Other bureaucrats,[115] members of Congress,[116] and interest groups[117] form perceptions of an agency's professionalism, and these perceptions influence the relationships between these entities. This has obvious implications for the viability of subgovernments, which are dependent upon such relationships. Agencies that suffer from a poor professional image will not engender the kind of respect that is necessary for the close, mutually dependent alliances found in subgovernments. For example, it is difficult for a member of Congress to engage in credit-claiming when he assigns tasks to an agency widely viewed as incompetent or demoralized. Such agencies often have problems implementing their programs; in other words, they cannot deliver the distributive goods and services that are the lifeblood of most subgovernments.[118]

[108] Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1984), 63–126.

[109] Ripley, *Congress*, 326; Dennis Ippolito and Thomas G. Walker, *Political Parties, Interest Groups, and Public Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 308–309.

[110] Vogler, *Politics of Congress*, 262; Ripley, *Congress*, 271.

[111] Rourke, *Bureaucracy*, 108–111; Meier, *Politics*, 66.

[112] James Q. Wilson, "The Rise of the Bureaucratic State," *The Public Interest* 41 (Fall 1975): 98.

[113] Rourke, *Bureaucracy*, 103–108.

[114] Peters, *Politics of Bureaucracy*, 176–178.

[115] Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Daniel McCool, *Staking Out the Terrain* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1985), 125–126.

[116] Fenno, *Power of the Purse*, 412; Wildavsky, *Politics*, 83–85.

[117] Meier, *Politics*, 57–60.

[118] Matthew Holden, "Imperalism in Bureaucracy," *The American Political Science Review* 60 (De-

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Resources. A final requirement for successful agency participation in a subgovernment is an appropriate level of resources. There appear to be two types of resources that are critical. The first is funding. Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier point out that "a threshold level of funding is necessary if there is to be any possibility of achieving statutory objectives . . . . an inadequate level can doom a program before it begins."[119] This is especially true of agencies participating in subgovernments, whose principal *raison d'etre* is to distribute government resources. Of course, if the subgovernment is effective it will provide sufficient resources; this again points out the recursive nature of subgovernment activity. The second requisite resource is program authority.[120] An agency must be delegated sufficient power to distribute benefits in a politically efficient manner. And again, if the subgovernment is strong this statutory authority will be granted by a demanding, and then grateful, Congress.

In sum, not all administrative agencies have the potential to participate successfully in subgovernments. Some agencies are hindered by a mission that does not administer divisible goods and services. Others are involved in distributive policy, but lack the political finesse and leadership necessary to maintain a functioning, stable relationship in a subgovernment. But with the proper mix of bureaucratic professionalism, political acumen, and resources, an agency can potentially thrive in the subgovernment environment.

Interest Groups

Subgovernments are critically important to interest groups because they offer "the most pervasive and effective channel for interest group impact on policy and program decisions."[121] Many interest groups, like administrative agencies, have developed close ties with certain congressional subcommittees; as a result, "congressional dependence on interest groups has exploded like a time bomb."[122] Of course, the same can be said for the other side of the subgovernment triangle: the interest group/bureaucratic connection. Every scholar who writes about sources of bureaucratic political power lists clientele support as one of the most important, especially if the clientele is well organized.[123] However, there is disparity among interest groups; some are more adept than others in their ability to participate actively in subgovernments and to maintain the flow of benefits that result from that participation. Hence it is necessary to identify those factors that affect the ability of interest groups to become involved—and stay involved—in the mutually dependent relationships characteristic of subgovernments.

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cember 1966): 943–51; Van Meter and Van Horn, "Policy Implementation," 47–74; George C. Edwards III, *Implementing Public Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980), 89–119.

[119] Mazmanian and Sabatier, *Implementation*, 26.

[120] Peters, *Politics of Bureaucracy*, 188–189.

[121] Ripley and Franklin, *Congress*, 10.

[122] Dodd and Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State*, 182.

[123] Meier, *Politics*, 59; Peters, *Politics of Bureaucracy*, 188–189; Rourke, *Bureaucracy*, 98–99.

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It is important to note that interest groups have two roles in a subgovernment. First, they are constituents of Congress; second, they are also constituents of administrative agencies. Thus to be truly effective in a subgovernment, an interest group must successfully fill both of these roles, which may at times require different strategies and activities. The factors that enable interest groups to accomplish these tasks overlap somewhat with those discussed for administrative agencies. This is because both interest groups and agencies fill some of the same roles; both represent specialized interests, both lobby Congress, and both are involved in mutually dependent relationships that hinge upon the delivery of goods and services.

Resources. The most obvious interest group resource is money.[124] An interest group must have a stable, secure source of funding to be effective in a subgovernment, where stability and security are critical elements. Typical sources of funding include the supportive population (especially if it is large and financially secure),[125] the government, and other interest groups. The stability and continuity of funding is often enhanced if the funding source acts as a "patron" of the interest group and provides a long-term level of support.[126] The reason why money is such an important resource is because it can be used to obtain other types of resources, such as professional personnel, facilities, information-generating services, and campaigns to raise even more funding.[127] In this sense money has a multiplier effect.

Another form of interest group resource is the level of commitment; when both the leadership and the rank and file are strongly committed to the goals of the interest group it is easier to develop organizational cohesiveness and mobilize for action.[128] A high level of commitment can compensate to some extent for the lack of other resources. In some interest groups a zealous spirit is the organization's primary resource.[129] These resources – money, the items money can buy such as staff and facilities, and commitment – are "a form of political currency which can be spent on various pressure group strategies and activities."[130]

Representative Legitimacy. Representative legitimacy is also an important group

[124] Leroy Rieselbach, *Congressional Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 200; John M. Bachellor, "Lobbyists and the Legislative Process," *The American Political Science Review* 71 (June 1977): 253; Ippolito and Walker, *Political Parties*, 314; Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, *Organized Interests and American Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 89.

[125] Rourke, *Bureaucracy*, 102.

[126] Jack L. Walker, "The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America," *The American Political Science Review* 77 (June 1983): 398–399; John Hansen, "The Political Economy of Group Membership," *American Political Science Review* 79 (March 1985): 93–94.

[127] Norman Ornstein, and Shirley Elder, *Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978), 70.

[128] Arthur Miller, Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk, "Group Consciousness and Political Participation," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (August 1981): 494–511; Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser, "Passionate Attitudes: Intensity, Centrality, and Committed Action" in *Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on Question Form, Wording, and Context* (New York: Academic Press, 1981); Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests*, 102.

[129] Mayhew, *Congress*, 94.

[130] Ippolito and Walker, *Political Parties*, 313.

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asset that aids in maintaining subgovernment relationships. This refers to the ability of an organization to convince policy makers that they speak on behalf of others: "[We] grant an organization legitimacy and pay attention to its policy requests because we assume that in some sense the spokesmen for the group represent the interests of the members."[131] This is particularly relevant to the interest group's role as congressional constituents, especially if those group members are likely to vote. In Congress "there is deference toward groups with disposable electoral resources."[132] But representative legitimacy also affects the interest group's role as a constituency of administrative agencies. Agencies with strong interest group support appear to do better in the budgetary process.[133]

Information. Interest group participation in subgovernments is also affected by the ability of the group to produce information, especially that which is readily accessible, politically useful,[134] and dependably credible.[135] The principal task of interest groups is not to convert opponents, but to reinforce the beliefs of their allies; the principal tool in this process is information.[136] Data, selectively released to support the interest group's position, can "unlock legislative doors."[137] Also, information in the form of publicity and publications can be used to sway public opinion and raise money.[138]

In sum, interest groups need to be "vocal, organized, cohesive, clever, knowledgeable, and persistent."[139] A group that possesses substantial resources, has convinced policy makers that it legitimately represents a significant supportive population, and has the ability to produce utilizable information is more likely to establish and maintain the symbiotic ties to Congress and the bureaucracy that characterized subgovernments.

Current Research

Some variations of the subgovernments model offer a refinement, while others are sufficiently different as to constitute wholly new concepts. A review of these various conceptualizations may help to illuminate areas of progress and identify theoretical questions that remain unresolved. The Heclo concept of issue networks

[131] Robert H. Salisbury, "Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions," *The American Political Science Review* 78 (March 1984): 66.

[132] Mayhew, *Congress*, 131; Bayes, *Ideologies*, 72.

[133] Fenno, *Power of the Purse*, 412–413; Kenneth J. Meier and J.R. Van Lohuizen, "Bureaus, Clients, and Congress: The Impact of Interest Group Support on Budgeting," *Administration and Society* 9 (February 1978): 459–464; Wildavsky, *Politics*, 67–71.

[134] Vogler and Waldman, *Congress and Democracy*, 104.

[135] Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests*, 104.

[136] Vogler, *Politics*, 260–261; Ripley, *Congress*, 263; see also Louis Maisel, "Congressional Information Sources" in Joseph Cooper and G. Calvin MacKenzie, eds., *The House at Work* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 247–274.

[137] Rieselbach, *Congressional Politics*, 200.

[138] Freeman, *Political Process*, 30; Walker, "Origins and Maintenance," 396.

[139] Freeman, *Political Process*, 30.

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is without a doubt the most commonly cited alternative to a subgovernment. The original subgovernment concept was sufficiently vague that it could be applied to almost any policy arena, and this inevitably led to abuses. The Heclo concept, however, is equally ambiguous, if not more so. He argues that issue networks do not have an identifiable set of participants, are not stable over time, and lack autonomy. He notes that "it is almost impossible to say where a network leaves off and its environment begins."[140] The issue network concept is so amorphous that it is difficult to perceive any identifying characteristics. How does one test for the "loose-jointed play of influence" where "no one . . . is in control of the policies and issues?"[141] In a sense the issue network plays the role of a null hypothesis; it exists when we cannot discern the existence of the subgovernment. Hence, one can test for the existence of an issue network by testing for subgovernments. The value of the concept is that it provides an alternative to the iron triangle, albeit an ambiguous one.

Kenneth Meier has also formulated an alternative conceptualization of subgovernments, designed to model policy making in the regulatory arena. His model offers a more specific concept that identifies major participants and outside sources of input. To a certain extent, he has simply provided for a greater range of interest groups. His model features the three traditional corners of the triangle, but divides interest groups into "industry" and "other" groups and adds a nebulous "significant others."[142] Meier also provides a useful critique of the traditional subgovernment concept by pointing out oversimplifications and significant exceptions.[143]

Ripley and Franklin have developed a number of useful ideas in regard to subgovernments. They stress the way that subgovernment activity varies across different types of policy and across time.[144] They also offer an incisive typology of four subgovernment "variations," including subgovernment dominance, adaptation to changing circumstances, the rise of competing subgovernments, and the "rare" case of subgovernment disintegration.[145] Their discussion of specific subgovernments and how they fit into these variations provides one of the most useful analyses in the literature.

Paul Sabatier's recent work on subgovernments combines a refinement of the subgovernment concept with an insightful framework of "knowledge utilization" that focuses on policy-oriented learning and how it affects public policy.[146] He argues that the subgovernment concept is the most useful way to think about policy change, but should be expanded to include "journalists, analysts, researchers, and others who play important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation

[140] Heclo, "*Issue Networks*," 102.
[141] Ibid., 88, 102.
[142] Meier, *Regulation*, 13.
[143] Ibid., 11–12.
[144] Ripley and Franklin, *Congress*.
[145] Ibid., 97–100.
[146] Sabatier, "Knowledge."

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of policy ideas, as well as actors at other levels of government who play important roles in policy formulation and implementation."[147] Sabatier's model emphasizes competing "advocacy coalitions" that seek to affect policy output. To a certain extent his model is a combination of systems theory and pluralism; it stresses the interaction between government actors and the larger environment and relies on the idea that competing coalitions of interests directly influence policy.

Most studies of subgovernments have concentrated on federal-level policy making, but recent research by Keith Hamm has focused on subgovernment activity in state governments. Initially Hamm identified six major themes in the literature on subgovernments.[148] These include conceptual characteristics, commonality of interest, interaction patterns, mutually beneficial exchange relationships, and the impact subgovernments have on both substantive policy and appropriations. He then applied these concepts to subgovernment activity in the state of Colorado.[149] His study provides one of the few attempts to empirically measure the existence of subgovernment behavior. His findings varied significantly across various legislative committees and their associated issues. He found some indication of subgovernment activity, but discovered numerous exceptions to the traditional conceptualization.

Given the breadth and diversity of recent subgovernment research, it is difficult to generalize about trends in theory and application. The concept still holds the interest of numerous political scientists, but is in the process of significant reformulation. However, there does appear to be a dominant theme in revisionist thought that can be summed up in a single yet critically important statement: each corner of the triangle consists of a multiplicity of interests rather then a single, cohesive participant. Participation by these interests varies across a number of dimensions, which often are in conflict.

This multiplicity can be seen among bureaucratic, congressional, and interest group participants. Numerous legislative committees and subcommittees are often involved in the same subgovernment (for example, seventy of them deal with water policy at the national level). Administrative agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities sometimes service the same issue area. The greatest emphasis, however, has been on the multiplicity of interest groups that now attempt to influence the traditional domain of the cloistered subgovernment. Thomas Gais, Mark Peterson, and Jack Walker argue that "the decentralized system of subgovernments is definitely being threatened. A new set of citizen groups are [sic] available . . . for sustained attacks on the system of subgovernments."[150] Similar thinking can be found in most of the other recent studies of subgovernments.

[147] Ibid., 13.

[148] Hamm, "Patterns of Influence."

[149] Hamm, "Role of 'Subgovernments,'" 177.

[150] Thomas Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and Jack Walker, "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Institutions in American National Government," *British Journal of Political Science* 14 (April 1984): 177.

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There is no doubt that these new interest groups have had a significant impact, but their overall influence may be overestimated. Kay Schlozman and John Tierney's comprehensive examination of organized political interests led them to conclude that traditional interests still dominate. They note that the increase in the number of citizens' groups was matched by an even greater increase in the number of traditional interests, and the proportion of citizens' groups actually decreased. As a result, interest group influence today is quite similar to past decades.[151] Revisionist subgovernment models have emphasized the conflict between competing coalitions of interest groups. This is without a doubt an important element in the subgovernment configuration. But the central question is not the mere existence of organized opposition, but the relative political strength of that opposition. There have always been interests opposed to the policy goals of dominant subgovernments. Today these groups are more visible and more numerous in absolute terms. This visibility is reflected in the contemporary thought on subgovernments. Whether these interests can substantially alter subgovernment policy output in the long run, especially distributive policy, is a question that deserves further investigation.

Conclusion

The subgovernment model presented in this article is an attempt to identify in a comprehensive manner the variables and relationships that determine the political viability of subgovernments. In reality, the list of variables is nearly infinite, but the ones chosen for inclusion here are those that are most prominent in the subgovernment and related literature. Also discussed were alternative and revisionist concepts and recent case studies relevant to subgovernments.

It is important to remember that the subgovernment model is just a model. By definition it is a simplification of reality. Some of the recent criticism of the model claims that it is much too simplistic to be of use.[152] There is no doubt that the policy-making process has grown increasingly complex in recent decades, and the conceptualization of the model as it was initially formulated is less useful today.[153] But the considerable vagueness and lack of analytical specificity of the model has also given it flexibility. As a result, the concept of subgovernments has changed to reflect this increasing complexity. For example, Ripley and Franklin caution that the subgovernment concept "should not be reduced to a simple-minded formula that implies no change and automatic outcomes and success."[154] Similarly, Davidson notes that the term "iron triangle" has become "a shorthand term that embraced a wide variety of relationships."[155] Perhaps the best approach is that suggested by Hamm, where subgovernments are placed on a continuum according

[151] Schlozman and Tierney, *Organized Interests*, 386–388.

[152] Heclo, "Issue Networks."

[153] Ernest Griffith, *Impasse of Democracy* (New York: Harrison-Hilton Books, 1939); Cater, *Power in Washington*; Freeman, *Political Process*.

[154] Ripley and Franklin, *Bureaucracy*, 88.

[155] Davidson, "Subcommittee Government," 105.

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to their leading characteristics.[156] This gives the theory sufficient flexibility to account for a variety of situations – from the pure, classical iron triangle to the more complex and integrated systems that Heclo calls "issue networks."[157]

According to one author, subgovernments "have been in existence in American politics since the founding of the republic."[158] More than a decade ago, Roger Davidson wrote that the control of subgovernments would be "a fundamental issue in future domestic politics."[159] The subgovernment concept has also been "one of the most frequently evoked images in the study of public policy. . . ." [160] Given the long-term popularity of the subgovernment model in the public policy literature and the recent criticism of the model, it appears necessary to clearly define our conceptualization of subgovernments and then test this against current political reality.*

[156] Hamm, "Patterns of Influence," 381, 415; Hamm, "Role of 'Subgovernments,'" 322.
[157] Heclo, "Issue Networks."
[158] Bayes, *Ideologies*, 22–23.
[159] Davidson, "Policymaking," 83.
[160] deHaven-Smith and Van Horn, "Subgovernment Conflict," 627.

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The American Exploitation of German Technical Know-How after World War II

JOHN GIMBEL

After World War II the Americans systematically exploited German scientific and technical know-how as intellectual reparations. To do so they brought German scientists and technicians to the United States under Project Paperclip, a program that received considerable public attention, particularly after the successful Russian launch of Sputnik in 1957, which gave rise to widespread currency of the quip that their Germans were better than our Germans.[1] But paralleling and complementing Project Paperclip, the Americans also sent hundreds of experts to Germany to ferret out scientific and technical know-how for transfer to the United States. The nature of these programs and the amounts and value of the know-how removed by the Americans and thus lost to the Germans can only

[1] See Clarence G. Lasby, *Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 6; see also Franz Kurowski, *Alliierte Jagd auf deutsche Wissenschaftler: Das Unternehmen Paperclip* (Munich: Albert Langen-Georg Müller Verlag, 1982); Tom Bower, *The Paperclip Conspiracy: Hunt for the Nazi Scientists* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987); Michel Bar-Zohar, *The Hunt for German Scientists*, trans. from the French by Leon Ortzen (London: Arthur Barker, 1967); James McGovern, *Crossbow and Overcast* (New York: W. Morrow, 1964); Boris T. Pash, *The Alsos Mission* (New York: Award Books, 1970); and Linda Hunt, "U. S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41 (April 1985): 16–24.

JOHN GIMBEL is professor emeritus of history at Humboldt State University and the author of numerous books and articles on U.S.–German relations since World War II. Among his books are *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949; The Origins of the Marshall Plan;* and *Science, Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany.*

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be touched on in this article.[2] What concerns me here is the broader and long-range ramifications of an action that was conceived, implemented, and imposed on the Germans by the Americans as a means to collect intellectual reparations for U.S. military and nonmilitary benefit. Perhaps surprisingly—ironically and justifiably so for the Germans immediately affected at the time—the American postwar exploitation of German science and technology furthered an extensive network of American-German scientific, business, and industrial collaboration; and it contributed to the American climate of opinion that insured West Germany's participation in the Marshall Plan, which in turn contributed to that nation's remarkable postwar economic recovery and development.

Postwar Exploitation Programs

In their military campaign against Germany, the Americans and their British allies created a number of special scientific and technical intelligence units that they staffed with engineers, chemists, physicists, and other specialists drawn directly from the armed services or recruited from government agencies, private industries, industrial and trade associations, and the universities.[3] When the war ended, hundreds of these experts returned home to their places of employment and to their professional and trade associations to emphasize the importance of what they had found and to champion a postwar exploitation program for the benefit of U.S. science and industry. Their interests touched virtually every aspect of German industry and technology, including wind tunnels, tape recorders, synthetic fuels and rubber, diesel motors, color film processing, textiles and textile equipment, machine tools, acetylene chemistry, ceramics, optics and optical glass, heavy presses, the cold extrusion of steel, heavy machinery, electric condensers, electron microscopes, die-casting equipment, and a long list of other things. For example, returning wartime investigators reported finding wind tunnels "far superior" to those in use in the United States, textiles and yarns "with no commercial counterpart in this country," a tape recorder that promised to revolutionize the recording industry, "an ingenious German machine" for producing smaller and cheaper condensers for "radio, radar, and other electric and electronic equipment," as well as a host of other things with similar promise or potential.[4]

[2] See John Gimbel, *Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990).

[3] Final After Action Report, T Force and T Branch, 12th Army Group, 1 Jul 1945, Record Group (hereafter RG) 332, ETO, USFET G-2 Section, Operations Branch, box 27, file Correspondence, 1945, Washington National Records Center (hereafter WNRC), Suitland, Md.; SHAEF, G-2, Intelligence Directive No. 17, Subj: "T" Force, 27 Jul 1944, RG 165, file ABC 334.8 CIO Subcmte. (30 Jul 44), Sec. 1-A, National Archives (hereafter NA), Washington, D.C.; Est. of a Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS), Note for files, 14 Aug 1944, ibid.; CIOS, Statement of Purpose of Grey List, CIOS (GLP - 4 Revised), [2 Feb 1945], RG 84, box 37, file 820.02a Safehaven Gen and CIOS, Jan-Aug 45, WNRC; Report of CIOS for 1944, CIC 63/9, 7 Feb 1945, RG 218, JCS Central Decimal Files, 1942–45, box 133, file CCS 319.1 (11-7-44), Sec. 2, NA.

[4] Donald R. Heath, US Gp CC, Memorandum of Conversation with Colonel Boyd and Colonel

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Responding to the wishes of the returning investigators, to requests from professional associations (such as the American Chemical Society, the American Petroleum Institute, and the Scientific Apparatus Makers of America), and to recommendations of U.S. government officials (such as Fred M. Vinson, the director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, and Henry A. Wallace, the Secretary of Commerce), President Harry S. Truman authorized a postwar commercial-industrial exploitation program late in August 1945.[5] The War and Commerce Departments subsequently implemented Truman's executive order through two agencies—the Office of Technical Services (OTS) in the Commerce Department and the Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT) in Europe. The former recruited technically qualified people and sent them to Germany "to screen, select, index, and microfilm documents of value to science and industry" and report the information to the OTS for release to the public. In Europe, FIAT provided necessary billets, work space, office equipment, supplies, communication facilities, and transportation for the OTS personnel. Further, it secured qualified German personnel for the entire operation, maintained a library, and took such other implementing actions necessary to accomplish the OTS mission.[6] The two agencies

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Scharff on 6 October 1945, RG 84, box 726, file 58 (400a Reparations, Sept–Oct 1945), WNRC; Department of Commerce, Publication Board, Release OPB-60, 6 Mar 1946, RG 40, box 108, file 1–99, WNRC; "German Fibers," *Business Week*, 23 October 1945, 63–64; CIOS Evaluation Report 348, Mahle Werk GmbH, Fellbach, 28 Aug 1945, RG 218, JCS Central Decimal Files, 1942–45, box 136, file CCS 319.1 (11–7–44), Sec. 13, NA; J. R. Townsend to G. D. Edwards, TIIC, 21 Aug 1945, RG 40, box 115, file Ger. Die Casting Machine, WNRC; US Gp CC, FIAT, CC-13704, to 1st French Army for Dieuxieme Bureau, 21 Jul 1945, RG 260, box 12, 7771st Document Center, file GBI/Tech/475 (CNE), WNRC; OMGUS, Office of the Director of Intelligence, FIAT, to USFET, G-2, Subj: Clearance for Evacuation of German Equipment, 19 Nov 1945, RG 338, USFET, G-2 Section, Operations Branch, Correspondence, 1945–46, WNRC; TIID, Progress Report No. 11, to J. C. Green, 10 Dec 1946, RG 40, box 99, WNRC; William C. Speed to Edwin Y. Webb, Jr., TIID, RG 40, box 99, file Year End Review, WNRC.

[5] Executive Order 9604, Providing for the Release of Scientific Information, (Extension and Amendment of Executive Order No. 9568), 25 Aug 1945, *Code of Federal Regulations, Title 3, 1943–1948 Compilation* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 1957), 422. For examples of professional association requests and recommendations of government officials see W. C. Schroeder, "Investigation by the U. S. Government Technical Oil Mission," *American Petroleum Institute Proceedings* 25 (1945): 24–29; Warren F. Faragher, "Collecting German Industrial Information," *Chemical and Engineering News* 26 (27 December 1948): 3816–20; "Widening Horizons," (editorial) *National Petroleum News* 37 (7 November 1945): R-936; Bradley Dewey, President, American Chemical Society, to Wallace and others, 23 Oct 1945, RG 59, file 862.542/10–2445, NA; Dewey to Byrnes, 24 Oct 1945; Byrnes to Dewey, 19 Nov 1945, ibid.; Vinson to General A. J. McFarland, JCS, 14 May 1945, RG 165, box 204, file ABC 334.8, CIOS Subcmte (30 Jul 44), Sec. 1-C; Leahy to Vinson, 8 Jun 1945, ibid.; Donald B. Keyes, TIIC, to D. P. Morgan, Memorandum, 5 Jun 1945, RG 40, OTS Reiss files, box 154, file TIIC Material, WNRC.

[6] JIOA, Minutes, Advisory Board, 8 Oct 1945, RG 40, box 79, file JIOA Advisory Bd., WNRC; John C. Green to Gruhn, JIOA, 17 Oct 1945, ibid.; Green to Wallace, 26 Sep 1945, RG 40, box 85, file Enemy Scientists, WNRC; Edward L. Bowles to Clay, 27 Sep 1945, RG 260, OMGUS Decimal Files, AG 1945–46, box 41, file AG 231.2 Scientists and Technicians, WNRC; AGWAR to USFET, W-59946, 5 Sep 1945, ibid., file AG 322 FIAT; USFET to War Department, S-22720, 11 Sep 1945, RG 165, file ABC 334.8 CIO Subcmte (30 Jul 44), Sec. 1-C, NA; Joint Intelligence Committee, JIC

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functioned until 30 June 1947, when General Lucius D. Clay, the American military governor, shut down the operation in the interests of German economic recovery.[7]

The FIAT and the OTS concentrated on two interrelated activities – one a documents filming project, the other a program to facilitate the work of technical consultants and missions sent to Germany by the OTS on behalf of government agencies, trade and industrial associations, and private industries. In practice, investigators, document screeners, and microfilm units visited hundreds of German targets, including the Ernst Leitz camera works in Wetzlar, the Merck pharmaceutical works in Darmstadt, M. A. N. in Augsburg, B. M. W. in Munich, Degussa in Frankfurt, Krupp in Essen, Bosch in Stuttgart, I. G. Farben in Hoechst, and every major university.[8] Their mission was to ferret out scientific and technical know-how for transfer to the United States. They had authority from FIAT to visit plants; interview plant personnel; examine processes and products; take photographs and samples; demand drawings, plans, and blueprints; and according to John C. Green, the OTS director, to "take all other measures appropriate to the full extraction of the information" they were after.[9] For example, they took Germans from their homes and work places to Dustbin, a detention and interrogation center for scientists and industrialists located in Kransberg Castel near Frankfurt am Main, where they could be held indefinitely for interrogation.[10] They re-

220/6, Subj: Acquisition of German Technical information of an Industrial Nature, 12 Oct 1945, RG 40, OTS Reiss files, box 138, file TIIC Basic Directive, WNRC; Report on German Documents Conference, 22 October 1945–25 October 1945, USFET, RG 260, FIAT Records, box 17/19, file 24, WNRC; AGWAR to USFET, W-87107, 6 Dec 1945, RG 260, OMGUS Decimal Files, AG 1945–46, box 64, file 322 FIAT, WNRC; AGWAR to USFET, W-87832, 10 Dec 1945, copy in mss History of FIAT, vol. 1, app. 24, p. 130, RG 319, Office of the Chief of Military History Historical Manuscript file, NA; OMGUS, Economics Division, to FIAT, 11 Mar 1946, RG 260, box 11/2-2, file 98. (Scientific Research), WNRC; OMGUS, FIAT, Enemy Documents Branch, Daily Journal, 22 Jan 1946, RG 260, FIAT Records, box 17/8, file 3, WNRC; OMGUS, FIAT, Circular 26, "FIAT Operating Procedure for the Scientific Library," 12 Jul 1946, RG 260, OMGUS Decimal Files, AG 1945–46, box 64, file AG 322 FIAT, WNRC; John C. Green, interview, 14 Jul 1982, Washington, D. C.

[7] OMGUS, General Orders, #54, 23 Jun 1947; FIAT, Final Summary Report, Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT), 1 Jul 1947, 10 pp., with enclosures, RG 260, OMGUS Decimal Files, AG 1947, box 120, file AG 322 (FIAT), WNRC.

[8] For examples, see K. H. Weberg to Neal D. Crane, Subj: Progress in the screening of Documents in German Industrial Chemical Targets . . ., 2 Nov 1946, RG 40, OTS Worden files, box 87, file Chemical Subcommittee, TIIC, WNRC; FIAT, Bi-Weekly Progress Report – FIAT, 1–15 Nov 1946, RG 260, OMGUS Decimal Files, AG 1945–46, box 64, file AG 322, FIAT, WNRC; FIAT, Daily Journal, 29 Nov 1946, RG 260, FIAT Records, box 17/9, file 4, WNRC; and FIAT, Bi-Weekly Progress Report - FIAT, 16–30 Nov 1946, RG 260, OMGUS Decimal Files, AG 1945–46, box 64, file AG 322, FIAT, WNRC.

[9] Green, To Whom it May Concern, 20 May 1949, RG 40, box 107, file FIAT Declassified Rpts., WNRC; Reiss to Unit Chiefs, 16 Jul 1946, RG 40, OTS Hilbourne files, box 147, file Reiss, WNRC.

[10] Dustbin detainees could also be held for about a month without exploitation. See FIAT, Subj: Qualifications of new DUSTBIN Detainees, 7 Jan 1946, RG 332, ETO, MIS-Y Section Records re FIAT, 1945–47, box 103, WNRC, which states: "If exploitation on the new arrival is not started within four weeks, procedures for his release will be started automatically."

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moved documents from work places and homes, in one recorded instance in the absence of the owner; in another by blowing open a bank's safe deposit box.[11] Elsewhere, as recorded in the case of Ernst Leitz, they used "high pressure methods" without indicating for the record precisely what that entailed.[12] The directive establishing FIAT did, however, give investigators specific authority to remove, arrest, and intern individual Germans.[13]

German firms and other targets affected by the investigations often recorded their losses and their unsuccessful attempts to refuse access to facilities and unpatented know-how, their fruitless requests for receipts, and their vain efforts to receive compensation for the value of what they delivered in scientific and technical know-how. Some also commented on the broader ramifications of the investigations. For example. Alexander Wacker Gesellschaft fuer Elektrochemische Industrie, after listing what had been taken, commented that investigators had gotten their hands on the firm's entire records collection on research, experimentation, and tests, and that foreign interests were now in a position to use the information in their own firms.[14] Another firm, Gesellschaft fuer Linde's Eismaschinen, reported that a visiting commission claimed to be operating with a mandate from the American government to acquire an archive of recent German industrial advances. It suspected, however, that the information would be used by private firms to compete with Linde in its former foreign markets.[15] Yet another firm, Degussa, reported that the visits were not just for the purpose of inspecting factories and equipment; they were occasion for gathering information of all types, and for taking photographs, sample products, recipes and formulas, drawings and plans, and documents relating to the entire enterprise. On occasion, the Degussa report continued, when investigators came without FIAT passes or with passes that appeared to be unclear or improper, there were unpleasant confrontations that Degussa tried to resolve by contacting units of the American occupation forces. In those cases, the report went on, investigators usually returned later with proper passes to do what they had wanted to do in the first place.[16] H. A. Waldrich, Maschinenfabrik/Siegen

[11] USFET, G-2, Subj: Letter of Clearance, 12 Dec 1945; Major Myron W. Warren, OMG Wuerttemberg-Baden, to Public Safety Officer, OMG, Heidenheim, Subj: Receipt of Documents, 19 Dec 1945, RG 260, box 12/197-2, file 3, WNRC; FIAT, Industry Branch, Weekly Progress Report, 1 May-15 May 1946, RG 40, box 99, file Staff Memoranda, 1946, WNRC.

[12] Reiss to Green, Subj: Progress Report No. 6, 28 Jun 1946, RG 40, box 26, file TIID - Progress Reports by Reiss 1946-1947, WNRC.

[13] US Gp CC, INT/FIAT/321.01.1, Subj: Establishment of Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT), U. S. Component . . ., 14 Jul 1945, RG 260, US Gp CC Records, box 10, file AG 322, FIAT Org. and Functions, WNRC.

[14] Wacker to Industrie- und Handelskammer (IHK), Munich, Subj: Beschlagnahmungen von Zeichnungen, Patenten, Verfahren u. dgl., 15 Sep 1947, B 102/3767, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, West Germany (hereafter BA).

[15] Linde's Eismaschinen AG to IHK, Munich, Subj: Beschlagnahmungen von Zeichnungen, Patenten, Verfahren und dergl., 11 Sep 1947, B 102/3767, BA.

[16] Degussa to Grosshessische Staatsministerium, Subj: Besuche industrieller Betriebe durch amerikanische und nicht-amerikanische Wirtschaftsoffiziere, 8 Oct 1946, file Verhandlungen mit Besatzungsbehoerden, 1 April 1945 bis . . ., Degussa Archives, Frankfurt am Main.

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reported that investigators came and demanded plans or samples of planing machines, vertical boring machines, lathes, production plans, scientific studies, calculations, laboratory tests, test-and-measurement methods, technical literature, professional journals, catalogs, printed forms, and lists of various kinds, including the names of customers and suppliers. The latter perhaps suggested as clearly as anything what the purposes of it all was.[17]

Short-term Impact on German Research and Recovery

In the short run the exploitation programs had a negative effect on the resumption of German research and on German economic recovery in general. American military government officials were charged with preventing disease and unrest in Germany. They were encouraged by policy and public statements, such as Secretary of State James F. Byrnes's Stuttgart speech of 6 September 1946, to develop a self-sustaining German economy. But they claimed to be frustrated by the scientific and technical exploitation programs.[18] Reflecting these frustrations, General Clay wrote to the War Department on 20 October 1946 that the FIAT investigations were a serious handicap to German economic recovery. He expressed doubts that "German industrial development in peacetime industry and research . . . can be pushed vigorously until some industrial security is provided for trade processes which are developed in these industries."[19]

The four-power level-of-industry plan for Germany, which was approved in Berlin in March 1946, and the Allied Control Council (ACC) Law No. 25, which governed the resumption of German research, left room for peacetime industrial development and research. The ACC Law, which emphasized prohibitions and restrictions, identified areas, fields, and categories of research that were permitted under controls to be exercised by the individual zone commanders. George Scatchard, the MIT professor who had served in Berlin as the chief American research control officer at the time, remarked later on that German research was "controlled but not crippled" by the law.[20] American military government research-control

[17] H. A. Waldrich GmbH, Maschinenfabrik, Siegen/W., to Wirtschaftsverband Maschinenbau, Duesseldorf-Oberkassel, 29 Apr 1947, file NR 99, Nr. 63, Hauptstaatsarchiv Duesseldorf.

[18] For example, Colonel Gerald B. O'Grady, the chief industry officer for the Office of Military Government for Wuerttemberg-Baden, whose office was known at FIAT for having made difficulties for FIAT investigators "on various occasions," once told a FIAT investigator that he "totally disapproved of such robbery." He also reported to OMGUS headquarters in Berlin that "practically none [of the investigators] are here in the interest of any Government but for purely personal gain" [sic]. O'Grady to OMGUS, Economics Division, Subj: Visitors and Items withdrawn from German Concerns, [with attached tabulation of visits in February and March 1946], 28 Mar 1946, RG 260, box 11/2-2, file 19 (98. Scientific Research), WNRC. For FIAT's difficulties with OMG, W/B, see F. H. McBerty to F. O. Robitschek, Subj: Stuttgart Difficulties and Errand, 4 Apr 1946, and T. G. Haertel to Deputy Chief, FIAT, Subj: Investigation Difficulties in Stuttgart, 12 Apr 1946, ibid.

[19] OMGUS from Clay to AGWAR for Echols, CC-5929, 20 Oct 1946, RG 84, box 760, file 7 (854. Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights), WNRC.

[20] George Scatchard, "The Policy for Controlling German Scientific Work," *Chemical Engineering*

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officers in the field urged the Germans to move forward with permitted research in the interests of developing a self-sustaining, peaceful, postwar German economy. For example, Colonel L. J. Brunton, the research control officer in Stuttgart, reportedly told the first meeting of the German Research Control Advisory Committee for Wuerttemberg-Baden that his primary duty was to see to it that no military research was conducted. But he also had another important function—to encourage German research in order to make the German peacetime economy competitive in world markets so that Germans could earn enough foreign exchange to nourish themselves within their current restricted boundaries.[21]

But the Germans moved slowly and reluctantly, if at all, in part out of fear that FIAT investigators would have access to their laboratories, research facilities, and findings unless existing policy and practices were changed. Seeking to bring about such change, the German Scientific Research Control Committee for the American Zone put the question of inspection of plants on the agenda for its meeting in January 1947. A brief record of that meeting shows, however, that discussion was postponed, most likely on the informal advice of American liaison officers to the committee. Shortly after the meeting and without further explanation, the Americans on the scene sent the Germans a copy of President Truman's Executive Order 9604, which had authorized the exploitation program.[22] Meanwhile, the far-reaching, adverse effects of the inspection of plants continued to agitate the Germans. In its February 1947 meeting, attended by observers from several industrial firms and technical high schools, the German Scientific Research Control Committee for the American Zone heard Colonel Brunton assure them that research establishments operating under ACC Law No. 25 had a right to refuse delivery of information demanded of them by FIAT investigators.[23] But the Germans, who had circulated Truman's Executive Order 9604 among themselves and reflected on their bitter experiences with FIAT investigators, were less than satisfied with oral assurances by lower-level research control officers. At its next monthly meeting on 25 March 1947, the German Committee spent much of the day discussing what its recorder referred to as the "sensitive question of the intellectual plunder of German industry by representatives of foreign firms" (". . . *die heikle Frage der geistigen Ausraubung der deutschen Industrie durch auslaen-*

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55 (January 1948): 260–62, which is a summary of a speech Scatchard gave in New York on 17 September 1947, to the Division of Physical and Inorganic Chemistry of the American Chemical Society, after his return from Germany, where he had served as Clay's scientific adviser and chief of the Scientific Research and Control Branch, Economics Division, U. S. Office of Military Government for Germany.

[21] Bericht ueber die 1. Sitzung des Beirates der Forschungsueberwachungsstelle beim Wirtschaftsministerium Wuerttemberg-Baden vom 21.11.46, file Z 1/581, 272ff., BA.

[22] Frowein to Eickemeyer, Laenderrat, 15 Jan 1947, file Z 1/423, 110, BA; Laenderrat Economics Council, Special Committee Scientific Research, 6th Meeting, 16 Jan 1947, file Z 1/88, p. 217, BA; Regional Government Coordinating Office to Rossmann, 23 Jan 1947, file Z 1/423, p. 104, BA.

[23] Wirtschaftsrat des Laenderrates, Sonderausschuss Wissenschaftliche Forschung, 7. Sitzung am 24. Februar 1947, file Z 1/423, pp. 19–21, BA.

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dische Firmenvertreter"). The committee decided that a written request to the Americans for a change in policy was useless ("*unzweckmaessig*"). The best they could hope for was that the regional research-control officers would intervene in individual cases, which the latter had apparently promised to do on request on a case by case basis.[24]

New FIAT investigations officially ended on 15 May 1947. FIAT went out of existence on 30 June 1947, as a result of a decision on high. But the impact of the so-called phase-out operations well beyond 1 July 1947 and – more importantly – the lingering after-effects of those already completed by then are remarkable. For one thing, the Hessian Economics Ministry official, Dr. Friedrich Frowein, who had undertaken to develop a bizonal industrial research plan at the request of the British/American Bipartite Economic Control Group, reported informally late in 1947 that in every one of his meetings with industrial representatives in Stuttgart, Mannheim, Munich, Frankfurt, Duesseldorf, and Hannover the question of the FIAT investigations had come up. In his final report, which he submitted on 21 April 1948, after additional visits in Bremen, Berlin, and elsewhere, Frowein reported that despite all clarifications of ACC Law No. 25 serious problems remained. In fact, he concluded, a number of firms were apparently inclined to hold back on research. ("*Eine Reihe von Firmen ist offensichtlich geneigt mit Forschungsarbeiten zurueckzuhalten.*")[25] In a book published many years later, Thomas Stamm described a 25 May 1949 meeting in Goettingen of German research control agencies; some representatives talked about ACC Law No. 25 as the basis for industrial espionage.[26] A report of 1 May 1949 was commissioned for internal use by the German Office for Peace Questions and prepared under the directorship of world-famous German economist, Gustav von Schmoller. "Many entrepreneurs," fear the possibility that "newly developed knowledge will fall into the hands of unauthorized persons; yes, into the hands of foreign competitors. [They] prefer to forego scientific research and development so long as the current regulations are in effect." Even though regional research control officers make promises about the confidentiality of their files, the report concluded, many of them are themselves experts and specialists whose access gives them an opportunity to use the information in their own work later to the detriment of occupied Germany.[27]

[24] Auszug aus Aktenvermerk ueber die 8. Sitzung "Forschungskontrolle" im Laenderrat, 25.3.1947, Betreff: Betriebsbesichtigung durch Auslaender, file EA 6/3, 321, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.

[25] Wirtschaftsministerium, W/B, Forschungsueberwachung, Aktenvermerk zur 12. Sitzung Laenderrat Arbeitsausschuss Forschungsueberwachung, 28.8.1947, file Z 1/424, pp. 182ff, BA; Dr. Frowein, Wiesbaden, Industrie-Forschungsplan fuer die Bizone, 21 Apr 1948, file Z 1/424, 15ff, BA.

[26] Thomas Stamm, *Zwischen Staat und Selbstverwaltung. Die deutsche Forschung im Wiederaufbau, 1945–1965* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1981), 56.

[27] Institut fuer Besatzungsfragen Tuebingen, *Einwirkungen der Besatzungsmaechte auf die westdeutsche Wirtschaft. Dargestellt im Auftrag des Deutschen Bueros fuer Friedensfragen mit Unterstuetzung des Bueros der Ministerpraesidenten* (Nur fuer den Dienstgebrauch, 1 May 1949), esp. 37–38.

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Exploitation Programs and German-American Business Connections

The FIAT handbook for investigators warned early on that "investigators may . . . be approached by German nationals with a view to establishing commercial contacts."[28] But there was obviously no way to control what went on in the field between investigators and their "targets" in the presence of nothing more than four walls—or what was left of them in postwar Germany. Available FIAT and OTS records show that investigators, particularly those with previous German business connections, were "very hard to handle," that they sometimes "used their FIAT investigations merely as a pretext to get into Germany," that they were often more interested in their own private affairs than in completing their FIAT missions, and that there was no way to stop them from visiting their properties or their former representatives once they were in Germany. Even those who faithfully carried out and completed their FIAT missions could as a matter of policy ask for extensions "to conduct private affairs" before they returned to the Untied States.[29]

In the absence of a Freedom of Information Act governing private industries, there is no way to learn precisely what kind of understandings, business deals, licensing arrangements, joint ventures, or similar things these people discussed and worked out. There are indications, however. For example, Sosthenes Behn, the president of ITT, agreed to donate the services of an ITT employee to the Department of Commerce for service with FIAT in Europe with the understanding that he would "be allowed to obtain for us information in which we alone are interested because of our affiliated companies."[30] After reading in *Chemical Industries* that the Commerce Department was recruiting people from industry to go to Europe as technical consultants, C. R. Addinall, the assistant director of research at Merck & Company, wrote to the OTS that he had been planning a business trip to Europe to gather business and scientific information "of value to Merck & Co., Inc." He would like to discuss going to Germany as a government representative to acquire "information that would be of public interest and also of value to Merck & Co., Inc." Merck's main interests were vitamins, hormones, antibiotics, and pharmaceutical chemicals "of all types," he noted. The company was also interested in herbicides, fungicides, insecticides, germicides, and "various raw materials and processes for the preparation of basic organic chemicals useful for synthetic work in the widest of fields."[31] Precisely what he did in Europe when he got there remains

[28] FIAT, Handbook for the Guidance of Members and Leaders of Field Teams operating under the authority of Field Information Agency, Technical (U.S.), 6 Sep 1945, RG 260, box 17/14, file 11, WNRC.

[29] Green to Haertel, 14 Mar 1946, RG 40, OTS Reiss files, box 156, file FIAT ltrs fr Haertel, WNRC; Reiss to Green, Subj: Progress Report No. 6, 28 Jun 1946, RG 40, box 26, file TIID - Progress Reports by Reiss, WNRC; Reiss to Unit Chiefs, 16 Jul 1946, RG 40, OTS Worden and Mayer files, file Utility Division, 1946, WNRC.

[30] Sosthenes Behn, President, ITT, to Edwin Y. Webb, TIID, 8 Apr 1946, RG 40, box 116, file ITT, WNRC.

[31] Addinall to Chemical Unit, TIIB, 21 Feb 1946, RG 40, box 163, file Returned, WNRC.

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a mystery to me, but he did reportedly tell a meeting in Washington before he left that "if a company wants to manufacture a chemical, it wants to know what that chemical can do, know its background, and what can be done — it wants a full working process, and it wants to know the patent situation — whether a patent has been applied for or granted and whether it is being transferred to a firm in the United States. . . ."[32] Still another indication may be found in the records of the German firm Degussa, which was visited in April 1946 by "Mr. Harbert," a representative of Harshaw Chemical Company of Cleveland, Ohio. Compared with the inquisitorial approach of other investigators, a Degussa report of his visit noted that Harbert approached them as would a "representative of a friendly firm." Among other things, he agreed to send five of his own patents to Degussa for consideration; and he promised to recommend Degussa to his firm as the European licensee for "Uverite," a product that representatives of the two firms had in fact discussed as early as 1939. In what the Degussa reporter referred to as music for German ears, Harbert—who had in fact emigrated to the United States from Germany some twenty years earlier—observed that he had more trust in German firms than in the French one that was also interested in the license.[33]

Other indications abound. Morris Schwartz, the president of The Kalart Company, who went to Europe on an OTS/FIAT mission with his chief engineer, William Castedello, in 1947, reported to his contact in the Commerce Department that he was negotiating the purchase of 100,000 camera shutters from the firm Friederich Deckel in Munich. He was also interested in negotiating the purchase of "certain machine tools produced and catalogued for commercial sale by the same manufacturer, F. Deckel."[34] Degussa records show that Horace H. Hopkins of DuPont, bearing a FIAT pass, visited the firm in May 1947. He discussed DuPont's plans to build a plant in the United States to produce Penta, which the firm had been buying at the rate of about fifty tons a month. How far the discussions went is not revealed, but the record shows that Hopkins planned to visit a Degussa plant and that Degussa had expressed its willingness to send an expert to help DuPont build its own plant.[35]

A particularly revealing illustration of the conveyor-belt function of FIAT for the establishment of future German-American business connections may be found in the autobiography of Karl Winnacker, a former I. G. Farben director whom the Americans removed in 1945. Eventually he returned to Farbwerke Hoechst, AG, to become chairman of the board. In commenting on the immediate postwar visits of chemists and industrialists who "all wanted to profit as much as possible from our technical knowledge," Winnacker named R. Lindley Murray, the presi-

[32] "Notes on the Pharmaceutical Meeting of 10 April 1946," RG 40, box 163, file Minutes, WNRC.

[33] H. Kohl, Besuch von Mr. Harbert, Harshaw Chemical Co., Cleveland, 17 Apr 1946, file Keram. Farben, 1.3.44-30.9.49, Degussa Archives.

[34] Schwartz to Edwin Y. Webb, OTS, 9 May 1947, RG 40, box 116, file The Kalart Co., WNRC.

[35] Retze, Degussa, Frankfurt, Betr.: Auslaenderbesuch, 19 May 1947, file Military Government, 1 April 1945, Degussa Archives.

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dent of the American Hooker Company of Niagara Falls, New York, as an exception. "He took from his briefcase a whole batch of drawings, spread them across my table and asked me to agree to a detailed exchange of knowledge about the electrolysis cells of Hooker and Hoechst. In fact," Winnacker noted without giving further details, "we did come to a friendly arrangement about this . . . Murray's company eventually operated an electrolysis plant constructed . . . and based on our principle."[36] I contacted a former OTS/FIAT investigator from Monsanto Chemical Company in 1981 to ask about future business connections that grew out of the FIAT investigations. He replied—albeit rather cryptically—that "in hindsight it seems evident that conditions leading to many acquisitions of technology, joint ventures, and establishment of foreign enterprises were spawned. I observed a number of these and I participated in a few during the next ten to fifteen years."[37]

Enter the Marshall Plan

In defending the exploitation program against those who would have terminated it in the interests of German economic recovery, John C. Green, the OTS director in Washington, once wrote that FIAT operations had made German technology and German scientists and technicians known to American industry as never before. "In fact," he asserted, "the very publicity which has been given to German industry by our program should react as an advertisement. . . ."[38] As if to prove him correct, once the Americans decided to sponsor and underwrite a general European economic recovery program under the Marshall Plan, there appears to have been almost universal agreement in the United States that the program could not succeed without major industrial input from Germany.

Statements, assertions, and arguments that Germany (or West Germany) must play a key role in European economic recovery were a common feature of both the planning and development of the program, as well as of the debates and deliberations in the Congress and of the discussions in the public forum. George F. Kennan remembered in his memoirs that a speech he gave on 6 May 1947 to the National War College reflected his thinking when the State Department's Policy Planning Staff—of which he was director—began to work on the Marshall Plan. "In my opinion it is imperatively urgent today that the improvement of economic conditions and the revival of productive capacity in the west of Germany be made the primary object of our policy . . . and that this principle be adopted as a general line of procedure of this government, binding on all of its departments and agencies."[39]

[36] Karl Winnacker, *Challenging Years: My Life in Chemistry*, trans. David Goodman (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1972), 116–17.

[37] Personal letter, 8 Sep 1981, in my possession.

[38] Green to Draper [draft, not sent], 22 Jan 1947, RG 40, OTS Reiss files, box 156, file FIAT ltrs fr Haertel - Dec., WNRC.

[39] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 333–35. The mss. copy of Kennan's speech, "Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy After Moscow," which I saw

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On 19 June 1947, the Committee of Three (the secretaries of State, War, and Navy) advised General Clay and Robert Murphy, his political adviser in Berlin, that the State Department—in cables it had sent to the American ambassadors in Paris, Rome, Brussels, and other European capitals—had stressed the need for an integrated European economic recovery program. That meant, the Committee of Three interpreted and emphasized, that "any program of European reconstruction must necessarily take Germany into account."[40] When the French reposted that the Americans appeared to be putting "special emphasis on German recovery rather than on the recovery of Europe as a whole,"[41] W. Averell Harriman tried unsuccessfully to reason with French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, who told him that he "would be compelled to protest" if the Americans went ahead as planned.[42] Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, on the other hand, reported on more favorable discussions he had had with other French political leaders who "beg, repeat beg, that no further measures for German rehabilitation be announced until European plan under Marshall proposals be prepared, when German program can be made to dovetail with it."[43]

Taking their cues from Caffery—and perhaps for other reasons—certain American officials subsequently pretended (and thus led commentators and historians astray) that the decision to include Western Germany in the European Recovery Program (ERP) originated with the sixteen-nations meeting in Paris in the summer of 1947, even though it is quite clear from the record that the Americans pushed and pulled at every turn of events.[44] At one point a State Department functionary

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in the records of the War Department's Civil Affairs Division, Planning Branch (Germany, Special Reports), when it was still classified as secret does not indicate any special emphasis for the quoted material.

[40] War Department from SecWar, State, Navy, to CINCEUR for Clay, 19 Jun 1947, RG 107, box 26, file ASW 091 Germany, book 2, NA.

[41] Memorandum, Benjamin V. Cohen to H. Freeman Matthews, 9 Jul 1947, RG 59, file 840.50 Recovery/7-947, NA.

[42] Caffery to SecState, 20 Jul 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 1947, II, 997-99.

[43] Caffery to SecState, 18 Jul 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, II, 723. See also Joel Carmichael, "Can the Marshall Plan Save Europe?" *Commentary* 4 (October 1947): 313, for the observation that "from the French point of view, the catch in the Marshall Plan emerged when it became clear that the basic premise of any such scheme of European upbuilding had to be the salvaging of German industry as the nucleus of a general reconstruction."

[44] For a statement that "the decision to include Western Germany in the Program was made not by the Untied States but by the 16 participating countries" during their Paris meeting, see Percy W. Bidwell, "The European Recovery Program, Its Nature and Purposes" in Percy W. Bidwell, ed., *Germany's Contribution to European Economic Life* (Paris: Librairie Marcel Riviere et Cie, 1949), 21–67. Calvin B. Hoover wrote in "Germany and European Economic Recovery," *Yale Review* (March 1948): 387, that "there was, it is true, a certain amount of moral pressure exerted by the United States on the Paris Conference. . . . There was, however, no pressure with respect to measures for the economic revival of Germany, and none was needed." Herbert Feis, writing many years later in *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970), 268–69, continued to stretch to make it appear that the initiative to include Germany came from Europe and the

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recommended that a report on Germany prepared for President Truman by the secretary of Agriculture not be published, apparently out of fear that things were getting out of hand. He asked rhetorically, "Why can't we get the President to declare a holiday on public statements and the airing of personal views by government officials until we pull ourselves together and *know* exactly what we want to do?"[45]

But the Americans knew what they wanted with respect to Germany. There was apparently no stopping government officials and others as Marshall Plan discussions went forward within the administration, in the U.S. Congress, and in the public forum. For example, the Policy Planning Staff's preliminary report of 23 July 1947 stated that "the importance of Germany to general European recovery is well-known and requires no statistical illustration. . . ."[46] A month later, a State Department instruction to its "friendly advisers" to the sixteen-nations meeting in Paris stated that the "bizonal German area must be taken fully into account" and that it "be covered fully into program."[47] Similar instructions went out from the War Department to General Clay and from the State Department to Ambassador Douglas in London early in September.[48] The minutes of an early meeting of a subcommittee of the President's Committee on Foreign Aid (Harriman Committee) show that the economic program for Germany was discussed in more detail than any of the other items on the agenda. The Harriman Committee's final report to the president contains a separate "Report on the Special Position of the Bizone," which states among many other things that "no part of the economic aid requested by the [sixteen nations] is more fundamentally necessary to the recovery of Western Europe than the aid asked for the rehabilitation of German industry, agriculture, and transport. . . . The economy of Western Germany is like a lock which needs to be opened," the concluding section reads. "The tumblers of the lock represent steel, coal, food, housing, economic reform, and many other factors. To open the lock all the tumblers must drop simultaneously."[49]

Paris meetings: "By July 10th Washington was able to advise Clay that agreement had been reached in the Committee of Sixteen for the Marshall Plan that Germany would have a vital part in the program for Europe, but cautioned him against letting this appear to have been the result of American initiative."

[45] H. R. Labouisse to C. Tyler Wood, 21 Jul 1947, RG 59, file 740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2247, NA. For Secretary of State Marshall's recommendation that Secretary of Agriculture Clinton P. Anderson's report on Germany not be published because "it stresses the economic reconstruction of Germany virtually to the exclusion of any mention of our interest in the reconstruction of the liberated areas—which is the basis of the Paris conference," see Marshall to Anderson, 22 Jul 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, II, 1156-57.

[46] Policy Planning Staff, "Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Problem from the United States Standpoint," Preliminary Report, 23 Jul 1947, 43, in Clifford Papers, file European Recovery Program - Reports, Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

[47] Lovett to Clayton and Caffery, 26 Aug 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, III, 383-89; Caffery (from Clayton) to SecState (for Lovett), 31 Aug 1947, ibid., 391-96.

[48] War Department from Noce to OMGUS, 3 Sep 1947, RG 165, box 119, file 334, Sec. II, NA; SecState to Douglas, 5 Sep 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, III, 409-10.

[49] Minutes of the meeting of the Subcommittee on Economic and Financial Analysis in Hanover,

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A staff report of a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs stated as its first sentence that the "key factor in the recovery of Europe is the future of Western Germany." The full committee's final report continued the theme, stating among other things that "the special place of Germany in any plans for restoration of Europe is apparent in any objective consideration of the problems. The point need not be labored here that German recovery is a great factor in western European revival."[50] A National Association of Manufacturers' report sent to Truman supported the Marshall Plan in general, but added that aid to Europe could not be considered separately from Germany, "the industrial core of Europe."[51] Senator Robert Taft told the Ohio Society of New York that "the German policy of the Government is even more important to the reestablishment of Europe than the Marshall Plan."[52] Finally, although this already lengthy list could be extended far beyond the limits appropriate to this article, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in a speech to the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations and the Chicago Chamber of Commerce, denied charges that U.S. "policy has sought to give priority or intends to give priority to restoration of Germany." But he asserted that "without a revival of German production there can be no revival of Europe's economy."[53]

It would be naive, myopic, and foolish to argue that the ripple effects of the postwar American scientific and technical exploitation programs led directly to the decision to include Germany in the Marshall Plan or that those effects were a primary factor. The available records of the bureaucratic bargaining, international negotiations, and public discussions occasioned by the adoption and implementation of the Marshall Plan for European economic recovery show clearly

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N. H., on 15 August 1947, in Records of The President's Committee on Foreign Aid, 1947, box 6, Truman Library; The President's Committee on Foreign Aid, *European Recovery and American Aid: A Report by The President's Committee on Foreign Aid* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), 117–22 for the "Report on the Special Position of the Bizone."

[50] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee No. 2—Foreign Economic Policy, "Western Germany—the Key to European Recovery and the World Coal Situation," Staff Report, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), 1 [copy in PCFA, 1947, box 2, Truman Library]; U.S. Congress, House, 80th Cong., 2nd sess., *Foreign Assistance Act of 1948*. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on S. 2202, House Report No. 1585, Calendar No. 738 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948), 27 for the quotation.

[51] "Recommendations of the National Association of Manufacturers [NAM] on the Principles, Conditions, and Administration of Economic Aid to Europe," Earl Bunting, Pres., NAM, to Truman, 10 Nov 1947, OF 426 Misc., box 1275, Truman Library.

[52] Printed In U.S. Congress, 80th Cong., 1st sess., extension of Remarks of Kenneth S. Wherry, 20 Nov 1947, A4250–53.

[53] Marshall's speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Chicago Chamber of Commerce, 18 Nov 1947, copy in Clifford Papers (Marshall, Sec. of State George C. speeches), box 40, Truman Library. Also printed in U.S. Department of State, *Germany, 1947–1949: The Story in Documents*, Publication 3556, European and British Commonwealth Series 9 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1950), 9–13, albeit without reference to the organizations addressed.

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that the reasons for including Germany were varied, diffuse, and highly complex. They included economic, financial, political, ideological, humanitarian, historical, and geopolitical elements as well as considerations of American power and position in the cold war and in the postwar world. It seems to be reasonably clear, however, that American conceptions of the organization, the structure, the vitality, the accomplishments, and the past performance of German science and industry also played a role. Those conceptions, some of which had historical roots dating back to the nineteenth century and most of which were fixed in the twentieth century and the two world wars, were in fact confirmed, verified, strengthened, and brought to the foreground by what the postwar scientific and technical consultants and investigators brought home with them in their baggage. That baggage included information that made German scientists and technicians known to American industry as never before. It included understandings, business deals, joint ventures, licensing agreements, and promises of similar things in the future.*

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Book Reviews

The Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshaping America's Foreign Policy *by Richard C. Thornton. New York, Paragon House, 1989. 427 pp. $24.95.*

This highly provocative, well-researched, and vigorously written account of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policies has three quite different layers. The first surface layer is a detailed account, often with new insights, of U.S. foreign policies between 1969 and 1976 in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the superpower relationship, and Angola. The second layer is the argument that in December 1972, immediately after Richard Nixon's landslide reelection victory, control of those foreign policies moved out of Nixon's hands and into Henry Kissinger's. The transition, Richard C. Thornton believes, meant a fundamental change in the direction of postwar U.S. foreign policy strategy. The third layer is the assumption (not really an extended or proven argument) that this control shifted because the "Eastern wing of the Republican party" plotted the Watergate coverup to "entrap the President" (p. 154) and undermine his authority so that Kissinger could carry out trilateralist policies.

The first two layers are well-constructed, the third little more than a series of suggestions. Thornton provides splendid overviews of U.S. policy. His close readings of the Kissinger and Nixon memoirs are fresh and usually follow Nixon's account when the two conflict. Utilizing the key secondary materials, Thornton's own work in some primary sources also informs, especially the Middle East and Southeast Asia-China sections. The analysis of how Kissinger moved into Angola in 1974–1975 as part of his larger and ultimately disastrous strategy to turn Beijing and Moscow against each other restores needed emphasis to China's early importance in that civil war.

In a broader sense, the author believes that Nixon's policies represented a modified containment policy of China and the Soviet Union, while Kissinger's views aimed at playing off the Soviets against the Chinese and working out a trilateral relationship that would bring German and Japanese economic expansion increasingly under Washington's control. Thornton is sympathetic to the president's strategy and is scathingly critical of Kissinger's. The criticism and the command

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of the factual record remind a reader of Seymour Hersh's *Price of Power*, but Thornton's argument, moving especially from the failure of détente and assumptions about growing Soviet strategic power in the 1970s is the more conservative perspective. Finally, the belief that Watergate was engineered to destroy Nixon's authority is not proven or even well argued. The Eastern wing of the Republican party is repeatedly referred to, but never defined. The links between John Mitchell's "Judas-like turn against the president" (p. 154) and Kissinger's larger policies are never identified.

Thornton plans to continue tracing his larger theses in volumes on the Carter and Reagan presidencies. They should be eagerly awaited and perhaps will be even more persuasive than this account, since they will not have to contend with Watergate.

WALTER LAFEBER
Cornell University

Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy *by Robert D. Schulzinger. New York, Columbia University Press, 1989. 291 pp. $27.95.*

For eight years, from 1969 to 1977, Henry Kissinger dominated American foreign policy. First as national security adviser, then as secretary of state, he presided over the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, the ending of the Vietnam War, and the opening of relations with China. His power grew as President Richard Nixon became a victim of Watergate; Gerald Ford had to rely on Kissinger heavily because of his own relative inexperience in diplomacy. Yet despite such triumphs as SALT I and his Middle East shuttle negotiations, Kissinger became a controversial figure as the result of growing public disillusionment with détente and rising congressional resentment against executive domination of foreign policy.

The debate over Kissinger's record has continued ever since. Critics stress his relentless ambition and his determination to monopolize the conduct of foreign policy, while defenders stress his grasp of international realities and his effort to match American commitments to the nation's declining world power. Robert D. Schulzinger largely succeeds in rising above this scholarly quarreling to offer a clear and balanced view of Kissinger's contributions to American diplomacy. Neither blind to his faults nor dazzled by his strengths, the author portrays Kissinger as an academic realist who succumbed to the temptation of becoming a celebrity. His major contribution, Schulzinger contends, was to put very real limits on American globalism. He helped wind down the Vietnam War, slow the escalating nuclear arms race, and persuade the American people to accept the Soviet Union as a legitimate rival.

Part of the price Schulzinger pays for this even-handed, dispassionate account of Kissinger's accomplishments is the lack of a sustaining thesis. There is no analysis of the nature of Kissinger's relationship with Richard Nixon, nor any convincing explanation of why Kissinger allowed his status as celebrity diplomat to

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overcome his original role of academic expert intent on guiding the nation toward a more realistic view of the world. Just as Schulzinger accuses Kissinger of becoming so caught up in events that he simply reacts to them, the author appears to be carried along by his subject's involvement in the crises of the 1970s. The one exception is Schulzinger's shrewd insight into the way Kissinger repeatedly disregarded the substance of diplomatic documents in his insistence on the negotiating process itself. Placing a premium on reaching agreement, he often was too casual about the specific details. So on SALT, on the Vietnam peace proposals, and on the Israeli-Egyptian truce negotiations Kissinger won short-term victories that failed to lead to long-term achievements.

The ultimate test of Kissinger's reputation, the author tells us, "rests on the unfreezing of relations with the Soviet Union" (p. 210). By this standard, Henry Kissinger looks much better in the early 1990s than he did in the 1980s. Whatever the flaws, his efforts at détente marked an attempt at establishing a more responsible relationship with the Soviet Union. If the cold war is indeed approaching an end, then Henry Kissinger is likely to stand out as a major transitional figure who helped prepare the way for a more peaceful world.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon *by Robert Jervis. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1989. 266 pp. $21.95.*

So much has been written about the nuclear revolution and its impact on defense and foreign policy that a heavy burden rests on those who believe they have something new to say. Robert Jervis does have new and wise things to say, but he must pass a second test. Has he not said what he can in earlier well-received studies, particularly *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* five years ago? Not all that he now discusses is entirely new, particularly since several chapters are based on earlier papers or articles. Nonetheless, this new volume is a well-integrated, thoughtful, and thought-provoking analysis that deserves the reader's attention.

Jervis's dissection of the underlying nature and dilemma of security policy, deterrence, and war prevention is unfailingly objective, displaying rigorous reasoning and presented dispassionately. It represents careful application of logic combined with broad historical grounding and illustration. In particular, Jervis draws upon and further develops thinking about the psychological and perceptual aspects of policy and strategy on which he has earlier contributed so much. His analysis of the psychological basis for possible preemption and war is an important and useful corrective to the frequent tendency to see a technical basis derived from the nature and balance of weaponry as the likely source of instabilities and possible preemption.

Jervis proceeds from the obvious fact that a general nuclear war cannot be won

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to the far from obvious implications of the attendant conceptual revolution for strategy and international relations. His approach includes the historical development of thinking and applications in events over the nuclear decades, but his framework is analytical. The well-read student of these issues may not learn new facts, but he will certainly find new insights. The study is an excursion led by a master into thinking through the implications of the nuclear age. It is not beyond the nonspecialist, nor beneath the expert.

The nuclear revolution has most directly affected the United States, the Soviet Union, and the relationship between the two nuclear superpowers, and that is the principal focus of Jervis's study. While fully aware of, indeed emphasizing, the interactive two-way relationship, Jervis's attention is for several understandable reasons primarily based on and directed toward the policy and strategy of the United States. One of the reasons is that most of the theoretical and analytical attention on the issues has been in the United States, and much more is available on U.S. official thinking and motivation as well. It is no criticism of this work to note a continuing need to develop our understanding of Soviet thinking. Again, accepting the principal focus on the superpowers, more attention might also be given to the impact and especially future implications of the nuclear revolution for the rest of the world. This is an original, insightful, and important contribution to understanding a critical problem.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
The Brookings Institution

Gandhi, Prisoner of Hope *by Judith M. Brown. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989. 440 pp. $29.95.*

Among the hundreds of biographies written of M. K. Gandhi, some, like Louis Fischer's, are distinguished for their first-hand personal knowledge of their subject; others, like B. R. Nanda's, for assessing Gandhi's contribution to Indian nationalism; and still others, like Geoffrey Ashe's, for their elegant style. Judith Brown's biography has none of these distinguishing qualities, but it is the best life yet of the Mahatma. The spectacular strength of this study lies in its scholarship. Brown had demonstrated this earlier in her two solid works, *Gandhi's Rise to Power* (1972) and *Gandhi and Civil Disobedience* (1977). These volumes together analyzed Gandhi's leadership of the Indian nationalist movement from 1919 to 1934 and were outstanding in their unprecedented command of relevant source materials.

This book excels her own previous writing on Gandhi as well as other biographies in the way she gathers and presents evidence. Complex issues and thorny points are consistently set forth with full documentation and admirable clarity. Gandhi's views on caste and on women, for example, are expressed in a condensed yet complete analysis that is grounded in his voluminous *Collected Works*. From

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British government sources, Brown marshals a rich array of quotations that tell us how the Raj perceived Gandhi. Pronouncements on the Mahatma by Lords Reading, Birkenhead, and Irwin are often as hilarious as they are revealing of official attitudes. Perhaps the most illuminating is Lord Wavell's, who as viceroy of India commented on Gandhi in 1946: "My distrust of this shrewd, malevolent, old politician was deep before the [Simla] Conference started; it is deeper than ever now" (p. 368). Brown concludes that Wavell's perception "is symptomatic of the frustration and misunderstanding of successive British administrators when faced with this enigmatic figure who was so unlike any politician to be encountered in British public life" (p. 368).

This volume, much more than Brown's other studies of Gandhi, is filled with sympathetic insight into his thought and purpose. She calls Gandhi a "prisoner of hope" (from Zechariah, 9:12) to suggest that "an essential aspect of his basic optimism was the belief that people and therefore situations can radically change" (p. 359). Yet she makes clear how little of Gandhi's aims have been realized in independent India. Gandhi regarded his "life's work" as "the construction of a new Indian polity and society infused with non-violence and godliness" (p. 389); by any standard he failed utterly.

Brown finds Gandhi's ultimate significance in the high quality of his leadership; "fundamentally he was a man of vision and action, who asked many of the profoundest questions that face humankind as it struggles to live in community" (p. 394). Some political leaders may dismiss "the vision thing" as inconsequential and seem uninterested or incapable of raising profound questions. Brown, however, believes that this line from *Proverbs* epitomizes Gandhi's spirit and contribution: "Where there is no vision, the people perish" (p. 282).

DENNIS DALTON
Barnard College

Nehru: The Making of India *by M. J. Akbar. New York, Viking, 1989. 609 pp. $24.95.*

In recent years, as India has lurched from one crisis to another, the Congress Party-led state has found few supporters among Indian intellectuals. One of those few is M. J. Akbar who, until he resigned to successfully contest the 1989 parliamentary election as the candidate of the Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress, was the editor of a prominent Calcutta daily, the *Telegraph*. The ideology of secular nationalism that he championed as a journalist and which presumably led him into entering the parliamentary elections as a Congress candidate is evident in his biography of Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964).

As the most prominent of all the Indian nationalists who stood for a secular nation-state, Nehru is a particularly apt subject for Akbar. But for this very reason many other biographers have been drawn to Nehru. Is there much left to say after

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S. Gopal's sensitive and magisterial three-volume biography? Anticipating this question, the author states that his study is the result of a quest to understand the forces that forged and fragmented India's unity. His book is faithful to this intention as it skillfully narrates how Nehru, battling with cultures and forces alien to his cosmopolitanism and secularism, attempted to create a free and united India. No one in the narrative, not even the British rulers of India, appears more unattractive than the leaders of Hindu and Muslim politics, and none more villainous than Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. Because the story's main thread is a confrontation between secular nationalism and communal politics, Jinnah emerges as an egotistic and narrow-minded leader who sabotaged the prospect for a secular-democratic and united India. In such a view of modern Indian history, India's partition in 1947 was caused almost entirely by men like Jinnah, who exploited Hindu chauvinism and used British patronage to pursue power ruthlessly. From this perspective, while Nehru, Gandhi, and the Indian National Congress were devoted to the legitimate cause of national unity, Jinnah and the Muslim League fanned the fires of hatred and separatism.

The author re-advances this view with remarkable perseverance and passion. The result is a warm and endearing portrait of Nehru in which the personal and the political merge effortlessly into each other. Particularly good examples of the book's accomplishment in this respect are its sensitive portrayal of Motilal Nehru and its superb reconstruction of Anand Bhavan as the hub of the Nehru household and nationalist politics. Drawing on a great deal of published sources and scholarly works, in one short chapter after another, forty-seven in all, the reader is led through the drama of high politics, beginning with the rise of Indian nationalism in the late nineteenth century and ending with Nehru's death in 1964. While there are no major surprises in the story of how Nehru contributed to the formation of the Indian nation-state, and of how and by whom he was opposed (mostly by right-wing Muslim and Hindu communalists), it is told without pulling any punches.

The biography leaves no doubt about the heroes (Motilal, Jawaharlal, Gandhi) and the villains (Jinnah, and, to a lesser degree, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad), but this somewhat Manichean view cannot do full justice to complexities. Take, for example, its treatment of Gandhi. While Gandhi's nationalism and his promotion of Nehru are correctly highlighted, the dissonance of Gandhi's deep commitment to non-modernity from Nehru's equally firm devotion to modernity is mentioned but not seriously explored. An obvious admiration of Nehru is not the only reason. More significant is the author's espousal of a unitary and modern nation-state, which leads him to dismiss, just as Nehru did, Gandhi's non-modernism as an unrealistic utopia, if not a fad. In fact, the author's advocacy of the interests of the state leads him to even commend Patel and criticize Nehru's decision to accept Mountbatten's advice that India take the issue of Kashmir to the UN. This brings him dangerously close to the idea that India's interest is synonymous with

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the nation-state—an idea that throughout haunts this splendidly-written chronicle of Nehru as India's exemplary champion.

GYAN PRAKASH
Princeton University

Constitutional Brinksmanship: Amending the Constitution by National Convention *by Russell L. Caplan. New York, Oxford University Press, 1988. 240 pp. $24.95.*

The title of this book easily misleads. Article V of the Constitution authorizes two-thirds of the states, by application to Congress, to call a national convention to propose constitutional amendments. Congress's failure to pass a statute defining application and convention procedures is the "constitutional brinksmanship" the author decries. The author attributes this failure to the desire of Congress—and especially its liberal establishment—to retain control of the amendment process. The fear that an Article V convention could propose wholesale revisions of the Constitution deters states from applying for conventions.

The author meticulously examines the use of conventions before and during the Constitutional Period, the Framers' intent, the language of Article V, Supreme Court decisions, state convention practice since 1789, and the history of Article V applications. Much of the history and intent surrounding Article V is too fragmentary to support reliably the author's judgment that only applications for specific amendments are allowable. Indeed, the author's extensive recitation of fragmentary and unconnected evidence sometimes obscures his central argument. The uncertainties apparent from the author's evidence leave the reader with the suspicion that it is Article V conventions themselves that are constitutional brinksmanship.

The author argues persuasively that there is no presidential veto of constitutional amendments or of congressional enactments structuring the Article V convention process. Congress can unilaterally return unclear convention applications to the states for clarification, set the time and place for a convention, and recommend the number and selection method for delegates. But ultimately the allocation of votes (by delegate or by state) would be decided by the convention itself, presumably subject to the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Congress could not "choke" a convention by setting a short deadline for its work; and ratification deadlines, ordinarily within the power of Congress, might be judicially challenged if set so short as to thwart reasonable public consideration of convention-proposed amendments.

The author also argues that Congress could block "ultra vires amendments" (those exceeding a convention's purposes as defined in the state applications) by

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refusing to select a method of ratification of such amendments. Ultra vires amendments, Congress's failure to authorize a convention after receiving the requisite number of applications, or Congress's refusal to provide a method of ratification would be subject to judicial review according to the author's very generous view of judicial power in the amending process. But the author acknowledges that public pressure to allow ultra vires amendments to go to the people for final judgment would be difficult to resist in Congress or the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Continental Congress, the Philadelphia Convention, and some state conventions have adopted ultra vires amendments that were legitimated by subsequent public approval.

The author concedes the flammable political situation created by an Article V convention. Uncertainties about the convention's power would infect delegate selection contests. Interest groups would seek the election of delegates with compatible views on potential amendments unrelated to the subjects specified in state applications, in order to safeguard their interests in the event that a convention, once called, chose to take up such unrelated issues.

The author concludes that: "It is far more dangerous to allow a convention drive to progress to its final stages with many crucial questions left unanswered than to provide minimal guidance" (p. 163) through congressional implementation legislation. Yet fear of a runaway convention was significant in blunting two of the three serious state-application campaigns in the nation's history—the Dirksen amendment to override the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote reapportionment doctrine and the contemporary balanced budget amendment. And congressional fears of a runaway convention forced the Senate to agree finally in 1912 to a House amendment for direct election of senators, after thirty-one states—one short of the requisite number—filed applications for a convention and further state applications appeared inevitable. These results may be more acceptable than a statute creating the appearance, but not reality, of fixed Article V procedures that would encourage application campaigns. Despite his careful scholarship and his often stimulating analysis, the author appears too sanguine about the effects of convention implementation legislation.

DAVID ADAMANY
Wayne State University

The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980 *edited by Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1989. 311 pp. $25.00.*

In the introduction to this collection of essays, Fraser and Gerstle argue that the New Deal established a new "political order" (p. x) that fundamentally shaped the character of American politics until 1980, when the election of Ronald Reagan signaled the demise of this order. They use the term "political order" broadly; it is intended to encompass the economic and social institutions, moral perspectives,

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and ideological orientations that can properly be associated with the New Deal. When the breadth of such an approach is combined with a commitment to historical and comparative analysis, the results can be impressive.

In his lead-off article Thomas Ferguson provides a more subtle version of the argument that the New Deal was fundamentally intended to perpetuate the rule of capitalists within a capitalist economic framework. Ferguson distinguishes the interests of capital-intensive, internationally-oriented firms from the interests of labor-intensive, domestically-oriented firms. He suggests that the conflicts among capitalists that these different interests generated, in addition to more idiosyncratic conflicts within capital such as the struggle between the House of Morgan and rival banking interests, are critical for a proper understanding of the New Deal. Similarly, Steve Fraser argues that an understanding of the various factions within the New Deal labor movement is critical to an analysis of the role of labor. But his analysis is less satisfying, because it remains unclear whether the New Dealers are an autonomous political elite, the vanguard of the rising professional middle class, or the vanguard of capitalists in mass-consumption industries (not to be confused with the capital-intensive internationally-oriented capitalists identified by Ferguson). Both Ferguson and Fraser agree that New Deal progressivism was not social democracy, and Ferguson boldly asserts that the conservatism of the New Deal can account for the failure of the Democratic Party to truly promote social justice and human rights during the post-New Deal period.

The articles by Alan Brinkley, Nelson Lichtenstein, Elaine Tyler May, Ira Katznelson, and Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin suggest a somewhat different picture of the New Deal order. Isserman and Kazin analyze the rise and fall of student radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s and conclude that despite the failure of the radicals to win state power, they did succeed in initiating a cultural revolution that still influences American politics. May discovers alienation and a potentially radical commitment to free self-expression in the seemingly conservative revival of family life during the 1950s. If the New Deal order is less uniformly conservative than it may at first appear, did Ferguson and Fraser overestimate the extent of New Deal conservatism?

Katznelson's essay on the Great Society goes the farthest in asserting that the New Deal may have been as genuinely committed to achieving social justice as Western European Social Democracy. Katznelson agrees with Fraser that labor union radicalism was curbed, but Katznelson believes this occurred in the 1940s rather than in the 1930s, and he emphasizes the role that the emergence of race as a political issue played in undercutting a politics of class. The essays by Brinkley and Lichtenstein support Katznelson's assertion that the 1940s were a critical conservatizing era, but they focus on other factors in explaining the origins of this conservatism. For Brinkley, the disenchantment with state economic planning that grew out of the American experiences with wartime price and production controls was critical; whereas for Lichtenstein the creation of a private welfare state through collective bargaining undermined the more radical earlier commitments of unionists for the establishment of a generously funded state-run welfare system.

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Had the New Deal order not institutionalized a commitment to social justice, it would be difficult to understand the outrage that Ronald Reagan's presidency has evoked from those on the Left. Perhaps this moral outrage accounts for Thomas Edsall's willingness to attribute significant income redistribution consequences (favoring the rich) to the policy changes of the Reagan era without seriously considering the possibility that some of those changes might reflect broader trends beyond Reagan's control. Ironically, Edsall credits Roosevelt with a genuine commitment to income redistribution, even though 1960s revisionist historians used the same types of data that Edsall uses against Reagan to prove that Roosevelt was essentially a conservative. Edsall could turn to the kind of analysis of long-term economic trends shaping the great depression offered by Michael Bernstein to illustrate the kinds of constraints Roosevelt operated under and to provide reasons for viewing income distributions as only one element in a very complex story. But had he done so, he would have raised serious questions about the adequacy of his thesis that the Reagan revolution marks the rise of a new oligarchic elite.

Jonathan Rieder provides a more complex account of the Reagan revolution when he describes it as a form of conservative populism, which simultaneously expressed and played upon the dissatisfactions of ethnic working-class Democrats and rural fundamentalists, while seeking to maintain its traditional business constituency. His discussion of the complex role that racial antagonisms played in the emergence of a conservative majority—an account notable for its assertion that "the diagnosis of racism or populism fails to grasp the complexity of racial resentment" (p. 254)—is a good example of the insightful analysis that many essays in this book provide. Regrettably, the editors demeaned the achievements of the book by lapsing in their epilogue into an ideological diatribe against the Reagan administration as "the politics of racism and resentment" (p. 295).

DONALD R. BRAND
University of Pennsylvania

Securing the Right to Employment: Social Welfare Policy and the Unemployed in the United States *by Philip Harvey. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1989. 146 pp. $25.00.*

Philip Harvey recommends a government policy that is as bold as the introduction of the Social Security Act and the War on Poverty: guaranteed employment for the jobless. Two past movements resulted in the 1946 Employment Act and the 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act. However, vigorous opposition ensured that both laws were empty gestures compared to the original bills. Today full employment is generally considered an impractical goal, and in recent years some conservative political leaders and economists have categorized even a 6.5 percent jobless rate as full employment.

The moral argument for full employment remains compelling. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt noted in proposing his economic bill of rights in 1944, "neces-

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sitous men are not free men." Harvey's masterful book demonstrates the idea's economic and administrative feasibility as well. The guiding principles of his proposal are liberal and conservative: "guaranteed employment at living wages" and the abolition of "income maintenance to able-bodied persons of working age" (p. 22). For the 1977–1986 decade (a period of high unemployment), Harvey estimates that his proposal would have cost slightly less than a trillion (current) dollars. However, after subtracting the income maintenance programs Harvey would eliminate, the ten-year price tag drops by three-fourths to just over $200 billion. Both his cost assumptions and his guiding principles are reasonable. As he notes, "The real puzzle is why developed market economies, despite their ideological commitment to the work ethic, seem more ready to use state finances to support the unemployed in forced idleness than to give them work" (p. 65).

A full employment economy would possess numerous advantages over the current system. Employees unafraid of dismissal would be much less likely to support inefficient work rules that attempt to guarantee employment at the expense of productivity. Guaranteed employment for workers who become displaced due to foreign trade would undercut support for the far more costly alternative of tariffs and "voluntary" quotas, which also impede efficient economic restructuring. Full employment would enhance overall economic efficiency by utilizing currently wasted resources, a factor that reported productivity data do not measure. Using macroeconomic policy to secure full employment exacerbates inflation, but a targeted effort such as Harvey's entails considerably less danger. If his estimates are correct, the net increase in spending should not spur inflation. Moreover, fiscal and monetary anti-inflation policies could be pursued more single-mindedly if the fear of mass joblessness were not a consequence.

Implementing a full employment program presents formidable but not insuperable obstacles. Harvey estimates that the government would have had to create an average of ten million jobs at a given time during the 1977–1986 period to guarantee full employment, 60 percent more than total government employment at that time. The chapter on administration is often insightful, but relies too much on the experience of the New Deal to anticipate problems and solutions. The discussion would have benefited from a more detailed examination of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, and Swedish employment programs surprisingly go unmentioned. Harvey's proposal to pay market (and sometimes higher) wages is politically and administratively infeasible. Even if the necessary information were available, under his plan the average wage would rapidly become the *minimum* wage, because workers earning less than the average would be guaranteed a job paying average wages, and the spiral would continue upwards.

These deficiencies aside, Harvey has performed a valuable service in support of a vital goal. His thesis is exceedingly well written and easily accessible to all interested readers, thoroughly researched, and a model of what scholarly books should be but rarely are.

FRANK GALLO
George Washington University

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A Shield in Space? Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative *by Sanford Lakoff and Herbert F. York. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989. 424 pp. $35.00.*

The theme of this comprehensive discussion of the strategic defense initiative (SDI) is that the SDI represents the dangerous illusion that in the nuclear age our national security can be achieved exclusively through technological means. This is not a new or startling thesis, but it is developed here with great care and thoroughness. As the authors recognize, this theme involves not just claims about technological prospects, but also claims about politics and strategy; the skillful blending of these elements makes this work the best book available on the SDI.

Why is the SDI a dangerous illusion? First of all, it is an illusion because the SDI cannot provide a technological fix for the nuclear predicament. The authors offer two grounds for this view, one general and one specific to the SDI program. First, the belief that technology in general can remove the vulnerability of American society to destruction by the Soviet Union illustrates the fallacy of the last move, the mistaken assumption that the Soviets will mount no response to U.S. weapons innovation. Second, it is very unlikely that the protection of U.S. society by ballistic missile defenses is technologically feasible. While careful not to preclude this possibility, the authors share the view of most of the scientific establishment that the chances are small.

Why is this illusion dangerous? One reason is that, like any illusion, it turns our attention away from the truth. The truth in this case is that the only way to achieve national security in the nuclear age is to accommodate ourselves to the fact of mutual vulnerability and seek to ameliorate the situation through stabilizing arms-control agreements and the easing of international tensions. To ignore this truth is to make our situation more dangerous. This truth is embodied in the ABM treaty that the SDI puts at risk. Another reason is that the SDI might be dangerous in its own right. SDI deployments without significant offensive reductions could raise first-strike fears, generating crisis instability and making war more likely.

The authors do recommend a continuing research program on defenses, on the hope, however slim, of a technological breakthrough that would make defenses feasible and serve as a hedge against Soviet research efforts. But defenses must not be deployed, at least short of a substantial reduction in offensive forces and an agreement over their mutual deployment. A limited deployment might provide some advantage, decreasing the vulnerability of U.S. retaliatory forces, but this benefit is either unnecessary or achievable in better ways. "Is there something so fundamentally wrong in the current defense posture that the search for a technological alternative should be accelerated" (p. 332)? There is not, at least not something that arms-control agreements could not fix.

Nor is the situation in need of fundamental alteration in virtue of its moral status. The authors argue that the moral case often made against nuclear deterrence does not hold. Curiously, they say little more about the strong moral appeal of defenses, evident even in Ronald Reagan's SDI speech, beyond a few remarks

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about the Catholic bishops' pastoral letter on the morality of nuclear weapons having been a possible motivating factor behind this speech.

One of the most interesting aspects of the book is its discussion of the political uniqueness of the SDI. Contrary to the pattern with other weapons programs, the SDI originated neither in the fear that the other side was about to acquire the capability, nor on independent assurances of its technological feasibility. The proposal was top-down, not bottom-up. It was Reagan's personal vision, and he went with it over the heads of the bureaucracy directly to the people. As a result, the authors contend, the SDI is unlikely long to survive the end of his administration. If we are now witnessing the slow death of the SDI, this surely must be the primary explanation.

STEVEN LEE
Hobart and William Smith Colleges

U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics *by Sam C. Sarkesian. Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989. 217 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $16.95.*

This is a dangerous time to be an expert on national defense and national security policy. Reform and turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union may be fundamentally changing the U.S.–Soviet relationship and the international system. Therefore, it is perhaps the appropriate time to publish a cautious book such as this on U.S. national security policy. The emphasis here is on process and structure rather than policy output. As such, it will disappoint readers who expect to find in-depth treatment of major issues of national security policy such as: U.S. nuclear doctrine, arms control, appropriate levels of weapons technology and complexity, the volunteer army, or Central American intervention. Sarkesian does occasionally address an issue in detail, and his call for more emphasis on unconventional warfare and counterterrorism tactics should be heeded by military and political leaders.

Instead, the author is mostly concerned with the general problem of "muddling through" that pervades U.S. national security policy. The key culprits are a "muddled process and a jigsaw-puzzle establishment." More fundamentally, Sarkesian worries about the limitations of an open, democratic society with diffused power and fragmented authority in today's world, especially given that the United States's chief rival is a closed dictatorship, the Soviet Union.

The open vs. closed society debate illustrates one serious shortcoming of this book: little new information is presented. In *How Democracies Perish*, Jean-François Revel already addressed this issue in a much more comprehensive and detailed fashion. Nor are both sides' arguments in this debate presented in a fair, objective fashion. A one-paragraph disclaimer praising the merits of democracy

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at the end of an entire chapter critical of its limitations is insufficient. In fact, the author is more willing to engage in democracy bashing than in America bashing. While neither the knee-jerk approaches of "blame-America-first" nor "America: Love It or Leave It" is desirable for an introductory textbook on national security policy, Sarkesian comes perilously close to the latter. Past CIA excesses are consistently described as "alleged," even in the cases of Chile and anti-Castro plots. He also misleads the reader into believing that America has a no-first-use nuclear weapons policy.

Strong anticommunist sentiment is also apparent. The discussion on revolutionary terror includes the PLO, Viet Cong, and FMLN in El Salvador as examples, but not UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique, or the contras (in the text, the "Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters"). Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, and the Soviet Union are cited for "state-supported terrorism," but not other plausible culprits such as Syria, Iran, South Africa, Israel, or Libya.

Finally, Sarkesian prefers a strong executive to provide policy leadership. The U.S. president indeed must contribute "coherent visions of national interest, clarity of national security policy, and clear directions to the design of strategy" (p. 202). The author frets that power has become too diffuse and that too many constraints are imposed on the president. However, these limitations did not prevent the dispatch of U.S. forces to Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, the Persian Gulf, or Panama. And historically, the United States has enjoyed what many have called a wartime "constitutional dictatorship."

In defending the need for presidential power, Sarkesian criticizes congressional shortcomings. While many of these criticisms are valid, they are usually excessive and partisan. Christopher Dodd and Stephen Solarz draw fire for their foreign-policy freelancing, but Jesse Helms's support for Argentina in the Falklands War is not mentioned.

Sarkesian describes anecdotally how Congress and the media manipulate public information, using the examples of Edward Boland (in a way that almost makes Boland appear to be a communist sympathizer) and reporting of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam war. No examples of presidential, governmental, or military distortions and manipulations of information are included. In order to succeed as an introductory text, a more balanced use of anecdotes and examples is highly desirable.

MITCHELL POTE
Vanderbilt University

The ANZUS Crisis, Nuclear Visiting and Deterrence *by Michael C. Pugh. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 285 pp. $44.50.*

The ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. alliance) dispute represents the most direct challenge to the logic of U.S. extended-deterrence strategy yet to emerge

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within the postwar Western alliance system. New Zealand summarily rejected Washington's arguments that an ally must support and affiliate itself with the nuclear component of that strategy in order to enjoy continued American security guarantees. During 1985–1986, the dispute generated intense levels of acrimony and high drama on its way to becoming one of the classical episodes of alliance dissolution to be found in U.S. foreign policy. This compels those who would analyze this episode to strive for as much detachment and objectivity as possible.

Michael Pugh initially represents his book as such an effort: the offering of a balanced analysis of the ANZUS dispute and the nuclear visiting issues, devoid of ideological bias and apart from any quest to match international systemic behavior to any "ruthlessly logical pattern" (p. 17). However, after wading through the author's polemical treatment of the developments leading up to the actual dispute, one is instead struck by his evident grievances against the realist school's approach to alliance politics and his wholesale endorsement for the antinuclear movement. No actual pattern of wholesale defiance of American deterrence policies has emerged to the extent that the author would have his readers believe—and certainly not to the extent that the West's democratic pluralistic framework has been seriously challenged by anything emerging from the Southwest Pacific. In fact, progress in nuclear arms control will come from the initiatives of the "haves" (the superpowers and China in the case of the Asia-Pacific) rather than through examples set by the "have-nots," who seek to transform forty years of nuclear strategy through formulating highly abstract—and inevitably qualified—nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific or elsewhere.

A second and more fundamental problem with the book is the author's tendency to select and apply source material in ways tailored to support arguments that a number of those sources in fact do not really endorse. This reviewer, for example, was incorrectly cited as arguing during testimony in the Solarz hearings that New Zealand's nuclear weapons ban made no strategic difference to U.S. security. Other positions adopted by key actors in the dispute often appeared to be taken out of context or represented via the use of unnecessarily acerbic prose. It is doubtful that the Australian government would buy Pugh's assertion that it does not support nuclear deterrence as the basis for a viable alliance relationship. In fact, the entire point of the 1983 Australian Labor Government's Defense Reviews conclusions was to reaffirm the deterrence value of the U.S. tie. Greater analytical balance might also have been achieved if the author had interviewed officials at the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Department of State, where American policy during this period was formulated about the ANZUS crisis.

Moreover, the seamless web paradigm, constituting the heart of Pugh's arguments about alliance politics, is defeated by the author's own analogies in his conclusion about new base access to Italy and closer U.S. defense relations with France, Japan, etc. It may very well be that the United States is moving toward a post-collective defense era in its international security politics; however, the major factors are money, defense burden-sharing, and uncertainties about the American willingness to continue its deterrence commitments around the world, rather than any

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full-scale revulsion against U.S. strategy or wholesale revolt against traditional Western threat perceptions. In his effort to establish a bridge between alliance theory and policy analysis (an admirable quest), the author appears to lose sight of his overall themes in the interest of representing in the most dramatic fashion possible what were fairly minor strategic developments. To what extent his analysis will, therefore, be weighed seriously by the future architects of strategic policy in Washington and allied capitals is, at best, uncertain.

In spite of these criticisms, I believe Pugh's work will most likely generate policy debate and sharpen the arguments raised on both sides of the ANZUS issue. The research is solid, and the material on "neither confirm-nor-deny" is particularly worthwhile for those wishing to understand the origins of this controversial aspect of U.S. deterrence policy. The appendices and notes provide some extremely useful documentation, and for that reason alone, the text should be adopted as a reference source for graduate seminars on Asian foreign policy security problems. Pugh is to be commended for his efforts to synthesize the various aspects of the ANZUS dispute into successive chapter formats, which for the most part are cohesive and succinct. In summary, he has provided a book that represents a commendable, if biased, first effort to understand how alliance dissolution may emerge in the West.

WILLIAM T. TOW
University of Southern California

Elections and Democracy in Central America *edited by John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989. 214 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $10.95.*

The subject of this volume is timely and should address a growing curiosity about Central America among scholars, students, and the public, as well as a scholarly trend toward studying democratization in Latin America. A closer look at elections in Central America and their meaning for the development of democracy makes an important contribution toward understanding politics in these small countries.

At the same time, with some notable exceptions, there is a general tendency among the contributors to be overly confident about the importance of elections in any process of democratization. Although elections may well be one of the central institutions of democracy, they are only a partial and incomplete indicator of progress toward democratization. In the political sphere they reveal little about the nature of processes and policies after the elections, about the power of the electoral winner, or about the circumstances and opinions of those who could not or would not participate in the elections either as candidates or as voters. In the economic sphere they reveal nothing about the distribution of economic goods or power, about electoral turnout and outcome, and, in general, about the "depth" of democracy (p. 13). Although John Booth in his introductory paper looks beyond

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elections in his definition and examination of democracy, his contributors do not necessarily follow his example.

Booth's introductory piece lays out a useful framework for examining the development of democracy. It calls for attention that considers democracy as a variable and studies the range ("array of issues" p. 12) and depth ("efficacy and autonomy of popular participation" p. 13) of democracy, as well as its breadth (percentage participating). Mark Rosenberg's discussion of Honduras as well as Susanne Jonas's and Robert Trudeau's focus upon Guatemala underscore the extent to which elections may take place in a nondemocratic context in which electoral candidates themselves endanger or undercut democratic development. These papers also include attention to social and economic issues of democracy raised in Booth's discussion.

In contrast, the examinations of Costa Rica by Mitchell Seligson and Miguel Gomez and of El Salvador by Jose Garcia confine themselves primarily to the study of elections. While they may be somewhat more warranted in Costa Rica than in El Salvador, even in Costa Rica the authors' assertions about the stability of the Costa Rican democracy may be excessively optimistic. Their data sample confines itself to urban areas without taking into account the opinions of the rural majority. Given the fact that governments, including the one in Costa Rica, focus more attention upon and direct more services toward urban centers than rural areas, one must wonder whether the overall image would be less positive had the sample included peasants and small farmers. In addition, these contributions fail to mention the rise of right-wing and undemocratic splinter groups in the context of Costa Rica's economic crisis. The omission is surprising, particularly given the discussion of the growth of Nazism during Germany's economic crisis. In El Salvador the focus upon elections seems particularly worrisome. When the contest is between the right, the far right, and the even-further-right, and when voters are pressured into voting, one cannot help but wonder how accurate a gauge of democracy such a contest can be. Issues left unmentioned are, nonetheless, important comments on the health of democracy in El Salvador. These include the persecution of the Church and the murder of Archbishop Oscar Romero, particularly given the assertions of a connection between that murder and Robert D'Aubisson, who would later become a presidential candidate. Others include the level of human rights violations in El Salvador, the economic inequalities, and the massive Salvadoran refugee problem, both within the country and abroad.

The book concludes with a helpful overview by John Peeler, who is particularly insightful about the long-term requisites for democracy in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central American and who again returns us to a broad conception of democracy that goes beyond electoral contests.

The volume should be useful to students of Central America and of democracy. Although it makes clear that elections warrant our close attention, it also illustrates that healthy skepticism should greet any assertion that elections mean democracy or, indeed, are the best indicator of evolution in a democratic direction.

LESLIE ANDERSON
University of Colorado

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Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy *edited by Steven E. Miller and Sean M. Lynn-Jones. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1989. 388 pp. Paper, $14.95.*

This revised edition of a book that first appeared in 1986 consists of a variety of articles that were originally published in *International Security* between 1981 and 1989. While the twelve selections are divided into four parts considering issues from grand strategy to the possible employment of the Rapid Deployment Force in Iran, the essence of the book is the seven articles addressing the problems of European defense. For those interested in reviewing academic debates, Part II offers Barry Posen and John Mearsheimer suggesting that NATO is in pretty good shape, while Eliot Cohen points out flaws in their arguments as he reaches his conclusion that NATO is not as strong as they would have us believe.

Part III presents Mearsheimer again, this time opposing the recent proposal that the United States should adopt a no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons in Europe. Since increased conventional forces will probably not be funded, such a pledge might make war in Europe more likely. Samuel Huntington argues for an increase in NATO's offensive conventional capability in an article that appeared in Ronald Reagan's first term. Robert Blackwill and Jack Snyder remind us that conventional arms control is a complicated business, but while Blackwill urges caution, Snyder recommends that NATO should aggressively pursue conventional arms control options. It is clear from this brief summary that even relatively recent articles (these were published between 1982 and 1988) have been overtaken by events in Europe. The collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, President George Bush's proposal for reductions to 225,000 troops for both the United States and the USSR, East German Premier Hans Modrow's call for a united German fatherland are all recent news items that make these articles appear to have been written a long time ago.

Part I contains three selections from 1989 issues of the journal that are concerned with broader questions of strategy and defense spending that do not focus specifically on the European problem. Stephen Walt makes a case for finite containment, arguing that the inevitable reductions in defense spending should come from forces devoted to Third World commitments. Steven David concludes the exact opposite, suggesting that we need to maintain our Third World obligations and force structures and should reduce the forces devoted to European defense if we want to save money. Gordon Adams and Stephen Cain are awash in "bow waves" and "stern waves" as they examine the impact that previous commitments to advanced weapons systems are having on present and future budgets. They are justifiably afraid that preparedness and sustainability will receive the bulk of the cuts, while the new hardware will continue through the pipeline providing snazzy new weapons with no one to use them. These three articles have not lost their contemporary relevance and are worth pondering, especially in the light of Bush's new budget that seems to evidence precisely that unwillingness to cancel doubtful weapons like the B2 bomber that Adams and Cain warned against.

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Part IV offers two articles on the problems confronting American attempts to project power. Eliot Cohen argues that we need to stop being fixated by the European war scenario, since that is the least likely one, and develop the attitudes and capabilities to fight the small wars that we will probably have to fight. In a 1981 selection Joshua Epstein shows why the Rapid Deployment Force might do better in repelling a Soviet invasion of Iran than is commonly supposed.

Like many articles from this journal, the ones offered here are well-argued, copiously footnoted, and contain many interesting facts presented in a readable way with only an occasional mishap like the missing sentence on page 51. There is no reason to expect that these scholars, any more than the experts in comparative government, should have been able to foretell the events of recent months. It is just bad timing that this book appears now to emphasize so clearly the fact that scholars continue to write and the world goes on anyhow.

PHILIP W. DYER
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

America's Defense *edited by Michael Mandelbaum. New York, Holmes and Meier, 1989. 334 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $24.95.*

Michael Mandelbaum has put together a first-rate collection of well-researched, historical/analytical essays on American military policy that is accessible to the intelligent lay person, but equally well suited as a college text. Differing in their perspectives, the authors nonetheless agree that for various reasons—institutional resistance to change, historical shifts in the international environment, or conflicting claims to shrinking resources—U.S. military policy has problems whose solution will require serious changes in how the United States goes about providing for the national defense.

David Hendrickson's chapter discusses American grand strategy since 1945 and its current dilemmas (what to fund? who is the enemy? what are the likely and the crucial contingencies? when to fight?). He concludes that U.S. power and interests are not as far out of line as many suppose, if the United States relies on its nuclear strength to protect its principal allies and its air and naval strength to protect its limited interests in the Third World.

Eliot Cohen writes about the personnel dilemmas facing the American military. He disapproves of the services' reliance on women and reservists to help solve some of them, bypasses force cuts as a solution, and offers some cogent thoughts on the relationship of the military to American society.

Thomas McNaugher wades into the weapon procurement thicket, surveying past efforts at reform and their frequently counterproductive results, and the impact of cold war pressures on procurement style. There is thoughtful discussion of the tension between efforts to field the latest technology rapidly and to test it adequately before going into production.

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Paul Dyster's chapter about the defense of Europe is a well-done, mainline assessment that, like others penned before autumn 1989, has been overtaken by events. It is nonetheless a good survey of NATO's dilemmas up to that time.

Dennis Ross addresses American military interests outside of Europe and the paradox that U.S. preparedness to fight one war in Europe, while rendering that conflict improbable, left U.S. forces ill-trained and ill-equipped for the wars in which they have actually been used since 1945.

Steven Miller analyzes the U.S. navy's responses to two key postwar threats: the U.S. air force and the Soviet navy. The air force, with its long-range bombers and nuclear weapons, threatened to supplant the navy as America's first line of defense. The Soviets threaten to withdraw their forces to the Arctic, away from NATO's vital sea lanes. The navy is meeting this threat with a strategy designed to sink Soviet strategic missile submarines in Arctic waters in the event of conventional war in Europe.

Williamson Murray's chapter on the air force is a compelling study of organizational psychology and the factors that molded the modern institution: high technology, the slaughter of World War I (which stimulated the search for alternative means of waging war), and the romance of flight. He assesses air doctrine and operations from World War II through Vietnam, noting their consistent maladaptation to operational realities. He concludes that most of the air force's troubles can be ascribed to sometimes fatally slow organizational learning.

Finally, Scott Sagan provides a succinct review of American nuclear strategy and the interweaving of declaratory policy and operational doctrine. He ends on a cautionary note regarding missile defenses and counterforce postures suited to preemption, but with support for higher-accuracy, reduced-yield weapons to limit civilian casualties in the event of U.S. nuclear retaliation.

Overall, this is a high quality, if high-priced, collection.

WILLIAM J. DURCH
Georgetown University

The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost *by Walter Laqueur. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989. 325 pp. $21.95.*

The aim of this book is to curb and sober up naive expectations that equate Mikhail Gorbachev's introduction of *glasnost* with the advent of freedom and democracy in the Soviet Union. Laqueur's search for the roots of the halting and contradictory processes of the current change ranges wide and deeply. He draws illustrations from Russian history (from the middle ages no less than from the nineteenth century), from Russian literature, from the observations of Western visitors since the seventeenth century—all marshaled to show that Russia has had a political and cultural development far different from that of the West. This development produced all sorts of obstacles to the growth of democratic institutions

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and habits long before the October revolution. In this context, the instrumental use of *glasnost* in the nineteenth century is usefully discussed.

Moving on to more recent times, the book provides brief outlines of Soviet political history, including attempts at reform that preceded Gorbachev. Most of the space is given over to dissecting the forces unleashed by the *glasnost* campaign and to pinpointing the numerous obstacles, ranging from alcoholism to xenophobia, that delay and deflect Russia's progress toward a civil society ruled by law.

Without doubt, Laqueur performs a service by drawing our attention to the uniqueness of Russian institutional and national traditions, as well as to the current state of affairs in that vast and incredibly complex country. A healthy antidote to the "Gorby mania" is in order. With this said, however, Laqueur's dissenting view on the substance and future of *glasnost* is much too historically deterministic. His use of history does not escape two pitfalls. For one, it sheds no light on the forces and changes that have produced such an unexpected phenomenon as Gorbachev, nor does it allow for similar surprising developments in the future. Second, his historical facts are not always correct, as with his references to Kievan history or to the attitudes of Russian poets toward Moscow.

For political scientists, the book can perform a useful service in calling attention to specifics of the Russian experience and political traditions, which should qualify facile comparative-politics analyses and prognostications. Beyond that, despite numerous footnote references, they will not find a full or rigorous analysis of the range of change now under way in the USSR. For this reviewer, the description of *glasnost* in films was inadequate, for it overlooked the role of documentaries. Similarly, the discussion of *glasnost* in foreign policy was superficial, since it relied solely on Eduard Shevardnadze's lectures to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ignored the highly interesting and informative writings of many prominent individuals in the foreign policy apparatus.

ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER
Columbia University

Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952 *by Howard B. Schonberger. Kent, Ohio, Kent State University Press, 1989. 347 pp. Cloth, $26.00; paper, $16.50.*

Schonberger has performed a useful service by describing in some detail the shifts in American policy toward a defeated Japan during the seven short years of the American occupation. He has done so by focusing on eight men—six creators and/or implementers of policy and two critics who ended in gallant but failed opposition. The six were members of the American establishment at the time; the other two were outsiders.

Joseph Clark Grew, a career diplomat from the New England aristocracy, played an important role in the formulation of American policy for a defeated Japan.

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General Douglas MacArthur, a nineteenth-century personality in a twentieth-century leadership role, commanded the occupation for most of its seven-year life. Harry F. Kern, foreign editor of *Newsweek* by way of Harvard, was a most influential lobbyist for a conservative shift at midoccupation in economic policy toward Japan. William H. Draper, a Wall Street banker and under secretary of the army, was a key developer of Kern's favored policy. Joseph M. Dodge, a leading banker based in Detroit, was the actual director of the new conservative policy in the closing years of the occupation. Finally, John Foster Dulles, a quintessentially establishment figure in early postwar America, was the leader in concluding a remarkably lenient treaty of peace with Japan.

By comparison, the author's two critics of the occupation were indeed pale figures. T. A. Bisson, one of the few prewar scholar/writers on Asia, served in the occupation and returned home to become one of its leading critics and a victim of McCarthyism. James S. Killen, a career union official, also served in the occupation and became the sole occupationaire who publicly resigned over an issue of principle, the occupation's denial of the right of public officials to strike.

The author does not provide full biographical studies of the eight men, but his portrayal of them makes it easy to understand why they held the views of the occupation that they did and why they acted as they did. One need not ask for more. Schonberger warns the reader that his book "makes no pretense at offering a history of the occupation of Japan" (p. 10). The warning should be heeded. The principal focus of the book is on the "reverse course" for U.S. economic policy for the occupation away from the intensely reformist policies at the outset to new ones favoring the surviving conservative elements in Japan. Yet a number of passages read as if the reverse course covered all aspects of the broad program of economic, political, governmental and social change that lay at the heart of the occupation.

One of Schonberger's concerns is to deal with the arguments (revolving around the reverse course) of the three American schools of thought—the Conservative, the Progressive, and the New Left—that deal with occupation history. Although he touches on this problem throughout, it is necessarily subordinated to his primary theme. If the reverse course is to serve an illuminating purpose, it needs clarification. There is no question, as Schonberger clearly demonstrates, that this reverse course occurred. But it is also a fact that it did not return Japan to its prewar state, without the military, of course.

As we look back over more than four decades, the question becomes: What does the reverse course contribute to our understanding of the occupation as a fundamental development in modern Japanese history? Although Schonberger does not provide an answer, he has earned our gratitude for raising again the issue of the relevance of the reverse course to the study of the occupation.

JOHN M. MAKI
University of Massachusetts

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The Republic of Korea: Economic Transformation and Social Change *by David Steinberg. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989. 218 pp. $34.50.*

Steinberg has written a much needed introductory book to South Korea, a comprehensive work covering almost every aspect of Korean society ranging from early history to present politics. It is an excellent overview of the dynamics of social and political change, especially in the economic and political arenas. Although most chapters are generally descriptive, Steinberg provides an analytical discussion in the last two chapters in assessing the future of Korea and development lessons from the Korean experience.

The author notes that Korea is renowned in the international system for its successful economic growth, and throughout the book he concentrates on examining salient factors that contributed to such a remarkable economic transformation. He discerns several forces, including Japanese rule, that exert considerable impact on Korean economic development. He mentions on several occasions the contribution of Japanese occupation to the economic growth. According to him, the "colonial period . . . created preconditions for economic growth" (p. 188). Under Japanese rule a considerable portion of the Koreans received education and training in various skills, and by the end of the Japanese period, Korea had modern industrial and agricultural systems and communication facilities. He goes further to say that strong anti-Japanese sentiment during the period of 1945–1965 "restricted Korean growth for that period . . ." (p. 47). Unfortunately, these arguments seem to be overly assertive without substantiation. He does not present any supportive evidence that had it not been for Japanese rule, Korea would not have had modern industrial facilities and thus slower economic growth.

Moreover, contrary to what he says, at the time of independence the general level of education was very low; 86 percent of the population over fifteen years of age had received no formal education. The Japanese owned about 94 percent of the business establishments in 1940, and the proportion of Korean engineers and technicians employed in manufacturing, construction, and utilities in 1944 was only about 2 percent of the total technical manpower.

In considering the forces that boosted economic growth, Steinberg fails to recognize the human capital factor in Korea. Many studies have focused on the effect of education on economic growth in the densely populated country with little arable land and virtually no mineral reserves. They have found a strong positive relationship between economic growth and the improvement of the human workforce through education. The Korean experience clearly supports the human capital theory that education facilitates national economic progress by improving the quality of labor through increased skills and work knowledge and by furthering the development of more productive technology.

In fact, the country's level of education greatly improved in the post-Korean war period. Korea has achieved an impressive record in education in comparison with other countries with a similar level of economic output. By 1965, for example, Korea had an educational achievement equivalent to that found in countries with

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an average GNP of $380, although its own average was only $107. The accumulation of educated manpower provided a large pool of human resources that were mobilized in the high economic growth period since 1962. Although some viewpoints of the author need substantiation and qualifications, this book provides an informative account of South Korea and is an invaluable addition to the scarce pool of textbooks on the subject.

KYUNG AE PARK
Franklin and Marshall College

Between Profit and State: Intermediate Organizations in Britain and the United States *by Alan Ware. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1989. 308 pp. $42.00.*

Alan Ware takes on a two-fold task in this book. First, he attempts to categorize all the organizations in the United States and Britain that inhabit the vast middle ground between state institutions and those that make up the private market. Second, he evaluates the claims that have been made for and against these organizations by a variety of commentators including defenders of free markets in and out of government, democratic theorists and pluralists of all stripes, and advocates of an independent or third sector.

Ware defines as intermediate organizations (IOs) those non-public entities that do not distribute profits to owners, officers, or others directing their activities. This leaves him with three main categories of organizations. A first group, such as consumer cooperatives and credit unions, originated as mutual aid organizations providing members with both economic and social benefits. Ware argues that government benefits by having IOs organize markets that profit-seeking enterprises ignore. And analysis of IOs adds to our knowledge of how private markets evolved under the conditions of early capitalism. Some, like the British consumer coops that served an important working-class constituency, have since become severely squeezed by market forces. On the other hand, savings and loan associations and their counterparts in the United Kingdom have been so transformed by success as to be virtually indistinguishable to the average consumer from their cousins in the for-profit sector. News reports demonstrate on a daily basis in the United States that they are of undisputed economic and political importance to the state and the private economy.

A second set of IOs comprised of religious organizations, universities, and charitable institutions has also been useful in furthering the objectives of the state. Their origins predate both industrial capitalism and the growth of the modern state; and each offers services (health care, education, social services, etc.) similar in kind and sometimes in price to what profit-making institutions offer. Recent developments affecting these institutions have reflected basic conflicts over the role of the state in each country. Administration of social policy by third parties

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accompanied the expansion of national purpose by the federal government in the United States during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. And use of the same types of organizations to deliver services is part of the current Thatcherite downsizing of the state.

Ware also examines voluntary organizations. Why people join, how much rank-and-file members participate in their internal decision making and to what ends, and whether such participation affects members' views of the political system are topics that have fascinated social scientists for decades. What he has to say about the political activities of middle-class cause groups (for example, famine relief, environmental protection, etc.) and self-help groups (Alcoholics Anonymous and its analogues) is especially interesting in light of the continuing debate over pluralist theory.

Ware's study should remind advocates of both profit and state—the social democrats who build Britain's welfare state at the end of World War II as well as the reinvigorated advocates of free markets in both countries—that the real world of organizations is quite different from their idealized accounts of it. Because of their diversity, Ware believes that IOs ought not be seen as an independent sector in either country. But because he is so effective at showing the range of IOs that continue to exist, one is struck by his lack of attention to how the concepts of state and market themselves are being redefined to reflect changes in practice.

Nor is it clear that the comparative focus that Ware chose suits his purposes well. Most chapters, whether organized around a category of organizations or an issue of governance, jump back and forth as he attempts to account for developments in each country. This book will be very useful for students of British and American politics, but one wonders whether focusing on organizations in just two countries, no matter how similar their political traditions may be, is a better research strategy than including material from other industrial societies would have been.

ARDITH MANEY
Iowa State University

From Margin to Mainstream: American Women and Politics since 1960 *by Susan M. Hartmann. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1989. 218 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $11.50.*

Susan M. Hartmann has written a book that will be welcomed by scholars interested in the participation of women in contemporary American politics. She provides a straightforward, comprehensive, historical account of women's attempts to gain access to and influence the American political system since 1960. Unlike other books that broadly examine the contemporary women's movement and its impact across many sectors of society, this book focuses exclusively on that por-

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tion of the women's movement that has attempted to engage and influence the political system.

The book begins with an overview of women's political participation during the four decades after women won the right to vote in 1920. Hartmann then examines women's involvement in the various grass-roots social movements of the 1960s and traces the emergence of the contemporary feminist movement in the late 1960s. Three chapters are devoted to the 1970s. The first charts the efforts of feminists to influence the political parties, the gains made by women in seeking elective and appointive office, and the development of new organizations aimed at promoting increases in the number and effectiveness of female public officials. The second describes feminist efforts to influence the policy-making process, focusing on issues such as the Equal Rights Amendment, economic and educational equity, abortion, rape, domestic violence, and displaced homemakers. The third chapter on the 1970s examines organized opposition to the women's movement and its agenda; the anti-ERA movement, the anti-abortion movement, and the mixed record of the Carter administration are highlighted. The book's final chapter describes and analyzes the major political developments of the 1980s that affected the women's movement, including the emergence of the gender gap, the broadening of the movement's agenda, the shift in focus to public policy initiatives at the state and local levels, and the nomination of Geraldine Ferraro as a vice-presidential candidate in 1984. The book ends with an epilogue that reviews the major accomplishments and status of the women's movement twenty years after its inception.

A major strength of this book is Hartmann's clear commitment to integrating and examining issues of race and class throughout the text. The fact that her primary subject matter is a movement that has always been predominantly white and middle-class makes this commitment all the more commendable. The political activities of African-American women receive particular attention. For example, Hartmann discusses black women's voting behavior, their participation in party leadership positions, their status as candidates and officeholders, their roles in the civil rights and welfare rights movements, their relationship to feminism and the feminist movement, and the origins and activities of their organizations. To the extent that relevant information is available, Hartmann also devotes attention to the political activities of Hispanic and Native-American women.

This book is not entirely without weaknesses. For example, Hartmann's account of women's attitudes and voting behavior in the years following suffrage fails to make clear that very little was known about women's political behavior prior to the post-World War II era, when survey research came into common usage. Similarly, the main part of the book, which ends with the 1984 election, leaves the reader with the impression that feminists and feminist organizations have considerable influence on the Democratic Party. While the epilogue does mention that women held major positions within the campaigns of both parties' presidential candidates in 1988, no mention is made of the much less influential role that organized feminism played in the Democratic presidential campaign during that election. However, despite these omissions, the flaws in this book are both minor and

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few and certainly do not detract significantly from the overall quality and contribution of Hartmann's work.

From Margin to Mainstream, which is based largely on secondary sources, would be an excellent primary text for courses on women and American politics or contemporary women's history. It also would be very appropriate as a supplemental text for more general courses on American government or twentieth-century American history and is a good introduction for anyone who wants to learn more about the feminist movement's efforts to influence the U.S. political system.

SUSAN J. CARROLL
Rutgers University

Jesse Jackson's 1984 Presidential Campaign: Challenge and Change in American Politics *edited by Lucius J. Barker and Ronald Walters. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989. 257 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $14.95.*

Jesse Jackson has already made two bids for the presidency, in 1984 and 1988. Moreover, immediately after the 1988 campaign, his was the one name politicians and pundits speculated the most about as a possible entry into the 1992 race. Surely Jackson is a new (exciting to some, disturbing to others) phenomenon on the American electoral scene. This book is an excellent chronicle of his first race. It combines theoretical perspectives on race and politics with good empirical analyses of what happened at each stage of the 1984 saga – from pre-primary maneuverings to postelection impact. No small strength of the volume lies in the fact that several of the fourteen contributors were active participant-observers as convention delegates; campaign strategists at national, state and local levels; and accomplished social scientists.

They give overview interpretations of the national challenge, as well as little known interesting particular accounts, such as the Jackson candidacy and the Hispanic community, and a case study of the Maryland primary. The book takes the reader into the intricacies of technical party mobilization and primary election rules, polling data, and voter-turn-out analyses in an illuminating way. This makes it excellent for teaching purposes. Neither is this an uncritical account of Jackson. The candidate's weaknesses as well as strengths are honestly explored, which makes the book a refreshing change from much of the quickie, polemical manuscripts rushed to print to take advantage of market appeal.

Some of the chapters describe the growing restiveness in black communities in the early 1980s – spurred in large measure by reaction to Ronald Reagan's social and civil rights policies, as well as victories in 1983 mayoral races in Chicago and Philadelphia – that made possible the talk of a serious African-American candidacy for president. Some chapters give accounts of the process of translating that talk into committed delegates to a convention that provided, for the delegates at least, good news (Jackson's inspirational speech) and bad news (the refusal of the party

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to adopt three of four major Jackson platform proposals). One chapter bluntly assesses the overall experience and concludes only cautiously optimistic for the long-term prospects of the kind of politics Jackson and his supporters were attempting to pursue. This same chapter honestly mentions the damage Jackson did to his own stature by his "hymietown" remarks. His moral authority, which was so important to a candidacy of this nature, was severely undermined.

Although there has been another Jackson presidential race since the 1984 campaign, this book ought to be the first in a series of such probing analyses on the topic of race and presidential politics. Whether Jackson runs or not in 1992 or later, we will always be mindful of the political dynamism in the 1980s, and books of this kind will help us better understand the developments.

One chapter, "Did Jackson cause a White Backlash against the Democrats?" presents an analytical problem. This is certainly an important question, but to answer it the authors adopt the measure of white fear response to Jackson's success in the primaries. "The argument here is that if white fear caused white defections from the Democratic party, then we might expect that these defections occurred at a rate proportional to blacks' political success, measured by Jackson's showing in the primary" (p. 210). This *sounds* reasonable, but it is much too simplistic. The methodology is much too restricted and limited and becomes boringly pretentious. Attitudes and consequences of race and racism are much more pervasive, subtle, and complex to be explored in such a mechanistic, methodological manner. To be sure, it is the kind of political science some like to practice, but thankfully there is not much of it in this otherwise very informative and insightful volume. For example, the last chapter raises the question of the future prospects of an "institutional coalition" of the kind the Jackson forces were trying to put together. That, I suspect, is the most challenging aspect of this well-told story.

CHARLES V. HAMILTON
Columbia University

Black Politics in Conservative America *by Marcus Pohlmann. New York, Longman Press, 1989. 271 pp. $19.50.*

The cover for this paperback book is quite impressive. The faces of two bewildered black men imprisoned by the flag colors. This powerful image introduces Pohlmann's discussion of the contradictions and conundrums of race relations. Generally speaking, blacks have made incredible economic progress since the Civil Rights movement. On the other hand, the income gap between them and their white counterparts is widening. The integrated schools they fought so hard for have eluded them as whites have moved out of the central cities. Nevertheless, according to polls, whites seem to be more liberal in their racial attitudes. Some have supported the rise of black politicians to positions of leadership in government. Yet there is still an ongoing debate about the state of race relations in America.

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Pohlmann has pondered some of these issues and decided that the progress of blacks, particularly economically, is an illusion. For the evidence he presents statistics that show blacks have been systematically excluded from participating in the American economic bounty. American capitalism, as it is directed by "a white-owning elite" is operated to exclude all non-owning classes. The capitalists are aided and abetted in suppressing the consciousness of the non-owning classes by the educational system, government, mass media, and churches. Sound familiar? To his credit, Pohlmann amasses an incredible number of facts, dates, events, and statistics to support his characterization of the plight of black Americans.

In examining the economic structure, class structure, welfare state functions, judicial arena, legislative arena and information arena, Pohlmann offers varieties of institutional reforms to facilitate black inclusion in the mainstream. Some of these reforms are traditional, such as easing voting registration and public financing of campaigns. Others may be considered radical, such as constitutional guarantees of good housing and livable incomes for all. Still others would require a redrafting of the U.S. Constitution, such as parliamentary form of government, de-emphasizing federalism, and provisions for national referendum. In the last chapter there is a restatement of Pohlmann's descriptive analysis. His normative analysis calls for more economic democracy, worker participation in management, and employee ownership. He also supports the concept of a Rainbow Coalition and an American version of socialism.

Pohlmann has written a short, readable, and sweeping book. His descriptive analysis will find supporters, but his normative analysis will divide his readers. His critics will attack the optimistic view that his suggested changes will necessarily solve the socioeconomic problems of blacks. His defenders will conclude the book has accomplished what the author intended it to do – stimulate thinking.

WILBUR C. RICH
Wayne State University

The Legislative Committee Game: A Comparative Analysis of Fifty States *by Wayne L. Francis. Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1989. 170 pp. $25.00.*

This is a benchmark work of comparative analysis of the role, structure, and operation of committees in American state legislatures. Though the committee systems of the U.S. Congress have attracted extensive scholarly attention, this subject has not been central to political science research on the states. Yet, as Wayne Francis notes, the ninety-nine committee systems functioning at the state level provide a "natural experiment" that may be profitably exploited so that we might better understand the "interplay of structure and behavior" in the collective, face-to-face decision making that is at the core of American legislative life (p. xi).

Francis does not enter into the now tiresome debate about whether political institutions and structures make a difference in what state governments do. Rather,

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he rightly assumes that they do make a difference and sets out to show how. His data is from a fifty-state survey of state legislators completed in 1981 (over 2,000 legislators responded); from additional materials on length of legislative sessions, workload, and committee assignments systematically gathered from legislative staff in the fifty states; and from member surveys and detailed analysis of the record in his two case study states – Indiana and Missouri.

Legislators, Francis thinks, behave reasonably rationally in order to get their way, delegating, bargaining, voting, and using information to "satisfice." He thus seeks to use his data to identify how committee structures are linked to the achievement by members of individual goals and preferences, and the consequence of this linkage for the way legislatures work. Some methodological reservations do arise concerning the author's use of some measures. For example, the employment of an average bill sponsorship rate to measure the level of member activity takes no notice of the fact that some legislatures limit the number of bills that may be introduced by each member, or that bill introduction is limited in some places to certain times in the legislative session. But in general, Francis is both careful in what he does and meticulous in explaining how he has proceeded.

Conventional perceptions to the contrary notwithstanding, decentralized decision making in committees, the author demonstrates, contributes to legislators' efficiency and satisfaction. Most members are assigned to committees they seek, and service on these allows them to both specialize and to move legislation in which they are especially interested. The legislative committee structure mitigates against the linkage of otherwise unconnected issues, encouraging sincere and discouraging strategic voting. Additionally, it spreads the risks and improves the quality of decision making by creating more specialized forums for the testing and review of proposed legislation.

Classically, legislative leaders seek to increase the number of committees and their size to respond to members' desires for power and position. Perhaps not incidentally, this also increases leaders' power, for it often results in members being overcommitted and less efficient. They thus lose by winning. Making some admittedly challengeable simplifying assumptions, Francis demonstrates that for legislators who want to reach decisions and also have them accepted by the whole body, the optimal size of committees is not fixed, but is linked to both the size of legislative bodies and the use of subcommittees. Members in smaller bodies prefer smaller committees, those in larger chambers larger committees. Even larger committees are regarded as optimal when subcommittees are used. This ought to be food for thought for reformers, for whom fewer smaller committees in state legislatures has been a hoary goal.

GERALD BENJAMIN
State University of New York, New Paltz

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Self-Employment for Low-Income People *by Steven Balkin. New York, Praeger, 1989. 240 pp. $42.95.*

This is not an easy book to review because of the extensive nature of the theme—the potentials for government to assist the poor-poor by helping them to become self-employed; the extended coverage both historically (pre- and post-Civil War) and geographically from the United States to Bangladesh; and the sketchiness of the data bases, not to stress the absence of reliable follow-up information about demonstration projects.

The author has several things going for him. He has done his best to become acquainted with the field. He is no starry-eyed enthusiast who believes that with good will and lots of money up to seven million (his upper estimate) poor Americans might be put on the track of successful self-employment. He offers a lower estimate of 400,000 but provides little guidance in choosing between the two.

The book is at one and the same time a contribution of sorts to cultural history, to employment policy, to ethnic group networking, and to much more. And the author makes a large number of interesting and often shrewd observations that cannot fail to challenge and enlighten even the casual reader. But I am hard pressed to know who among the readers of this review I should focus on, and more particularly I am far from clear as to what I should tell them about this off-beat effort, which is how it must be classified. The book deals with the economic and employment structures of gypsies but offers little information and less insight into such critical self-employment areas as the off-the-record economy or networking among immigrant groups. There are a few passing comments about the latter but almost nothing about the former.

But having formulated the above discontents, let me quickly emphasize that the author has a somewhat narrower perspective than to deal with *all* aspects of self-employment. His critical concern is with the potentials of self-employment for low-income people. More specifically, he has succeeded in pulling together considerable information about the extent to which the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) program provided training to help some small numbers of the unemployed explore the potentials of starting a business as a way to become independent.

The author has a strong belief that the challenge to public programs is to help the poor-poor, not those who may be temporarily out of work but rather those of limited education and work experience. I disagree. Starting even a one-person business is fraught with difficulties, and one loads the odds against a public program that is focused solely on the poor-poor.

The members of the academic community know so little about this theme; the numbers of self-employed continue to expand; the immigrant experience points up the substantial potentials of speeding the integration of newcomers into the economy through their employment in ethnic businesses. For these reasons, we must acknowledge that the author of this work has broken new ground in the selection of the theme, in his diligent exploration of relevant evidence, and in his reasonable assessments. The real differences between the author and me have to

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do with scale. I surely will not buy into his seven million, nor even his 400,000 estimate of potential trainees. But if our society ever again remembers the outsiders and decides to launch some serious programs to help them, I would like to see the potentials for self-employment more seriously explored, which brings me into the author's camp.

ELI GINZBERG
Columbia University

Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review *by Robert Lowry Clinton. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1989. 332 pp. $35.00.*

Whatever impact the U.S. Bicentennial Commission and other similarly motivated organizations have had on the average American's knowledge of the Constitution (not much, if a recent *National Law Journal* survey showing that 67 percent of those polled believed the Constitution had an explicit guarantee of the right of privacy is to be believed) the observance of the Constitution's two-hundredth birthday did provide both stimulus and opportunity for scholars to study the original document in order to discern not only what it meant to the Framers, but what it means to us today.

Much of this work has focused on the role of the judiciary in our tripartite government and, specifically, the Supreme Court's exercise of judicial review. In addition to familiar discussion as to whether the Court should adopt a role of self-restraint or one of judicial activism, a new focus has been the controversy over the appropriateness of literalist, interpretist, or noninterpretist approaches to the Constitution. Robert Lowry Clinton of Southern Illinois University, however, strikes out in a very different and highly provocative direction by reexamining the very foundation stone of judicial review—*Marbury v. Madison* and the various "facts" associated with this particular decision.

It is Clinton's thesis that *Marbury* was not an attempt by Chief Justice John Marshall to claim for the Court and himself the power to scrutinize acts of Congress and president so as to determine whether such actions were in conformity with the Constitution; Marshall asserted that only in cases of "a judiciary nature" could the Court declare legislation contrary to its interpretation of the Constitution null and void; and Marshall's claim of even this power, far from being part of a Federalist grab for power, was well within the ambit of contemporary Democratic thinking. Clinton further argues that the traditional juxtaposition of Marshall's justification of judicial review with Pennsylvania Justice John Gibson's dissent in *Eakin v. Raub* misses the reality that Gibson fully subscribed to the great chief justice's interpretation of judicial review, because Marshall in fact claimed a very limited power to declare laws unconstitutional. This fact, the author claims, is lost sight of by both the chief justice's supporters and detractors.

For Clinton, the key to Marshall's understanding of judicial review ". . . entitles the Court to disregard [federal] legislation *only where such legislation bears directly*

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upon the performance of judicial functions" (emphasis in original, p. 18). This rendering, the author contends, flows logically from Marshall's joining of the Framers' understanding of Article III's "arising under" jurisdiction with Blackstone's widely accepted Tenth Rule of statutory construction, which cautioned judges to enforce legislation unless such legislation resulted in ". . . absurd consequences [or was] manifestly contradictory to common reason. . ." (p. 19).

Clinton supports his revisionist view of judicial review with a thorough analysis of contemporary responses (essentially, nonresponses) to *Marbury*; the strikingly different treatment of the precedent by legal commentators, particularly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; and succeeding justices' failure up until the late 1950s to cite it as precedent for their exercise of judicial review.

The reader, even if persuaded by the author's rendering of history, may be inclined to say to Clinton's findings: Interesting, but either how can we put the genie of judicial review back into the bottle, or why should we? Clinton handles this response surprisingly facilely, replying to these expected criticisms that were the Court to embrace what he considers to be the original Marshallian meaning of judicial review, little would be changed. The "stitch in time that saved nine" wiped out the major line of precedents that ran contrary to what Clinton contends was Marshall's reading of judicial review; the Warren Court decisions, by and large, are in conformity. Decisions on criminal procedure, for instance, are clearly of a judiciary nature. The Burger Court (once referred to as the Nixon Court!) seems to have strayed farthest from original intent. Clinton cites *I.N.S. v. Chadha* as one example of this trend. He might have noted that despite the Court's ruling on the issue of the legislative veto, president and Congress continue to act almost if *Chadha* did not exist.

Teachers of constitutional law have traditionally told their classes that although judicial review of acts of Congress and the president exists, it is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. Clinton's book may have the result that some of the same teachers will have to amend their lectures to state that not only does judicial review of coordinate branches lack a basis in the words of the Constitution, but it also has no foundation in *Marbury v. Madison*. Without doubt, this is one of the few books that lives up to the dust jacket's claim that it is "one of the half dozen recent works that will be central to the scholarly dispute about judicial review."

FRANCIS GRAHAM LEE
Saint Joseph's University

Protecting Constitutional Freedoms: A Role For Federal Courts *by Daan Braveman. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1989. 217 pp. $39.95.*

In 1986, when Chief Justice Warren E. Burger retired and William H. Rehnquist became chief justice of the United States, a chorus of observers predicted that it was only a matter of time before the counterrevolution in individual rights – the

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dreaded but never realized outcome of the Burger era—would become a reality. Now that the Rehnquist Court has confirmed the accuracy of those predictions, Daan Braveman informs some, confirms the suspicions of others, and simply reminds those of us who wished to forget that the Burger Court did indeed institute its own counterrevolution in individual rights. The Burger Court reversed many of the doctrines of the Warren Court, but on a quite technical jurisdictional level that concerned the authority of the federal courts to hear cases that involve federal constitutional rights. The Burger Court's counterrevolution was no less dangerous than that of its successor; it was, however, more difficult to comprehend and often escaped the notice of all but the most technically attuned legal scholars.

Braveman outlines the process by which the Burger Court closed the doors to the federal courts, forcing litigants who sought protection of their rights under the federal law and the United States Constitution to take their claims to state courts. The Burger Court severely undercut the doctrines of the Warren Court that made the federal courts the primary guardians of constitutional rights. Moreover, the Court, Braveman points out, illegitimately undermined Congress's determination after the Civil War that the jurisdiction of the federal courts should be expanded to protect individual rights. Using nontechnical terms that are readily understandable to non-law-school trained scholars, Braveman recounts the ways in which the Burger Court expanded several doctrines in order to relegate cases involving constitutional rights to state courts.

The doctrine of standing to sue, which originally sought to prevent the courts from hearing cases that were not truly cases or controversies, requires that the litigant show some kind of injury that can be attributed to the conduct being challenged. Braveman illustrates the Burger Court's manipulation of the doctrine of standing by guiding the reader through the details of a case in which several different types of parties attempted to challenge exclusionary zoning practices in a suburb of Rochester, New York (*Warth v. Seldon*, 1975). According to the Court, none of the plaintiffs established a link between an injury and the zoning practices. The plaintiffs included individuals who were unable to acquire housing in the suburb, property owners in the city of Rochester who were forced to pay higher taxes because of the suburb's practices, an organization whose purpose was to pursue open housing, and a group of builders who lost business because of the exclusionary zoning. Braveman maintains that it was clearly hostility to the merits of the plaintiff's case that lay beneath the Court's decision. Thus, the Burger Court hid its conservative political agenda behind a mask of jurisdictional rules.

Braveman explains in an equally effective manner additional strategies the Burger Court used to close the federal courthouse doors. For example, during the Warren era it became common for the federal district courts to grant injunctive relief in order to restrain state officials from unconstitutional conduct, particularly conduct in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1971 the Burger Court held that federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal proceedings except in extraordinary circumstances (*Younger v. Harris*). Subsequently, the Court expanded that rule to apply to civil cases as well as criminal. Such developments,

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according to Braveman, lack justification in the concerns of federalism. The Burger Court simply manipulated doctrine to eliminate the role of the federal courts as protectors of constitutional rights.

During the 1970s the federal courts were often hailed as the superior forum for constitutional adjudication on the grounds that they were more likely than state courts to value individual rights. It has never been demonstrated conclusively that federal courts are actually superior to their state counterparts in that sense. Consequently, if Braveman rested his case against the Burger Court on his disagreement with negative outcomes for litigants at the hands of state judges, his argument would be far from convincing and would certainly break no new ground. Although he contends that it is highly unlikely that parity between state and federal courts exists, Braveman provides several more convincing reasons that federal courts should not be closed to constitutional litigants—reasons that go beyond the issue of outcome. I found two of those reasons particularly convincing. First, litigants should have a choice of forum; they should not be forced into the forum they perceive to be the less sympathetic. The Burger Court has taken away that choice. Second, the Constitution gave to Congress, not the Supreme Court, the authority to determine the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Congress acted pursuant to that authority when it enacted legislation that gave the federal courts jurisdiction in cases involving deprivation of constitutional rights by state officials. The Burger Court repeatedly, according to Braveman, disregarded a congressional judgment.

Braveman has managed to transform a great deal of difficult, technical case law into a clear and readable exposition of a dangerous trend begun by the Burger Court and continued by the Rehnquist Court. *Protecting Constitutional Freedoms* comprises an important contribution to the literature on the Burger Court. Still, Braveman neglects to tell the Burger Court's side of the story. Although I concur with the author that the Burger Court closed the doors of the federal courts because the state courts seemed to be more likely to favor the state's interests rather than the claims of individuals, it would make for a more convincing argument to provide more analysis of individual opinions in order to fully demonstrate that the Court relied on "rhetoric rather than analysis" (p. 177).

SUE DAVIS
University of Delaware

From Charity to Enterprise: The Development of American Social Work in a Market Economy *by Stanley Wenocur and Michael Reisch. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989. 327 pp. $29.95.*

The authors of this important contribution to the body of scholarship on the history of professions fulfill their promise of offering "a political-economic perspective on professionalization" (p. 3) and in so doing convey both the assets and lia-

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bilities of that analytic approach. Wenocur and Reisch succeed in accomplishing a complex charge: that of identifying and assessing the political, economic, and ideological factors that helped define (and periodically redefine) the terms under which the social work profession has evolved. However, in the course of focusing upon the interrelationships among the market, the prevailing ideologies of capitalism and individualism, and the profession's development, they exaggerate the role of external forces in determining social work's priorities. They treat the profession as if it were a cipher with few of its own values, traditions, and imperatives and little intrinsic decision-making power vis-à-vis the outside world. Unwittingly, the authors thereby underestimate the agency, initiative, and idiosyncracy of the internal culture and leadership of social work, because the authors' gaze focuses primarily on the contextual imperatives that have surrounded that profession and on the profession's reactions to those imperatives.

From Charity to Enterprise is an extended case history of social workers' efforts in the United States to develop a specialized "product line," to produce a critical mass of certified practitioners, to attract a sufficient number of loyal consumers, to ensure a fair wage for their professional work, and to secure a legitimated and bounded niche in the universe of professions. Wenocur and Reisch convincingly and painstakingly trace the impact of the changing market economy, with its expansive, recessive, and depressive movements on each era of the social work profession's evolution. The consequences for the profession, its clients, and its public of the chronic undersupply of trained practitioners are highlighted in the discussion.

Sustained attention also is paid to the profound influence of the resources and ideologies of representatives of economic and social elites—such as philanthropists of the Gilded Age, the Russell Sage Foundation, the financial federations of the Community Chests, the Commonwealth Fund, the Rockefeller Foundation, and select universities and colleges—on the trajectory of social work as a profession. In investigating the benefactors and shepherds of the social work enterprise, the authors capture ably the central and constant tension within the social work profession since its inception—the ongoing discrepancy between the priorities of the profession's sponsors, whether private or public, and the expressed needs of social workers' clientele, a congeries of impoverished and historically disempowered groups and individuals.

For Wenocur and Reisch, a central strategic misstep of the social work profession has been its reluctance to unionize. The avoidance of unionization "reflected the social class of most social workers and an acceptance of the dominant ideology of U.S. capitalism embodied therein. Social workers were either not from working-class backgrounds or, in the case of newer workers, were striving for a higher social status than their forbears [sic] had attained" (p. 88). Social workers, in short, according to the authors, did not pursue unionization because they were either middle-class or working-class, a tautology that hardly satisfies.

The authors omit a discussion of the reasons for social workers' acceptance of dominant ideology and for the status-consciousness of those working-class prac-

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titioners "who were striving. . . ." They also omit an examination of the labor movement's general inability to organize professionals and general disinterest until the 1970s in organizing women. Furthermore, in explaining the unwillingness of social workers to unionize, the authors do not appear to take into account social workers' familiarity with group work, advocacy, and organizing methods, skills used by social workers in everyday work, a factor that may well have led them to rely on themselves and other peers rather than turn to outside union organizers for assistance.

These few reservations aside, this book performs the significant service of merging careful historical scholarship with the analytic findings of political economy. It will make a welcome addition to the libraries of those scholars and practitioners who are attempting to comprehend the nature of contemporary professions in general or of the social work profession in particular.

BARBARA LEVY SIMON
Columbia University

Seven Years in France: François Mitterrand and the Unintended Revolution, 1981–1988 *by Julius W. Friend. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989. 249 pp. $34.95.*

Scholars looking for a theoretically driven or highly original account of the recent French Socialist experiment will find this book disappointing. However, many readers should find it a valuable addition to their shelves. What it provides is a lucidly written, succinct, and generally balanced history of the often remarkable political evolution of France since the election of François Mitterrand in 1981. It should also be noted that, unlike many instant histories, it is based on scores of interviews and solid research into the vast store of relevant secondary sources, documents, and newspaper accounts in both French and English.

Except for two thematic chapters (on the Socialists' reforms and foreign policy) the book is organized in a chronological fashion. The first of the seven chapters deals with the genesis of the Mitterrand experiment, briefly tracing the evolution of the French Left and Mitterrand's role within it during the decades before 1981. Chapter two examines the Socialist government's frenetic reform efforts of May 1981 to early 1983. Chapter three explores the period that began with the reversal of economic policy in March 1983 and concluded with the 1986 legislative elections, which produced a thin majority for the Center-Right at the expense of the beleaguered Socialists.

The fourth chapter presents a balance sheet on the accomplishments of the Mauroy and Fabius governments of 1981–1986. Here Friend appropriately stresses not only the limited extent to which the Socialists achieved their desired goals, but also the ironic way in which their rule generated—through what Friend terms the Serendip Effect—significant changes that were not only unintended but often antithetical to the goals originally sought in the heady days of 1981–1982. The

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most important of these were the transformation of the Socialist Party from a highly ideological, reform-oriented party to one guided more by pragmatism, the enhanced value of the market in the eyes of both the Left and the *dirigiste* Right, and the elevation of the entrepreneur to the status of a hero in France ("O paradox," as Friend exclaims on p. 165).

Chapter five focuses on the era of cohabitation of a Socialist president and Center-Right legislative majority/prime minister that stretched from the elections of 1986 to those of 1988. Chapter six traces the development of French foreign policy during the first Mitterrand *septennat*, noting that ambitious changes (especially in relations with the Third World) sought during the early years and the overall continuity—with France continuing to "play the role of the most active of non-superpowers" (p. 210)—that eventually resulted from a combination of external constraints and Mitterrand's pragmatism. The concluding chapter describes the new political context at the beginning of Mitterrand's second term and sums up the impact that this forty-year veteran of the French political scene could claim to have had after a full term in office. "He has," asserts Friend, "reshaped the political landscape, diminished the PCF [French Communist Party], established the PS [Socialist Party], twice defeated the parties of the Right and driven them into division and confusion. The France of 1988 . . . is less divided and tense than the France of 1980" (p. 224).

There is nothing original about this conclusion or Friend's overall analysis of the "unintended revolution" brought about under Mitterrand's stewardship. Indeed, virtually identical theses have been developed in books recently published in both French (Serge July, *Les Années Mitterrand: Histoire Baroque d'une Normalisation Inachevée,* 1986 or François Furet et al., *La République du Centre: La Fin de l'Exception Française*, 1988) and English (Stanley Hoffmann's conclusion in *The Mitterrand Experiment*, 1987). Nonetheless, Friend's book stands as one of the most comprehensive overviews of the period and will provide English readers with an accessible introduction to a fascinating period in French political history.

JOHN T. S. KEELER
University of Washington

State-Building in the Contemporary Third World *by Su-Hoon Lee. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1988. 191 pp. $30.00.*

This is an admirable effort to use quantitative methods to explain the expansion of the state—a "social organization" (p. 28)—conceptualized as the expansion of extractive capacity, coercive capacity, and the capacity to incorporate the citizenry. The author concedes that the three theoretical perspectives used "by no means exhaust all causal elements that should explain state-building in the Third World" (p. 145). These are industrialism, political-class-struggle, and transnational linkages. The first refers to the argument that "industrialization and associated socioeco-

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nomic changes will cause the expansion of the state" (p. 34) and draws on theories proposed to explain the expansion of the state in the "first" world. In the Third World, however, it is often the state ("overdeveloped" in its structure and power vis à vis society due to its role in the colonial system) that actively promotes industrialization and socioeconomic change; that is, the causal relationship is reversed.

The political-class-struggle perspective is similarly derived from the literature on the advanced capitalist state; but in Third World countries, classes are both very different and not nearly as powerful a set of societal actors. To claim that "it is reasonable to suppose that, to the degree that the state in dependent capitalist societies too is capitalist, those arguments will apply" (p. 37) is to beg the question: if the degree turns out to be "small" or if "dependent" capitalist states are very different (the author doesn't address these issues), the arguments will not apply.

The author handles the methodology—mainly a panel model analysis—and data, which come from over sixty Third World countries in 1960, 1970, and 1980 (with comparisons to some thirty additional, non-Third World countries) with sophistication. There are, however, problems with the indicators chosen for the three outcome variables: central state revenue as a percentage of GNP to measure the "extractive capacity" of the state; total military expenditure as a percentage of GDP to measure the "coercive capacity" of the state; and mass education enrollments as a proportion of the total population for the "incorporative capacity." Some of the most important Third World states extract revenues through provincial governments, and many rentier states extract revenues from trade (for example, export of minerals) using the profits of parastatal enterprises. It is not clear whether the measure used takes this into account. The argument for excluding police and paramilitary is unconvincing, and the exclusion is particularly damaging because police and paramilitary expansion is used to substitute for military expansion.

The author errs in arguing that a purported function of an educational system—the legitimation of the state ("through the educational system, the state creates certified citizens and increases its authority" p. 32)—justifies using the expansion of educational enrollments to measure the expansion of the "incorporative capacity" of the state. The expansion of the educational system can also be driven by the demands of society on the state, and given the role of students in challenging state power, the legitimating function of education should be called into question.

The author interprets his results with care, not glossing over counterintuitive results or disappointingly low statistical correlations, so that one cannot disagree that "transnational factors [are] significant determinants of the expansion of the relative power of the state vis-à-vis the local society" (p. 139). But one cannot accept the "main conclusion" that such expansion was "primarily due" to "transnational linkage" of states to "the modern world-system" (p. 139): apart from the questions on indicators, there are plausible alternate explanations (for example, one that focuses on the ideology of state elites) to be tested.

PHILIP OLDENBURG
Columbia University

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Party Politics and Elections in Latin America *by Ronald H. McDonald and J. Mark Ruhl. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1989. 386 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

Long neglected in Latin American studies, political parties and elections are even more in need of attention in this age of democratization. Ronald H. McDonald and J. Mark Ruhl provide sound, pithy descriptions of the history and current array of over 365 parties in nineteen countries. They do an admirable job of condensing standard scholarly interpretations of complex organizations and developments. They study single-party systems (Cuba, Nicaragua [oops], Mexico, Paraguay); two-party systems (Columbia, Uruguay, Honduras); emerging two-party systems (Venezuela, Argentina, Costa Rica); multiparty systems (Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Panama); and emerging multiparty systems (Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, Dominican Republic).

In addition to party systems, the authors treat party functions (recruitment, communication, social control, and governing) and characteristics (elitism, factionalism, personalism, disorganization, and heterogeneity). The concepts are not new, but it is worthwhile to have them applied so clearly to a wide range of Latin American cases. This comprehensive coverage contributes to the current reevaluation of political parties in the hemisphere, without ignoring how flimsy many of them still are, especially in Central America.

This book is most interesting and innovative in its portrayal of the evolution of electoral rules and systems. McDonald and Ruhl examine a bewildering variety of plurality systems, runoff-majority systems, and proportional representation systems. They show that all the countries have presidential rather than parliamentary systems, and most possess bicameral legislatures elected by proportional representation.

Although very careful and accurate, this volume offers no great empirical or theoretical advances. It is based overwhelmingly on secondary sources, listed in rather skimpy bibliographies of mainly English-language materials. After straight, solid institutional analyses in the country chapters, the authors fall into an outdated and unconvincing modernization framework in the conclusion. They also veer off into odd culturalist explanations (for example, for Latin Americans, voting is as much ritualistic as instrumental) and strange attributions of corporatist values to entities as diverse as the Colombian National Front and the Chilean Marxists. Despite such minor lapses from otherwise tight prose and argumentation, this is a useful book. It is particularly recommended for reference purposes and for undergraduate instruction.

PAUL W. DRAKE
University of California, San Diego

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Still Hungry After All These Years: Food Assistance Policy from Kennedy to Reagan *by Ardith L. Maney. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1989. 192 pp. $37.95.*

By 1980, the food stamp program cost about $9 billion and served almost one out of ten persons in the United States, reaching more poor people than any other social program legislated during the War on Poverty. But in the early 1980s, hunger was still visible across the nation: people waited hours on line to receive free distribution of surplus cheese. Senator Robert Dole said most Americans were embarrassed by the return of Depression-era images. Ardith Maney explores the paradox of "still hungry after all these years" through a skilled analysis that makes two important methodological decisions. One, she takes a longitudinal perspective; and, two, she emphasizes political context.

The span of Maney's analysis is a period of over half a century. She traces the political history of the food stamp program through four policy cycles from 1933 to the Bush administration. A long-range perspective reveals the slow pace of evolving social policy and the enduring nature of certain political conflicts, political coalitions, and policy choices that confronted a changing cast of individual leaders over the decades.

Maney's emphasis on political context brings out three main political forces that she successfully demonstrates to be important to understanding why policy decisions were made as they were. First, she shows that political leaders, including the president, members of Congress, and executive appointees needed not only to build constituency support, but also to balance food assistance against other political objectives. Championing food assistance served President John F. Kennedy's and President Lyndon B. Johnson's political needs to compete with Hubert Humphrey in the farm policy arena, particularly to win Midwest constituents. But at the same time, Johnson had to contain the costs of social policy, and so from the beginning, eligibility for food stamps was kept tight and the benefit levels were controlled.

Second, Maney demonstrates that food assistance policy survived and changed over time partly because of its ties to the political movements of the period, particularly civil rights and antipoverty activism. One strength of this connection, she points out, was the ability to produce information at field hearings and before the media about real life.

Third, Maney emphasizes that food assistance policy developed as much (or even more) from the demands of the private profit-making economy as from the needs of the poverty population. The power of food producers influenced policy at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) particularly when government aid to some producers came allegedly at the expense of other producers. The president, key members of Congress, and USDA appointees were reluctant to disrupt private food markets and, for example, ended the cheese distribution program at the behest of competing producers.

The thoroughness of Maney's research can be illustrated by one example that I select out of personal interest. In 1966, I worked for a Headstart program in St. Landry Parish, Louisiana, where many black sharecroppers and small sweet

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potato farmers lived so close to subsistence level that they could hardly participate in the cash economy. Another Northerner there was John Zippert, a CORE worker, who repeatedly wrote long letters to USDA in far-off Washington, explaining in detail that the very poorest people did not have the money to buy food stamps and so were kept out of the program by its purchase requirement. John was very highly admired, but still we could see little effect from his letter-writing. But now, a quarter-century later, Ardith Maney has found John's letters in the USDA archives, and she credits him with helping to change USDA's policy by opening their eyes to the real life of poor people. A decade after John's letters, USDA opposed the purchase requirement, and Congress allowed people who had *no* money to receive food stamps.

Still Hungry After All These Years is a readable, interesting, and comprehensive investigation of food policy changes over a long time. Because of its emphasis on political context, its relevance is not only to food assistance policy; the book can be used to explore broad forces that influenced many social policy developments of the era. It is an excellent and important study.

DONNA WILSON KIRCHHEIMER
Lehman College
City University of New York

International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment *by Oran R. Young. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1989. 248 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $10.95.*

This volume is a collection of recent essays by Oran Young, the majority of which have been published previously. The essays are tied together by a common theoretical concern—the role of institutions in international relations—and by a common empirical focus—the specific contributions of international institutions to governing various domains of the human environment, ranging from marine mammals and deep-seabed minerals to the electromagnetic spectrum, the atmosphere, and the stratospheric ozone layer.

Young's thesis can be summarized briefly: "A common mistake among commentators on international relations is to say that international society features few effective institutions when, in fact, they mean to assert that it has few effective international organizations" (p. 198). International institutions are ubiquitous, Young argues persuasively, defining institutions as "behaviorally recognizable practices consisting of roles linked together by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles" (p. 196). Young is particularly interested in the institution of *regimes*—as opposed to, for example, markets. In the human environment, this institutional form includes everything from open-to-entry common property to supranational allocative rules, with zonal arrangements, various types of reciprocal exchange, and coordination mechanisms falling

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somewhere along the way. Perhaps more controversially, Young also contends that "there is no evidence to suggest that compliance levels are, for the most part, lower in international society than they are in domestic societies" (p. 80).

Young says a lot of sensible things in these essays about the difference between international institutions and organizations, the power of international institutions, modal patterns in the origins of international regimes, and international compliance mechanisms. And from the case materials one can glean some appreciation of the structure and functioning of international regimes in the human environment. Nonetheless, the book also has several shortcomings.

First, although the volume is addressed to important theoretical concerns and the discussion is cast at a fairly high level of abstraction, little theory per se is used, let alone constructed, by Young. Instead, definitions, categorizations, and permutations on both abound. The *language* of social choice is employed throughout, for instance, but the *logic* of social choice is not consistently applied. Reams of other theoretical traditions are also invoked, but more as sources of vocabulary, metaphors, and footnotes than explanation. When it comes to making plausible causal arguments, Young more often than not epitomizes the proverbial three-handed academic.

Second, although the volume purports to advance not only the theory but also the practice of regime formation, only rarely do the empirical materials constitute anything more than illustrative fodder. When they do, as in Young's treatment of the U.S.–Canada Arctic waters dispute, the discussion can be illuminating, but there are too few in-depth analyses of this sort in the volume to make the claims of policy relevance thoroughly credible.

Finally, poor editing continually reminds the reader that this is a collection of papers spanning a decade or so; the same definitions recur over and over again, as do the same citations, including sources that have become so elementary that any reference beyond one borders on overkill.

Oran Young has been associated for many years with the new institutionalism in international relations; indeed, he has been one of its more creative practitioners. This volume demonstrates both the virtues of that literature, as well as the tasks that remain to be accomplished.

JOHN GERARD RUGGIE
University of California, San Diego

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Reference Books and Source Materials Received

Congressional Staff Directory, 1990, vol. 1 *edited by Ann L. Brownson. Mount Vernon, Va., Staff Directories Ltd., 1990. 1127 pp. $50.00.*

The Documentary History of the First Federal Elections, 1788–1790, vol. 4 *edited by Gordon DenBoer. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990. 503 pp. $50.00.*

Federal Staff Directory, 1990, vol. 1 *edited by Ann L. Brownson. Mount Vernon, Va., Staff Directories Ltd., 1990. 1382 pp. $50.00.*

Index to International Public Opinion, 1988–1989 *edited by Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press Inc., 1990. 720 pp. $199.50.*

Judicial Staff Directory, 1990, vol. 1 *edited by Ann L. Brownson. Mount Vernon, Va., Staff Directories Ltd., 1990. 892 pp. $50.00.*

Niccolo Machiavelli: An Annotated Bibliography of Modern Criticism and Scholarship *compiled by Silvia Ruffo Fiore. Wesport, Conn., Greenwood Press Inc., 1990. 824 pp. $85.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 62: 1919 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1990. 662 pp. $52.50.*

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

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

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

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